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ABSTRACT 
 
The core issues of this thesis are the EU-US airplane subsidy disputes, which are 
market-share driven, political-economic conflicts of interest, arising from the duopoly 
competition between Airbus and Boeing in the fourteen-year period from 1997 to 
2011. The Airbus vs. Boeing dispute case is characterized by the complexity of the 
dispute - the largest ever to go before the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
Geneva. The thesis focuses on government subsidy disputes between two big 
political and economic powers – the EU and the US – through an in-depth analysis 
of both sides of the arguments. With duopoly in the large commercial airplane 
industry, new insight can be gained through better understanding of potential net 
welfare gain or loss from having two competitive manufacturers competing against 
each other in a free marketplace.  
 The legal issues are the core narratives of this thesis. Use of the case 
study enables us to better understand how these two corporate players, markets, 
and government policies make the difference in terms of economic outcomes. 
Hence, it is an effective means of addressing key problems in the real world of the 
large commercial airplane industry. The value added of this thesis comes from the 
contribution to scholarly research and practice by placing the Airbus vs. Boeing 
case study at the core of its political-economic debate on government subsidy 
issues.  
 Therefore, the main theoretical framework of this study is state-business 
relationships,
1
 which explore different approaches in the EU and the US while 
recognizing that there are some differences between EU member states of Airbus
2
.  
The study explains how the Airbus vs. Boeing case will be used, -  and  how it will 
 
 
x 
be located within the wider theoretical and disciplinary perspectives of state-
business relationships, based on the concepts developed by Susan Strange with 
some reference to the ‘varieties of capitalism’ debate by Peter Hall and David 
Soskice
3
. The political-economic differences across the states are captured by the 
concepts advanced in the ‘varieties of capitalism’ debate, while both the state-
business relationships and the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach were used to 
understand the individual corporate variations of Airbus and Being’s different 
business models.  
 This study also investigates the political-economic implications of 
European competition policy, and the politics associated with it. The core of the 
subsidy dispute is about the relationship between the state and business in the 
context of the world trading system. The World Trade Organization (WTO) plays a 
critically important role by offering a dispute settlement mechanism - specifically as 
to what kind, and how much, aid a state can legally give to a business enterprise. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2004, the United States (US) government filed a complaint to the WTO (World 
Trade Organization) on behalf of Boeing over the use of subsidies from European 
Union (EU) governments to Airbus, which amounted to $205 billion over the past 35 
years
4
. It was the largest case ever to go before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) in Geneva, Switzerland.  
 The US alleged that Airbus’s continued use of subsidies from 
governments in the EU violated WTO rules and distorted free competition. These 
EU governments, however, counterclaimed that the US government subsidized 
Boeing through various other means, including military sales and federal state tax 
breaks.  
 For several decades, the large commercial airplane business has played 
a starring role in the EU and US economies. No other companies have better 
epitomized that starring role than Airbus and Boeing, on both sides of the Atlantic, 
which has come as a result of the dynamic growth of both companies, and has been 
further enhanced by mergers and acquisitions since the 1990s. Thus, both the EU 
and US have big stakes in a political and economic relationship - a marketplace 
worth trillion dollars.  
 Since the EU became a major player in global trade, rivaling the US, 
Airbus has become the only rival to Boeing in the large commercial airplane 
marketplace. While Airbus is a consortium company financed by several European 
governments, including France, Germany, UK, and Spain, Boeing is a private 
American company publically registered and traded in the New York Stock 
 
 
2 
Exchange. At various points over the last four decades, the Airbus-Boeing 
competition has accumulated in several EU-US airplane subsidy disputes, each 
company accusing the other of unfair trade practices. Such accusations have 
sometimes highlighted a serious conflict of interest between the EU and the US.  
Moreover, the publicity surrounding the EU-US subsidy disputes has often 
appeared highly political, and has undermined the efforts of both governments to 
protect their national interests and save their local companies. 
  This thesis analyzes the sources of the political-economic subsidy 
disputes between the EU and the US governments and their airplane makers, 
Airbus and Boeing. It examines the means employed to prevent and settle the 
disputes both bilaterally through the 1992 – 2004 GATT Agreement and through the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO. The main theoretical framework of this 
thesis consists, therefore, of two theories: the theory of state – business  
relationships and the theory of varieties of capitalism. The theory of state – business 
relationships explore different approaches in the EU and the US, while recognizing 
that there are some differences between the EU member states of Airbus.
5
 The 
theory of varieties of capitalism derives from the contemporary capitalism. The 
theoretical applications on the empirical studies of Airbus vs. Boeing disputes 
elucidate how business decision makers, government policy makers, and scholars 
will benefit as they relate their analyses to varieties of many industrial segments that 
form the contemporary capitalism.     
 There are three main themes underlining this thesis: first, the cross-
cutting theme of this thesis is the on-going disputes between Airbus and Boeing 
regarding the EU government subsidies to Airbus and the alleged US government 
subsidies to Boeing. The second theme of this study is the highly intensive nature of 
 
 
3 
the existing duopoly competition between the two distinctly different business 
models of Airbus vs. Boeing. With strong financial support from EU governments, 
Airbus has been able to maintain a competitive edge over Boeing for decades, 
continuously dominating a major share of the market. The third theme relates to the 
politics of the EU and the US governments, which continues to directly and/or 
indirectly effect the outcome of the Airbus vs. Boeing duopoly competition.  
 In recent years, the disputes have become the most prominent case at 
the WTO. But government subsidies have been an issue with Airbus and Boeing 
since the late 1970s, and since then, have turned into a series of trade disputes 
between the EU and the US, with both defending the national interest of their top 
exporters and star players, Airbus and Boeing, and locking them in one of the most 
politicized subsidy disputes in recent history. In 2007, the issue reached the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO.  
 The special state-business relationship that exists between Airbus and its 
European sponsor countries can be seen in the form of EU government loans, 
provided to Airbus at a below-the-market rate.
6
 Boeing, a private US enterprise like 
any other private US corporation, does not expect any subsidies from the US 
government.  Indeed, the US policy toward private business enterprise is clearly 
evidenced by the way in which the US government distanced itself from Boeing’s 
near bankruptcy in the late 1960s. However, it has since taken a more proactive 
approach to the private US industry. Boeing, being the top US exporter of large 
commercial airplanes and also a major US defense contractor, is a crucial  
contributor to the US balance of payment. Therefore, in an effort to win the EU - US 
subsidy litigation, Airbus and Boeing both received a great deal of attention and 
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support from their own governments, which represented these two airplane 
makers,, during the lengthy legal proceedings at the DSB of the WTO in Geneva.  
 The US government claimed that Airbus benefitted from EU member 
state and EU subsidies, enabling the company to develop a full product line of 
airplanes and gain more than a fifty percent of the market share of large commercial 
airplane sales. The US also argued that every major Airbus airplane model was 
subsidized, in whole or in part, by EU governments in the form of “launch aid.” The 
US further argued that EU governments continued financing with no or low interest 
rates, with repayment tied to, and entirely dependent on sales of the financed 
aircraft. If a particular Airbus model does not sell well, Airbus does not need to 
repay the financing. The case in point is that the Airbus A380 triple deck “super 
jumbo” jet received approximately US$3.7 billion subsidies from France, Germany, 
Spain and the United Kingdom.  
 Airbus retained its major market share with the aid of launch money from 
EU governments. Therefore, the US alleged that Airbus’s continued use of 
subsidies from EU governments violates WTO rules and distorts free competition.  
However, the EU government counterclaimed that the US helped Boeing through 
various ways and means, including technology transfers from the military airplane 
technology to the commercial airplane technology, and federal and state tax breaks.  
 Since the EU became a major player in global trade, Airbus has become 
Boeing’s only rival. Both are widely recognized as the most competitive large 
commercial airplane manufacturers in an on-going duopoly competition. The large 
commercial airplane industry operates in a fast changing political-economic 
environment in which the Airbus vs. Boeing duopoly is a zero-sum competition: a 
gain for Airbus results in a loss for Boeing. The aforementioned three themes of this 
 
 
5 
thesis were therefore developed in order to examine the political-economic 
implications of the on-going EU-US subsidy disputes.  
 The European and US governments each presented the Airbus vs. 
Boeing dispute case to the first meeting of the panel on the 27
th
 of September 2007. 
An interim ruling on the case scheduled for October 2007 was delayed and 
rescheduled. In late 2009, the judicial panel of the WTO finally made a preliminary 
ruling in favor of Boeing. The ruling was that the EU governments’ financial aid to 
the Airbus A380 super jumbo jet was illegal. The final ruling of the Airbus vs. Boeing 
case at the WTO was made in 2011. At the June 2011 DSB meeting at the WTO, it 
was decided that the EU and its member states would have to withdraw subsidies 
or remove the adverse effects within six months.  
  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
As a result of these government subsidy disputes, two studies were published on 
the subject of government subsidy issues, linked with the EU-US trade policy. The 
first, a 1990 Gellman study commissioned by the US government, examined the 
economics of Airbus commercial airplane programs and the potential effects of 
Airbus’s presence on both the market for commercial airplanes and on competing 
US firms. The study argued that Airbus programs would not have become 
commercially viable, nor could they have existed, without government subsidy. The 
study also argued that Western Europe’s share of the worldwide transport market 
would have been lower. The second study presented the counter-arguments of the 
US law firm Arnold and Porter, hired by Airbus. This 1991 Arnold and Porter study 
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documented the direct and indirect subsidies the US government allegedly offered 
to US manufacturers. The study also alleged the existence of a US government 
subsidy in the form of technology transfers from the military to commercial 
airplanes. However, the eventual demise of Douglas Aircraft, due to the lack of 
available capital in the US and abroad, helped reinforce US arguments regarding 
the absence of subsidies in the US commercial airplane industry.  
 The limitation of these two studies commissioned by Airbus and Boeing is 
that they were conducted about twenty years ago, and were commissioned by the 
parties specifically to suit their side of the subsidy disputes. Moreover, when they 
were undertaken, Boeing was an industry leader in the large commercial airplane 
business. Since then, Airbus has made great strides. As noted above, with the 
sustained use of subsidies from the EU governments, Airbus has become a market 
share leader.   
Two empirical studies have been conducted by Baldwin and Krugman 
(1988) and Klepper (1994), to determine the profit-shifting and welfare effects the 
entry of Airbus has had on Europe, the US and the rest of the world. Both studies 
conclude that the Airbus entry would have been unsustainable without subsidies 
and that Airbus caused significant welfare losses to the US. Baldwin and Krugman 
(1988) followed with a Spencer type (1988) incorporate a Spencer learning curve 
model, while Klepper (1994) provides an important addition to the earlier works of 
Baldwin (1988) and Krugman (1994). Baldwin and Flam (1989) also conducted a 
simulation study of the commuter airplane market using the same approach as that 
of their past studies.  Miller (1988) has taken the same study approach as Baldwin 
and Krugman (1988), and the Klepper study (1994) of Airbus’s commercial viability, 
by estimating discounted cash flow results for Airbus airplanes. Miller (1998) also 
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uses market competition simulations on Airbus’s R&D subsidy effects using Airbus 
A330/A340 vs. Boeing 777.  
In support of Airbus, extensive research studies have been conducted by 
two British scholars: Lawrence (2001), Director of the Aerospace Research Centre, 
University of the West of England (UWE), Bristol, and Director of CERMAS ESC, 
Toulouse; and Professor Keith Heyward, Professor of International Relations at 
Staffordshire University and Head of Research, Society of British Aerospace 
Companies. Lawrence (2001) conducted two aerospace strategic studies: one study 
entitled “Strategic Issues in European Aerospace” (1999) deals with strategic issues 
and project case studies by British scholars, including Professor Hayward and 
Professor Lawrence, plus the US Professor David Thornton of Cambell University 
North Carolina; the other, “Aerospace Strategic Trade (2001)”, elaborates on the US 
Department of Defense’s subsidy of US large commercial airplane industry. 
“Aerospace Strategic Trade” (2001), Lawrence (2001) scrutinizes federal financial 
support for US large commercial airplanes during the years 1992-1998. Lawrence 
(2001) argues that his study (“Aerospace Strategic Trade” in 2001) shows how the 
US conducts strategic trade in aerospace via industrial policy based on R&D 
supports. Lawrence’s two studies (2001) both suggest that the US subsidizes the 
large commercial aircraft industry. As such, “Aerospace Strategic Trade” forms the 
theoretical foundations and backbone of Airbus’s accusation that subsidization of 
the large commercial airplane industry has been, and still is, practiced by the US.   
Further to this, Steven McGuire (1997), Professor of Management at the 
University of Aberystwyth, has examined the EU–US commercial airplane subsidy 
disputes in his study on Airbus, “Airbus Industrie: Conflict and Cooperation in US-
EC Trade Relations.” He also wrote in “Trade Politics” (2004), a book edited by 
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Brian Hocking and Steven McGuire, and also “The European Union and the United 
States: Competition and Convergence in the Global Arena” (2008), co-authored with 
Michael Smith.  
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
 
The core aim of this research is to explore the parameters and variances of the 
trade politics associated with the EU-US commercial airplane subsidy disputes, with 
the following three research objectives:  
 Firstly, this research investigates why the EU and the US governments 
have been disputing the Boeing vs. Airbus subsidy case for so many years.  This 
research assesses the underlying conflicts of interests, dispute prevention, and 
dispute settlement, in order to understand how markets and government policy 
impact economic results. The main focus of the research is on the government 
subsidies of R&D expenses, which are referred to as “launch money” or “launch aid” 
for development of large “new generation” commercial airplanes, and also the US 
government’s tax treatment of Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC).
7
 Consequently, 
an analysis of the large commercial airplane subsidy disputes can greatly improve 
our understanding of how a private American enterprise, such as Boeing, continues 
to be so successful in the global marketplace.   
A second objective of this research is to find the raison d’etre for the 
commercial airplane subsidy dispute, and why the 1992 GATT bilateral agreement 
had lasted rather peacefully for twelve years.   
 
 
9 
The final objective is to investigate whether the DSM at the WTO 
functioned effectively to achieve a dispute resolution for the EU and the US.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
The central question in this thesis has two dimensions: what is so unique about 
large commercial airplane subsidy disputes and what makes the disputes so difficult 
to resolve? These two questions also lead to the following three research questions:  
 
1. Why have the large commercial airplane subsidy disputes been one of 
the longest running political-economic issues between the EU and the 
US? 
2. Why had the 1992 GATT agreement on this issue been kept rather 
peacefully for twelve years until it suddenly collapsed in 2004? 
3. Has the DSM of the WTO provided a mechanism for resolving these 
disputes? 
  
As previously outlined, the EU-US political disputes are the recurring trade disputes 
between the Europeans and Americans concerning the rivalry between Airbus and 
Boeing specifically concerning the EU and the US governments’ subsidies to the 
R&D of their large commercial airplane manufacturers, Airbus and Boeing.  Such 
subsidies are often referred to as a “launch aid”, because they are used as a 
governmental aid for the launch of new airplane programs. Since the signing of the 
1992 GATT agreement, disputes between Airbus and Boeing over airplane 
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subsidies seemed to have subsided, but had never been fully resolved. Boeing had 
been calling for a “level playing field,” which means free and fair competition without 
government subsidies, whereas Airbus had been counter-arguing that Boeing 
received subsidies through government defense contracts and tax breaks. 
 Nevertheless, Airbus and Boeing kept the 1992 GATT agreement for 12 
years. Boeing finally filed complaints at the WTO in late 2004 and terminated the 
1992 pact. Airbus immediately followed suit. As such, this study undertakes an in-
depth analysis of the competition policy of the European Union and also examines 
the causes and determinants of the EU-US government subsidy disputes.  
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES  
 
 
Research Methodology 
 
Qualitative methods were used to answer the research questions and hypotheses. 
This took form of semi-structured, in-depth face-to-face and telephone interviews 
with Airbus and Boeing senior management and industry officials in October 2009. 
Their details are as follows: 
 
 Mr. Francisco W. Peiro, Aeronautics and Raw Materials, DG TRADE G.2 
– Industrial Sectors, European Commission in Brussels on October 13, 
2009. 
 Mr. Nusrat Nazeer, Senior Information Officer, World Trade Organization 
in Geneva, Switzerland on October 15, 2009. 
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 Mr. Charlie Miller, Director of Boeing UK in Boeing London office on 
October 26, 2009. 
Telephone interviews were conducted as follows: 
 Mr. Ted Austell, Boeing executive at the Washington D.C. office in charge 
of Airbus–Boeing disputes.  
 Dr. Rainer Ohler, Airbus executive in Toulouse, France, recommended 
“Aerospace Strategic Trade: How the U.S. Subsidized the Large 
Commercial Aircraft Industry,” authored by his mentor, Philip Lawrence.  
 
 The theoretical framework of this thesis is developed in Chapter 1: 
Theoretical Foundations. The main theory of this thesis is based on the theory of 
“Varieties of Capitalism,” authored by Hall and Soskice, as well as Susan Strange’s 
studies of multipartite relations between government and business (or states and 
firms). In her study, Strange (1988) defines what is not theory and what is theory.
8
  
  
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses have been developed and will be tested in this research: 
 
1. Without the continued ‘launch aid’ from EU governments, Airbus would 
not have been able to speed up the development of a full product line 
comparable to Boeing’s. 
 
2. With the sustained use of subsidies from EU governments, Airbus has 
been able to surpass Boeing and has captured the major market share 
since 2003. 
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3. Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group receives benefits from cross-
subsidization in the form of technology transfers from the US military 
airplane manufacturing technology.  
 
4. Boeing was aided by two levels of subsidies: at the state government 
level from the state of Washington, and at the federal government level 
through US defense contracts. 
 
5. Boeing terminated the 1992 GATT agreement in order to pressure Airbus 
to cut off, or delay, the continued ‘launch aid’ for a new airplane program.   
 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS   
 
 
By way of background, and as a means of providing a theoretical framework, the  
 
thesis starts with an account of the theoretical foundations on which the research  
 
has been developed. It proceeds as follows:   
 
CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
The chapter presents the case of Airbus-Boeing duopoly and explains the 
theoretical implications of the empirical case studies. Theoretical foundations are 
based on two theories: the state-business relationship and the theory of “Varieties 
of Capitalism”. The chapter begins with an analytical basis for conceptualizing the 
EU-US subsidy disputes in the strategic duopoly competition in the commercial 
airplane industry. 
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CHAPTER 2: AIRBUS, BOEING, AND THE WTO  
This chapter analyzes the features, characteristics, and the 
competitiveness of the two players, Airbus and Boeing, and how they operate in the 
duopoly competition in the world market. The chapter also examines the roles and 
theories of the WTO and how the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO works 
in the litigation of the Airbus vs. Boeing case.   
 
CHAPTER 3: MAKING/MARKETING LARGE COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES 
The chapter examines the Airbus vs. Boeing business practice and 
competition that led to the subsidization by the government in the broader context of 
global business in which these two players manufacture, market, and sell large 
commercial airplanes. The chapter also examines the marketing strategies of Airbus 
and Boeing. 
 
CHAPTER  4: THE TERMINATION OF THE 1992  EU-US AGREEMENT 
 The chapter explains the 1992 GATT agreement and investigates the 
termination of the 1992 EU-US bilateral pact in 2004.  
 
CHAPTER 5: THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AT THE WTO 
The first panel hearing in the case took place on 26-27 September 2007. 
In the WTO case against the US, the EU made numerous allegations on various US 
subsidies to Boeing.  
 
CHAPTER 6: THE CASE OF THE UINITE STATES AT THE WTO 
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This chapter examines the way in which the focus on the EU-US subsidy 
disputes was placed and how the US led the case against the EU at the WTO.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter sets the stage for the Airbus vs. Boeing case study in the EU-US 
transatlantic airplane subsidy disputes by presenting the theoretical foundations that     
potentially enhance the understanding of state-business relationships. The 
theoretical contribution that this thesis makes is to improve our understanding of 
state-business or government-business relationships through the empirical research 
of Airbus vs. Boeing. The on-going EU-US subsidy disputes are directly related to 
state-business relationships in the context of the global trading system, the thematic 
link of which is illustrated in the following schematic:  
 
 
State - Business Relationships => Global Trading System => EU - US Subsidy       
 
Disputes => Airbus vs. Boeing => World Trade Organization 
 
   
  No in-depth academic research has been undertaken on the subject of 
on-going Airbus vs. Boeing government subsidy disputes. The originality of this 
Airbus vs. Boeing subsidy dispute case study hopefully makes distinctive, value-
added contributions to the understandings of the EU-US government subsidy 
disputes in question, the subsidy disputes more generally, the contentious nature of 
the global trading system and how the disputes are to/or not be resolved within it, as 
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well as more broadly the changing nature of the relationship between the state and 
business in a changing global/domestic context.   
 This study explains how the Airbus vs. Boeing case will be used and how 
it will be located within wider theoretical and disciplinary perspectives of state-
business relationships with reference to the Varieties of Capitalism debate. The 
core of the subsidy disputes is about the relationships between state and business 
(governments and firms) in the context of the global trading system. The WTO plays 
an important role in the world trading system – specifically as to what kind of help 
and how much a state can legally give its private business.  
 Therefore, the main theoretical frame of this study is state-business 
(governments-firms) relationships which explore different approaches in the EU and 
the US while recognizing that there are some differences between the involved EU 
member states in relation to Airbus.
9
 These political-economic differences across 
the states are captured by the second theory, the “Varieties of Capitalism” debate. 
These two theories, the theory of state-business relationships and the theory of 
“Varieties of Capitalism,” were used to understand the individual corporate variation 
between the different business models of Airbus and Boeing. With duopoly in the 
commercial airplane industry, there is, potentially, a net welfare gain from having 
two competitive manufacturers cut free of subsidies.  
 
THE THEORY ONE: STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 
 
This chapter seeks to review a useful theoretical framework in the theory of state-
business (governments and firms) relationships. There are three main players to be 
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considered in state-business relationships: the state (or government), business (or 
firms), and the trade associations that serve as intermediaries between the state 
and business (Coen and Grant, 2006, p13).  
 However, in the UK and the US, governments and big businesses have 
been dealing directly with very large firms bypassing trade associations.
10
 In these 
countries, trade associations never exerted much discipline over individual firms 
(Coen and Grant, 2006, p56). The relationships between European firms in the 
aerospace industry and their respective states have both some common traits and 
other characteristics that remain specific to each country (Hayward, 1995, p195). 
The EU in this study encompasses three major European states representing the 
major shareholders of Airbus: France, Germany, and the UK. The EU-US airplane 
subsidy disputes reflect a fundamental divide and political-economic differences 
between the EU member states of Airbus on one side and the US on the other. 
There are some differences across these three major EU member 
states.
11
 The ‘Comparative Capitalism’ and the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach 
will provide insight into key features of contemporary capitalism by explaining the 
similarities and differences of the most developed economies of the EU and the US, 
as well as the differences across EU states. A ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach 
can provide the basis of a productive interchange among scholars researching 
many issues in economics, industrial relations, social policy-making, political 
science, business, and the law (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p68).           
In her work on state-firm relationships, Strange (1992, p6) argues that 
governments must face up to structural changes in world politics, particularly 
regarding the structure of production in the world economy, and must pay proper 
attention to the increasing importance of firms. Many political-economic changes 
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have taken place in recent decades: the liberation of the former communist bloc 
followed by the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rapid rise of the East Asian 
countries, China’s surpluses, the US chronic deficits, etc.  
Strange (1992) claims that ‘these common driving forces of change are 
the accelerating rate and cost of technological change’, and have facilitated the 
globalization of production as well as increased capital mobility. She also argues 
that these structural changes have permeated beyond finance and production to 
deeply effect global politics.  
Strange further suggests that because of these structural changes, 
governments must now bargain not only with other governments (government-
government relation), but also with firms or enterprise (government-firm relation), 
while firms bargain with governments (firm-government relation) and with one 
another (firm-firm relation). She also supports the view that the intensification of 
competition among states for world market shares has forced states to bargain with 
foreign firms to insure that they locate their operations within the territory of the 
state, urging national firms not to leave home. 
 How will the case study be used and explained by the state-business 
relations model? The Airbus-Boeing case study will be used within the wider 
theoretical perspectives of state-business relationships, which will provide a 
theoretical base for explaining the EU-US airplane subsidy disputes. Such a 
theoretical base reveals the roles of Airbus and Boeing in a competitive context: the 
EU and the US government-business relationship and, EU and US government 
policies. However, there are some substantial political-economic differences 
between European capitalism and American capitalism as well as within individual 
European states.  
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The study will address the competitive issues of Airbus vs. Boeing and 
the challenges of global competition within the theoretical framework of state-
business relationships. The nation, its government, and business (or firms) all have 
a role in this framework. Airbus’ source of competitiveness and sustained use of 
‘launch aid’ from EU governments will be critically assessed and explained by a 
theoretical framework that the state-business relation theory can provide. 
In the state-business relationships in Europe, there was ‘a growing 
tendency of using large national enterprises in an effort to solve specific problems, 
as if they were agencies of the state’ (Vernon, 1974)
12
. The European idea behind it 
was to develop a national champion as a public policy – “an enterprise responsive 
to its national government’s needs and entitled to its national government’s support” 
(Hayward, 1995). “Providing capital on favored terms was one typical device; 
discriminating in government procurement policies was a second; subsidizing 
research programs a third” (Vernon, 1974, p12). “Whatever the method, it implicitly 
or explicitly embodied one important factor: the exercise of public power to 
discriminate in favor of chosen national champions” (Vernon, 1974, p12).  
What roles do national governments play when European firms face 
competition from American firms, or American firms face competition from European 
firms?  Specifically, what strategic roles do EU states play for Airbus, which is 
regarded as having a strategic and critical place in the EU economy? What are the 
major differences in state-business relations between the EU and the US? Those 
are some of the many questions that can be explained within a conceptual context 
of state-business relationships.  
 
PROBLEM OF COMPARATIVE CAPITALISM APPROACH TO STATE- 
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BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 
 
The difference between state-business relationships in the EU and the US can be 
explained by a Comparative Capitalism approach, which may be used to compare 
many kinds of economies, and to consider how firms coordinate their endeavors. 
Comparative Capitalism is based on the perspectives of institutional variations. The 
following three perspectives have been in the mainstream of Comparative 
Capitalism over the last thirty years: a ‘modernization approach’; ‘neo-corporatism’; 
a ‘social systems of production’ approach (Hall and Soskice, p2).  
The ‘modernization approach’ to Comparative Capitalism regarded the 
principal challenge facing developed economies as the modernization of industries 
that still operated according to pre-war practices, promoting high rates of national 
growth. Those taking this approach focused on institutional structures. Thus, states 
were given more leverage over the private sector, such as planning systems and 
public influence in the financial system (Cohen 1977; Estrin and Holmes 1983; 
Zysman 1983; Cox 1986)
13
. Countries were often categorized as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ 
states (Katzenstein 1978b; Sacks 1980; Nodlinger 1981; Stocpol and Amenta 
1985)
14
. Based on this perspective, for example, France was regarded as a model 
of success, while the UK was seen as a “laggard” (Shonfield 1965; Johnson 
1982)
15
.  
The concept of ‘neo-corporatism’ was developed as a second approach 
to Comparative Capitalism during the 1970s, when inflation became a key problem 
facing developed economies (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979; Berger 1981; 
Goldthorpe 1984; Alvarez et al. 1991)
16
. Neo-corporatism was associated with the 
capacity of a state to negotiate collective bargaining with employers and trade 
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unions on wages, working conditions and social or economic policy
17
. Therefore, a 
state’s capacity for neo-corporatism was generally dependent upon the 
centralization of the trade union movement.  
The “social systems of production” approach was a new approach to 
Comparative Capitalism during the 1980s and 1990s
18
. It included analyses of 
sectoral governance, national innovation systems, and flexible production 
regimes
19
. These studies pay more attention to the behavior of firms in response to 
the reorganization of production necessitated by technological change
20
. They put 
an emphasis on the movement of firms “away from mass production toward new 
production regimes that depend on collective institutions at the regional, sectoral, or 
national level”
21
. 
The neo-institutionalist approach to Comparative Capitalism has been  
critiqued by Colin Crouch (2005). He takes a close look at Comparative Capitalism 
literature and the way in which neo-institutionalist approaches to the “diversity of 
capitalism are falling into the trap of oversimplification and determinism” (Crouch, 
2005, p22-23). He argues that over-simplification often results in confusion between 
ideal types and cases, and suggests ways in which institutional entrepreneurs can 
achieve change. By his definition, institutional entrepreneurs approach institutions in 
the same way that economic entrepreneurs approach business opportunities. 
Crouch (2005) develops a theory of governance mode by recombining the 
governance mechanism that the institutional entrepreneurs use to make changes 
and achieve their goals. He presents some examples of compound and 
recombinant governance in action through an account of the institutions that govern 
the high-tech sectors of Southern California and recombinant governance in the 
neo-liberal turn in the UK at the end of the 1970s.  
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THE THEORY TWO: “VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM” APPROACH TO THE 
THEORY OF STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 
 
The theory of “Variety of Capitalism” (Hall and Soskice, 2001) goes beyond these 
three preceding perspectives of institutional variations that have dominated the 
study of Comparative Capitalism. The “Varieties of Capitalism” approach is an 
actor-centered concept in a firm-centered economy where strategic interactions of 
firms are crucial to the behavior of economic actors, while Comparative Capitalism 
is based on the perspectives of institutional variations.  
The major emphasis of Hall and Soskice was that there was no single 
form of capitalism (Crouch, 2005). Indeed, there are some political-economic 
differences between Europe and the US and within the individual European states. 
What explains these individual political-economic differences across the states? 
Some see these differences as deviations from “best practice” that dissipate as 
states catch up to a leader,
22
 while others regard them as the “distillation of more 
durable historical choices for a specific kind of society”
23
. This is because economic 
institutions limit the level of social protection, income distribution, and collective 
goods at one’s disposal - features of the social solidarity of a nation (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). Hall and Soskice argue that, in each case, the comparative political 
economy revolves within a theoretical framework, which is used to explain 
institutional variation across states.  
 Hall and Soskice (2001) support the view that features of states once 
regarded as attributes of strength actually impede the implementation of many 
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economic policies. Instead, they look for a basis for comparison more firmly 
established in the organization of the private sector.
24
 Firms need to be brought 
back into the core of the analysis of Comparative Capitalism by highlighting the role 
that business, and its associated relationships with firms play in the political 
economy.
25
 Hall and Soskice (2001) depart from the Comparative Capitalism 
approaches with their conception of how behavior is affected by the institutions of  
political economy. For an analysis of Comparative Capitalism, there are three 
frameworks that explain how institutions of political economy affect the behavior of 
economic actors.
26
 First, institutions are seen as socializing agencies that set norms 
or attitudes. Second, the effects of an institution follow from the power
27
 (e.g. power 
of policy-makers or trade union leaders) it provides to particular actors. A third 
framework sees institutions as a matrix of sanctions and incentives (e.g. the 
willingness of trade unions to moderate wages to lower inflation).  
The core argument of Hall and Soskice (2001) is that Comparative 
Capitalism is short of strategic interactions and that these approaches tend to miss 
strategic interactions, which are central to the behavior of economic actors. So the 
most important institutions distinguishing one political economy from another will be 
those conditioning such interaction, and it is these that need to be captured in this 
analysis. By locating the firm at the centre of the analysis, Hall and Soskice attempt 
to connect business studies with comparative political economy, the two disciplines 
that are all too often neglected and disconnected.  
The “Varieties of Capitalism” approach to the political economy is actor-
centered, where each of a number of multiple actors seeks to advance their 
interests rationally in strategic interactions with others (Scharpf, 1997a). In the 
framework of actor-centered institutionalism, Scharpf (1997a, p36) combines actor-
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centered and institution-centered approaches in an integrated framework. However, 
the major difficulty with the actor-centered approach is that they must, at bottom, 
rely on intentional explanations that are inevitably based on subjectivities (Dennett 
1981; Rosenberg 1988).
28
 In the actor-centered concept, ‘actors are characterized 
by their orientations such as perceptions and preferences and by their capabilities’ 
(Scharpf, 1997a, p51). The actors include individuals, firms, producer groups, and 
governments in a firm-centered economy where the firms are regarded as crucial 
actors in a capitalist economy.
29
 Firms are the core agents of adjustment facing   
technological change and global competition,
30
 and the firms’ activities are 
translated into overall levels of economic outcomes.
31
  
 
CORE COMPETENCIES 
 
Hall and Soskice look at a conception of the firm being relational. Firms are seen as 
actors seeking to develop and exploit core competencies
32
 or dynamic capabilities 
as capacities for developing, producing, and distributing goods and services 
profitably (Teece and Pisano, 1998).
33
 In order to resolve coordination problems 
central to their core competencies, Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that firms develop 
relationships in five spheres: industrial relations, vocational training and education, 
corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and their own employees (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001, p6-7). For example, Boeing’s ‘market shaping’ strategy includes 
development of core competencies as well as detailed customer knowledge 
specifications in order to develop these capabilities needed now and the future.   
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LIBERAL MARKET EONOMIES (LME) AND COORDINATED MARKET  
ECONOMIES (CME) 
 
This analysis seeks to provide a conceptual approach that can be used to compare 
different kinds of political economies in the EU states and the US where Airbus and 
Boeing coordinate their endeavors. These EU states and the US can both be 
classified as either Liberal Market Economies (LME) or Coordinated Market 
Economies (CME) that constitute two ends of a political-economic spectrum 
encompassing a whole array of many states. The US and Britain are primarily 
Liberal Market Economies (LME). Germany represents a Coordinated Market 
Economy (CME). 
 In France, the old French model has disappeared and a new model has 
emerged exemplifying the dynamics underlying the adjustment of the French 
economy. The implication for the French political economy is the increasing 
importance of the market and the simultaneous reduction of the state’s role in the 
French political economy.  Hall and Soskice make a core distinction between liberal 
market economies and coordinated market economies (2001, p8). In general, liberal 
market economies differ from coordinated market economies to the extent that  
firms rely on market mechanisms to coordinate their endeavors, as compared to 
forms of strategic interaction supported by non-market institutions (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001, p33).  
In liberal market economies, firms coordinate their activities through 
hierarchies and competitive market arrangements. Williamson (1985) describes 
these forms of coordination from the perspective of transaction cost economics: 
“Transaction cost economics characterizes human nature as we know it by 
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reference to bounded rationality and opportunism” (Williamson, 1985, pp44-48). He  
argues that there are three levels of rationality: the strong form is “maximizing”, the 
semi-strong form is “bounded rationality”, and the weak form is “organic rationality.” 
“Bounded rationality” is the cognitive assumption that transaction cost economics 
relies on, while “opportunism” refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of 
information.  
Market relationships are characterized by the exchange of goods and 
services through competition and formal contracting. Market institutions provide a 
means for coordinating with the economic actors (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p8). 
According to Hall and Soskice (2001, ibid.), in coordinated market economies, firms 
are heavily oriented towards non-market relationships that coordinate with other 
actors and construct their core competencies. In coordinated market economies, the 
financial system (or market for corporate governance) provides firms with access to 
finance that is not entirely dependent on publicly available financial data.  
Differences between liberal and coordinated market economies are 
reinforced by institutional complementarities (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p17). The 
point about institutional complementarities is relevant to the study of Comparative 
Capitalism. Hall and Soskice (2001, p17) support the view that complementarities 
also exist in the operations of a firm. They also suggest that “two institutions can be 
complementary if the presence (or efficiency) of the one increases the returns from 
(or efficiency) of the other”.
34
 Efficiency in these firms could be further increased if 
two firms operated under no subsidy conditions in airplane manufacturing, 
according to the WTO rules, because they will strive for the most efficient and the 
most innovative way to manufacture airplanes in order to survive free competition in 
the level playing field.   
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AMERICAN STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 
 
American ‘Managerial Capitalism’ inspired the largest and fastest-growing market in 
the world when the nation completed its communication and transportation network 
and perfected its operating methods in the 1870s and 1880s (Chandler, 1984, 
p492). American entrepreneurs recruited management teams in production to 
capture the potential of scale economies and invest in distribution to market the 
mass-produced goods at home and abroad, as did all the industries “in which large 
industrial firms would cluster for the following century” (Chandler, 1984 pp492-493). 
In large, complex business organizations in the US, full-time salaried managers 
came to make decisions as to both current and future production and distribution 
and the allocation of resources (Chandler, 1984 p494). By then, owners rarely made 
managerial decisions because of the greatly increased size and complexity of the 
enterprise. Thus, Managerial Capitalism was firmly established as a major segment 
of the American business enterprise which was characterized by separation of 
ownership from management.  
The American liberal tradition was permeated by anti-state norms, the 
state (or government) being viewed as ‘a permanent threat to the individual’s liberty 
to speak, worship, produce or dispose of property free from censorship, regulation, 
legislation and  taxation” (Hayward, 1986, xii). 
In liberal market economies, firms rely more heavily on market relations to 
resolve coordination problems, while in coordinated market economies, firms 
address the market relations and coordination problems through non-market 
coordination, which entails collaboration and strategic interaction (Hall and Soskice, 
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2001, p27).  In the major spheres of firms’ endeavors, competitive markets are more 
robust with less institutional support for non-market forms of coordination. 
As such, while in coordinated market economies, corporate networks 
provide investors with inside information through corporate networks, firms in liberal 
market economies focus on quarterly balance sheets, current profitability, and 
current share values, in order to ensure access to finance or deter hostile takeovers 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001, p27).
35
 Secondly, in the industrial relations arena, firms in 
liberal market economies generally rely heavily on the market relationship between 
individual workers and employers to organize relations with their labor force. 
Management normally has unilateral control over the firm, including freedom to hire 
and fire (Hall and Soskice, p29). Thirdly, the education and training systems are 
generally complementary to these highly fluid labor markets (Hall and Soskice, 
p30). Finally, inter-company relations in liberal market economies are based on 
standard market relationships and enforceable formal contracts. In the US, these 
relations are also mediated by rigorous antitrust regulations designed to prevent 
companies from colluding to control prices or markets and doctrines of contract laws 
(Hall and Soskice, p30).  
How does technology transfer take place in liberal market economies? 
Generally, technology transfer is secured through the movement of scientific 
personnel from one company to another that fluid labor markets facilitate (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001, p31). These scientific personnel bring their technical knowledge with 
them. Liberal market economies also rely heavily on the licensing or sale of 
innovations to achieve technology transfer. How does technology transfer apply to 
commercial airplane manufacturing? Airbus argues that Boeing acquires technical 
knowledge from US defense contracts, and transfers the acquired technology to 
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commercial airplanes. Airbus contends that such technology transfers constitute 
forms of governmental subsidy.  
FRENCH STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 
 
By contrast to the American liberal tradition of anti-state norms, the French tradition 
is in favor of state forces rather than market forces. France, having long lived within 
the Roman Law tradition, kept a normative and actual state dominance with 
authority mechanisms left largely intact (Hayward, 1986). It was taken for granted in 
France that “governments could decide what they wanted to happen and were able 
to make it happen” (Hayward, 1986). The French market-relationship is a 
“centralized, unitary political structure, super-ordinate to a society in general and 
market forces in particular” in contrast to the American‘s “fragmented, federal 
political structure operating in a market-dominated, pluralistic political and economic 
system” (Hayward, 1986, pp16-20). Even if France later edged in a more liberal 
direction in response to international forces, the dirigiste (French state centered 
policy) tradition remained strong, as reflected in the resonance of a nation of 
“economic patriotism”, advanced in the first decade of the 21
st
 century. 
Hall and Soskice (2001, p35) argue that each economy (either liberal or 
coordinated market economy) shows specific capacities for coordination that 
conditions what its firms and government do. The top managers of many French 
firms have close ties to the state but weak ties to other firms (Hall and Soskice, 
2001, p35). As a result, they are less likely to pursue the corporate strategies found 
in Britain or Germany (Hall and Soskice, 2001, ibid).   
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Hayward (1986, p203) argues that the French government has been 
“most interventionist” compared to German and British governments. For example, 
it has not only provided Air France with financial support (two cash injections) but 
has also played a major role in Air France’s takeover of UTA and Air Inter. In an 
attempt to rectify delays and cost overruns in the Airbus A380, former French Prime 
Minister Dominique de Villepin asked his Finance Minister to prepare management 
changes at Airbus and EADS, in close cooperation with European partners.
36 While 
the US government has nothing to do with Boeing‘s corporate affairs, management 
shuffles at Airbus were greatly influenced by French and German governments. For 
instance, the board of EADS decided to keep a dual management structure (French 
and German co-CEOs at the top), which is an ineffective and dysfunctional 
reporting system. In fact, EADS ended up hiring McKinsey to get an advice on 
whether to issue a profit warning. Thus, EADS kept the balance of French and 
German political interests instead of implementing a sound management structure 
with one CEO and one Chairman. The recent EADS management reshuffles were a 
“classical European political-industrial complex stitch up”. In essence, nothing has 
changed in terms of management restructuring except the replacement of French 
and German co-CEOs at the top.   
Given the fact that Airbus is embedded with the French government 
which owns a 15 percent interest in EADS with the German government, it is not 
surprising that the French government intervened in the industrial restructuring of 
EADS. The state became involved in industrial restructuring and its micro-industrial 
approach was increasingly focused on direct dealings with a select few national 
champion firms (Hayward, 1986, p34). Hayward argues that in the French traditional 
system, the state’s role was to reduce social conflict and maintain the status quo 
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through the use of regulations that restricted both foreign and domestic competition, 
slowing down the pace of change. He suggests that this helped to preserve social 
harmony while allowing French capacity to go its own way within the world 
economy; thus, business performance was only a secondary matter. Hayward 
possibly overstates this view, given that in practice, many French firms are 
competitive at an international level and increasingly engage in FDI (for example, 
EDF). 
GERMAN STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 
 
In coordinated market economies, firms resolved many of these problems through 
strategic interaction. How can non-market coordination be achieved in the principal 
spheres of firms’ endeavors in Germany? The following five principal spheres need 
to be looked at:
 37
 
The financial system or market for corporate governance provides firms 
with access to finance that is not always based on publicly available financial data. 
This makes it possible for firms to make investments only in the long term. 
However, since finance is not dependent on the balance sheet, the core problem of  
CMEs (Coordinated Market Economies) is that investors must have other ways of 
monitoring a company performance in order to ensure the value of their investments 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001, p22-23). That means they must have access to ‘inside’ 
information about the company,
38
 which is illegal in the US. In Germany, information 
about a company is available to investors by (a) the close relationships that have 
been cultivated; (b) the knowledge secured from extensive networks of cross-
shareholding; (c) joint membership in active industry associations that gather 
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information about companies (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p23). Firms operating in 
“dense business networks” and potential funders can gain a great deal of inside 
information about the track record and projects of a firm from these business 
networks (Hall and Soskice, 2001, ibid.). Hostile mergers and acquisitions were very 
rare until recently. Firms need to focus on profitability and shareholder value if there 
is any prospect of a hostile takeover by others.  
The internal structure of a firm reinforces these systems of network 
monitoring in many coordinated market economies. Compared to liberal market 
economies in the US and the UK, senior managers in Germany rarely take a 
unilateral action. They need to have secured agreement for major decisions from 
supervisory boards that include employee representatives, major shareholders, and 
from other managers. This German consensus decision-making encourages 
information-sharing, the “development of reputations”, for reliable information and 
network monitoring (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p24). In coordinated market 
economies, managerial incentives reinforce business networks. Therefore, German 
firms place long-term employment contracts in relation to a manager’s ability to 
secure consensus for his projects. This leads managers to focus on maintaining 
their own reputation. However, long-term labor employment contracts limit the 
mobility of scientific or engineering personnel across firms to effect technology 
transfer as seen in liberal market economies. Instead, in Germany, such diffusion of 
technology across the economy is promoted by a number of institutions and 
business associations. 
While American firms focus on profitability and use stock-options in 
managerial compensation, the incentives for German managers are in line with 
those of German firms (Hall and Soskice, 2001, ibid). Many firms, including German 
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firms in coordinated market economies, use production strategies that provide 
highly skilled workers with substantial autonomy to encourage then to share the 
information they acquire. Such strategies generate continuous improvements in 
production lines and production processes (Hall and Soskice, 2001, ibid). German 
firms’ coordinated market economies make use of labor with high industry-specific 
or firm specific skills (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p25), and use education and training 
systems that enable workers to develop such skills
39
. Germany relies on industry-
wide employer associations and trade unions to supervise a publicly subsidized 
training system.  
AMERICAN LIBERAL MARKET ECONOMY (LME) vs. GERMAN COORDINATED 
MARKET ECONOMY (CME) 
 
Capitalist economies are regarded as systems where companies and individuals 
invest, and not only in machines and materials technologies (Hall and Soskice, 
p22). How do CMEs differ from LMEs? There are some differences: German CMEs 
are used to illustrate how non-market coordination is achieved, although German 
CMEs may differ to some extent from other CMEs. In American LMEs, firms rely 
more heavily on market relations to resolve coordination problems, whereas firms in 
the German CMEs address forms of non-market coordination that entail 
collaboration and strategic interaction (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p27). In terms of the 
American case, competitive markets are more robust in each of the major spheres 
in which firms compete and there is less institutional support for non-market forms 
of coordination. In the German case of CMEs, the financial system typically 
provides companies with access to finance that is not entirely dependent on publicly 
available financial data (Hall and Soskice, p22). Information about a company is 
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available to investors by virtue of the close relationships that companies cultivate 
with suppliers and clients, through the knowledge from extensive networks, and by 
joint membership in industry associations (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p23). 
BRITISH STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONSHP
40
   
 
While organized capitalism such as that found in France and Germany has 
experienced a long period of very slow growth and high unemployment, the UK has 
pulled away from both Germany and France in terms of per capita income (Coen 
and Grant, 2006, p43)
41
. When the British Labour Party took control of government 
in 1997, Great Britain became one of Europe’s stronger economies (Lehne, 2006 
p38). Where Labour had traditionally favored state ownership of industry and 
government intervention in the economy, it now applauded private enterprise and 
privatization (Lehne, 2006, p183).  
Britain’s liberal market economy is characterized by low levels of 
business coordination, state intervention, and deregulated markets, which serve as 
the primary coordinating mechanism for economic activity (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Is Britain interventionist or market oriented? Hart argues that the British state has 
been alternately interventionist and market-oriented with respect to domestic 
business (Barfield and Schambra, 1986, p157). As a result, firms are often unable 
to resolve collective action problems and are rarely in a position to jointly provide 
basic supply-side goods that sustain vocational training, R&D, and long-term 
finance (Hall and Soskice, 2001, ibid). British manufacturers have mainly 
emphasized short-term profits in a financial system that encourages rapid turnover 
and an industrial relations system that promotes employers to adopt cost-cutting 
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practices (Rubery 1994 as cited in Hall and Soskice, 2001). Deregulation 
throughout the British economy also allows and sometimes forces firms in the UK to 
cut their operating costs (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p220).   
However, the initial problem with most British business firms was the lack 
of a separate ownership and management. In most British firms, separation of 
ownership from management did not take place until after World War II. Because 
the UK’s domestic market was smaller and was growing less rapidly than the 
American market, British entrepreneurs had less of an incentive than Americans to 
fully exploit the potential of scale economies. British industrialists generally 
considered their firms as “family estates to be nurtured and passed down to their 
heirs rather than mere money-making machines” (Chandler, 1984, p497), as they 
were in the US. As such, family ownership remained important, with most UK firms 
controlled by board members and senior management (Lehne, 2006, p74).  
Growth by diversification into new product lines greatly increased the size 
and complexity of the business enterprise. However, British entrepreneurs preferred 
to manage their own businesses instead of turning their operating control over to 
non-family, salaried professional managers, in the way that typical American 
corporations did. Thompson (1989, p75) argued that, this problem had to be 
combated with “some drastic change in the form of management education”, but a 
long-term projects”. Indeed, the transformation from family management to 
professional managers came slowly. Why was this the case? The answer seems 
complex but Chandler (1984, p497) suggests that it lies in Britain’s industrial 
geography and history, its educational system, a lack of anti-trust legislation like the 
enforcement of the Sherman Antitrust Law in the US, and a continuing commitment 
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to personal family management. Nevertheless, because it was the first industrial 
nation, Great Britain became the world’s first consumer nation. 
Grant (1995, p77) argues that “British government’s role in relation to 
industry has often been that of a ‘spectator’ or ‘auxiliary’ state, exposing British firms 
to greater international competition and encouraging them to develop an 
international orientation.” He also argues that Britain is the country “in which the 
transition from the old conception of a ‘national champion’ to that of the international 
firm has gone furthest”.
42
 This partly reflects the British government’s passive 
involvement with national champions, which has brought nothing but new political 
problems instead of opening up economic opportunities.
43
 National champions were 
acquired because their collapse would be economically and politically too costly 
(e.g. British Leyland), or they were developed to create a British presence in 
technologically significant sectors, but eventually failed.
44
 The British industrial 
policy is largely reactive,
45
 and led to an emphasis on privatization and 
deregulation
46
, encouraging management autonomy, efficiency, and flexibility. 
However, lack of confidence in domestic solutions has also led to the continued 
promotion of British investment policies which seek to encourage the entry of 
Japanese firms to compensate for inadequacies in British management.
47
  
In examining the relationship between major actors in Britain, Grant 
points out the tenuous nature of the connections between them. He argues that the 
inadequacies of British business associations and the relative weakness of the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) indicate a weak relationship between 
government and industrial firms, characterized by misunderstandings (Grant, 1995, 
p80). 
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According to Grant, the ‘national champion’ seems like a dinosaur from 
another age (Grant, 1995, p77) and its policies a throwback to Fordist industrial 
structures of highly centralized, large-scale mass production. They have, however, 
given away to more decentralized, globally dispersed, flexible forms of lean 
production in the past several decades (Grant, 1995, Crane et al, 1997). Such 
flexible forms of accumulation “raise yet newer possibilities for how states relate to 
the world economy and production” (Crane et al, 1997, p17). Grant supports the 
view that one of the fundamental problems with the ‘national champion’ was that it 
created “an imbalance of information and expertise between government and the 
firms with national champion status”,
48
 allowing firms to take advantage of the 
imbalance of knowledge by demanding unjustifiable levels of assistance from the 
government, which has no way of checking the rationale and justification.
49
  
Grant (1995, p79) further argues that our theoretical understanding of the 
firm as an actor is underdeveloped, and that the task of integrating various insights 
from other relevant disciplines into a political economy of the firm has scarcely 
begun
50
. Grant (1995, ibid) characterizes large British firms as: generally 
internationally oriented; well disposed to the process of European integration; 
acquisition oriented; and politically sophisticated and advanced, reflecting high-
quality government relations and their experience of a “company state”. However, 
Britain is moving in the direction of a “regulatory state” where the government’s role 
is to “provide consumer champions to check the otherwise unfettered operations of 
firms oriented towards an international market” (Hayward, 1995, p81).  
Competition policy in Great Britain has not been a government priority, 
although it emerged in the post-World War II period (Lehne, 2006, p251). The anti-
trust law is strictly enforced in the US, although the `US government’s law suit 
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against Microsoft did not succeed. Under British law, there is no presumption 
against monopolies or mergers with policy seeking to regulate only those 
monopolies that harm the public interest (Lehne, 2006, ibid). Whereas British 
competition policies are somewhat closer to the US antitrust law, German and EU 
policies are more like a statist tradition. Unlike the strict US law against monopoly, 
the British process for enforcing monopoly and merger policies is administrative and 
rather lenient.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provided a theoretical foundation that will help enhance our 
understanding of the empirical case study of Airbus vs. Boeing subsidy disputes. 
The main theoretical foundations of this study are based on two theories: the theory 
of “state – business relationships” and the concept advanced in the “Varieties of 
Capitalism”. These two theories were used to understand individual corporate 
variation of Airbus and Boeing.  
 This Airbus – Boeing case study was developed within wider theoretical 
perspectives of the state – business relationships which provides a theoretical base 
for explaining the EU-US subsidy disputes. Such a theoretical base reveals the 
roles of Airbus and Boeing in a competitive duopoly context: the EU and US 
government policies. However, there are some substantial political-economic 
differences between European capitalism and American capitalism and within the 
individual European capitalism. Therefore, this thesis addresses the competitive 
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issues of Airbus vs. Boeing and their global competition within the theoretical 
framework of state-business relationships and varieties of capitalism.   
 The theory of state – business relationship will provide us with a better 
insight into the relationship between the EU governments and Airbus as well as the 
American relationship between the US government and Boeing. The state – 
business relationship theory also encompasses the state to state relationship 
between the EU governments and US government as well as the rivalry business 
relationship between Airbus and Boeing. Strange (1992) has a great foresight into 
the free trade and free competition that eventually led to the intensive competition 
between Airbus and Boeing for the world market share.  
 The WTO plays a critical role when ruling the critical issues and 
complaints about how much help a state can legally give its private enterprise, while 
the DSM (Dispute Settlement Mechanism) at the WTO enforces these procedures 
and rules. The chapter elucidated the variation of the two different corporate 
models, Airbus and Boeing, through the concepts advanced in the “Varieties of 
Capitalism” and the state-business relationship. These two theoretical concepts 
provide the better understanding of the government subsidy disputes between 
Airbus and Boeing. The subsidy disputes eventually led to the litigation in 2004 
when the US filed legal complaints at the WTO and took seven years before the 
case finally reached the verdict at the WTO court in June 2011. However, it should 
be noted that the legal disputes between Boeing and Airbus were not completely 
ended at the WTO in June 2011. The legal ramification of the June 2011 verdict is 
ensued by Airbus like any other legal disputes. The legal disputes continued on at 
the WTO for a while as Airbus has a right to appeal until Airbus exhausts all the 
possible legal avenues to their satisfaction.   
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 The next chapter will elucidate the three main actors as they directly 
relate to the duopoly competition: the duopolists, Airbus and Boeing represented by 
the EU governments and the US governments on their behalf at the WTO, which 
acts as an arbitrator authorized to judge the legal disputes between the EU and US 
governments’ legal representatives. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AIRBUS, BOEING, AND THE WTO  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The EU and the US are dominant actors on the world stage and their relationship is 
critically important in all aspects of global politics and the global economy.
51
 This 
chapter starts with an analysis of this relationship exploring how it has developed 
and impacted the main political arena. McGuire and Smith (2008) argue that the EU 
and the US are bound together, but in a form of “competitive convergence”, the 
influence of which can be seen and felt around the world.  
  As “two weighty actors” on the world stage, they are joined by the 
economic power of Japan and are now being challenged from the rising political and 
economic powers of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
52
 Many of these political-
economic changes are the driving forces behind the world’s political landscape and 
have facilitated globalization and increased capital mobility. As Susan Strange 
(1992) suggests, “the common driving forces of change are the accelerating rate 
and cost of technological change, and have increased the globalization of 
production as well as capital mobility and global communications.”
53
 Alongside the 
EU and US and Japan, China has joined the global arena as a major player, making 
the China-US relationship more important than ever before. These four players 
continue to be the major players and are highly engaged in each other’s political-
economic processes.  
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  While the on-going EU-US airplane subsidy disputes continue, the 
relationship between the EU and the US remains important in all facets of the global 
political-economy. McGuire and Smith (2008) argue that the EU and the US are 
bound together in a form of “competitive convergence”, that they are well integrated 
in economic terms and this will continue to be a source of competition and 
convergence in a changing world order. Therefore, the EU-US relations can make a 
difference in world trade development, monetary relations, technological 
innovations, development and management of free enterprises through free 
competition policies.
54
 
 
STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS IN EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
 
In Europe, the military was an important facet of the aerospace industry.
55
 The 
military interest precipitated state-business relationships in the airplane industry, 
including all phases of manufacturing and every aspect of aerospace technology.
56
 
European airplane industries are commonly assumed to be armaments-based 
industries, largely based in the hands of their respective governments.
57
  
In reference to the state-business relationship, Hayward (1995) highlights 
the dependence of the British airplane industry on the state.
58
 In France, the army is 
the origin of the airplane industry because the military basically dictates the 
technical choices and also prevents any possibility of a monopoly. This model of the 
state-business relationship intensified with nationalization in 1938 and also in the 
post-war period. Hayward (1995, p160) argues that programs for commercial 
airplane manufacturing maintained the capacity for research groups and the means 
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of industrial production during peace-time. He contends that this situation justified 
the strategic character of the commercial airplane industry in France, Germany and 
the UK. The European aerospace manufacturing business has, however, 
fundamentally transformed over the past two decades (Hayward, 1995, p158). The 
operating environment of the European aerospace industry has been modified by a 
series of external changes, including the rise of Airbus, the “explosion” of the civilian 
market, the end of the cold war and the emergence of new political-economic and 
industrial strategies (Hayward, 1995, ibid). Hayward (1995, pp158-159) argues that 
such external changes in the operating environment were a genuine revolution in 
the very idea of “nationalized industries”, and had effect on three different levels: 
Firstly, these firms became autonomous from governmental bodies and 
the public policies of the aerospace sector. Governments and firms – in different 
ways in each country – were shifted around and the firm itself became the principal 
actor in the new system. It replaced the old system in which a firm’s action was 
integrated within an overall state-determined strategy. Muller claims that “each 
national public policy has given itself the sole objective of contributing to growth in 
its company’s market share”.
59
 Airbus did exactly that and finally caught up with 
Boeing by achieving market share parity in 2003, and has retained a market share 
leadership position ever since. Secondly, a multiplication of alliance strategies has 
been developed between European firms resulting in a “complex web of co-
operative and competitive relationships”
60
. Thirdly, some surprising convergence 
took place between the policies implemented in this sector, emerging in the profile 
of a European model of national enterprise – within which the public or private 
status no longer has much importance.  
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THREE STATE- BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP MODELS
61
  
All three countries, Great Britain, France and Germany, have encouraged a public 
industrial development champion in the aeronautical industry. According to Hayward 
(1995), these three countries represent three different state-business relationship 
models.  
The British airplane industry was very powerful at the end of the World 
War II and was ahead of the American airplane industry in certain fields, such as jet 
propulsion. In order to keep this technological edge, those who favored public 
intervention organized themselves against the British Treasury, which was rather 
skeptical about allocation of public funds to the airplane industry. Clearly, state aid 
to the airplane industry was politically controversial. After the end of the war, 
Second World War, the Ministry of Supply was in charge of airplane manufacturing, 
but the British Government sought to cut back the financial involvement of the state 
due to the failure of airplane construction programs. 
Following this, the British Ministry of Aviation took over the functions of 
civil and military aviation in 1959. This period was characterized by a system of 
public ‘launch aids’, a golden age for public intervention in aeronautical affairs in 
Great Britain. However, in 1964, the Labour Party changed the contours of the 
state-business relationship. The principle of state aid to civil aviation remained, and 
the Ministry of Aviation integrated with the Ministry for Technology. The 1965 the 
Plowden Report outlined the necessity of a more commercial approach to state aid 
for civil programs. However, the British civil aviation policy was traumatized by the 
Concorde program,
62
 which became synonymous with a black hole into which public 
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money disappeared. This is one of the main explanations as to why the British 
withdrew from Airbus programs in 1968. 
By contrast, the French airplane industry was in a bleak situation at the 
end in 1945. Factories and equipment had been destroyed and France suffered 
from technological inadequacies caused by the war. However, after a frantic pursuit 
of research projects, France made a great recovery, becoming a major player in 
aviation within ten years. During this period, the state-business relationship came to 
surface in a most spectacular way.  
The French model is characterized by the power the Ministry of Defense 
exerts over the entire industry, while the Ministry of Transport has become ever 
more important when it comes to decisions about the launch of civil aviation 
programs. This was boosted by the launch of Concorde, which made the Ministry of 
Transport more significant. In 1976 the Ministry of Transport became the body in 
charge of airplane manufacturing. Technical expertise was located in the French 
aviation sector. The strong cohesion of the state-business relationship has come as 
a result of this period. 
In Germany, the aeronautical policy reflects the weakness of the industry, 
which had ceased to exist immediately after the war, and Allied countries raided 
Germany’s leading specialists. Until the end of the 1960s, Germany manufactured 
airplanes under license, but from 1968-1969 the German government began 
investing in the Airbus program with the purpose of re-establishing an industrial 
base in the commercial aviation manufacturing market and reinforcing its link with  
France. German weakness in airplane manufacture is reflected by the conflicts over 
Transall, the Franco-German military freight airplane and the problems associated 
with VFW and Fokker. 
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ACTOR CENTERED CONCEPT AND CORE COMPETENCIES 
In the actor-centered concept, “actors are characterized by their orientations 
(perceptions and preferences) and by their capabilities” (Scharpf, 1997a, p51). 
Firms are the core agents of adjustment, facing technological change and global 
competition and their activities are translated into overall levels of economic 
outcomes. In the Airbus-Boeing disputes, there are several crucial actors, including 
two crucial economic actors as well as several major political actors. The two crucial 
economic actors are Airbus and Boeing, who are tied up in a strategic duopoly 
competition with strategic interactions. These two firms deploy political leverage on 
several major political actors including the US government and several EU 
governments. These political actors are similarly involved in strategic interactions, 
using political and economic leverage elucidated by the Varieties of Capitalism 
debate, and a particular approach to political economy, in seeking to advance their 
interests in the commercial airplane industry.  
Firms are seen as actors seeking to develop and exploit profitably (Teece 
and Pisano, 1998).
63
 Hall and Soskice (2001) look at core competencies or dynamic 
capabilities as capacities for developing, producing, and distributing goods and 
services. In order to solve coordination problems as directly related and crucial to 
their core competencies, Hall and Soskice (2001, p6-7) argue that firms need to 
cultivate and develop relationships in five spheres: industrial relations, vocational 
training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and their own 
employees.  
As aforementioned, the “Varieties of Capitalism” approach to the political 
economy is actor-centered in an economy where each actor seeks to advance 
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his/her own interests rationally through a strategic interaction with others (Scharpf, 
1997a). Actor-centered institutionalism (Scharpf 1997a, p36) combines actor-
centered and institution centered approaches in an integrated framework. However, 
the major difficulty with the actor-centered approach is that they must, essentially, 
rely on intentional explanations that are inevitably based on subjectivities (Dennett 
1981; Rosenberg 1988).
64
 
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY DISPUTES BETWEEN THE EU AND THE US  
In the on-going dispute, the agential factors are state actors, namely the EU and the 
US as well as global actors, Airbus and Boeing. The agential factor is the action or 
political conduct of Airbus and Boeing as actors, and also the WTO as an actor and 
an arbitrator respectively. The existing political phenomena can be explained by the 
following structural and agential factors. In the “playing field” where Airbus and 
Boeing operate, the WTO is the DSM which has procedures and rules to enforce. 
These are the “structure”, and within this structure, the “agents” (the EU 
governments and the US government) exist and act. Here, the WTO has more 
powers than the EU and the US because the WTO is able to relate to the “structure” 
and enforce the rules. In relation to the WTO, – a structure debate is about how the 
“structure” (or the rules) makes Airbus/Boeing act in a certain way or how the 
actions of Airbus and Boeing are able to shape the rules or the relationship between 
these two, according to the concept of the “agent – structure”
65
. 
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STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS   
Three propositions were developed by Susan Strange in 1992. The first of these 
common roots, are identified as many seemingly unrelated events and 
developments in world politics and business, which are actually the result of the 
same structural changes in the world economy and society. The second of these 
propositions is that the same structural changes have led to fundamental changes 
in the nature of diplomacy: where there was government-government bargaining, 
firms now bargain with governments (firms-governments) and with one another 
(firm-firm). The third proposition is about the significance of firms as actors that 
influence the future course of transnational relations.  
STATE-TO-STATE, STATE-TO-BSINESS AND FIRM-TO-FIRM RELATIONS  
 
Strange (1992) also argues that governments must face up to structural changes in 
global politics, particularly to the change in structure of production in the global 
economy, and pay proper attention to the increasing importance of firms. Her work 
on relations between states and firms proposes a new agenda: the study of firms as 
actors in global politics and two new dimensions to diplomacy of state-firm and firm-
firm bargaining. She argues that governments must bargain not only with other 
governments but must also add two new dimensions to diplomacy with firms: state-
firm and firm-firm bargaining. These structural changes effect global politics and  
necessitate the type of bargaining among governments and firms at three distinct 
levels of relations: government-government; government–firm; and firm-firm.           
The on-going EU-US government subsidy dispute has effected the global politics of 
conflicts and cooperation at three defined levels of relations: Airbus-Boeing (firm-
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firm) competitive relations; Airbus-EU governments and Boeing-US government 
(firm-state) relations; and EU governments-US government (state to state) relations. 
However, it is argued that due to increasingly competitive relations between states 
that strive for increasing global market shares, such competitive driving forces have 
compelled states to start bargaining with non-US firms to operate “within territory of 
the state” (Strange, 1992).            
FOREIGN FIRMS AND NATIONAL FIRMS  
 
Strange’s view (Strange, 1992) on “foreign” firms and “national” firms which, she 
believes, should not leave home is obviously an outdated protectionist view.           
What are the “foreign” firms and “national” firms that Strange refers to? The word 
“foreign” is rather dated, and has been replaced by “international” several decades 
ago. For example, Airbus is not called a foreign firm but referred to as a “European 
firm.” Airbus could be a “national” firm to the French because of the French domicile 
and because it is made of French/German capital investment. Similarly, Boeing is 
not a “foreign” firm, nor a “national” firm, but a private “American firm”, undertaking a 
multi-national business, operating both in the US and in the global marketplace.           
 Boeing’s airplane manufacturing relies heavily on outsourcing with a 
major focus on assembling airplanes in the US manufacturing sites of Renton and 
Everett in the state of Washington. Boeing does its own sales/marketing, but has 
been steadily increasing its outsourcing to Japan since 1970, when the B747 
inaugurated its commercial service. There followed profit/risk-sharing joint-ventures 
with Japan on the B767, the B757, and the B777 programs successively, as well as 
the current on-going B787 “new generation” airplane program. Boeing has been 
outsourcing for decades mainly because of the increased cost of US labor and 
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partly due to the airplane sales concession called the “offset” program that Boeing 
grants airline customers.  
                 US labor unions have complained about Boeing’s outsourcing. The 
problem with this, however, is that US workers simply priced themselves out of the 
market decades ago. Therefore, the major portion of airplane manufacturing, 
including major assemblies, are done outside of the US and are then flown to 
Boeing’s main plants in Renton and Everett in the state of Washington, where the 
final major assembly takes place and customer specified airplane engines are 
mounted. This is then followed by flight testing and inspection certified by the US 
FAA (Federal Aviation Agency).  
               Susan Strange (1992) supports the view that “bargaining” produces 
partnerships of alliances between host-states and firms, which is based on the 
exchange of benefits and opportunities to enhance either party’s success in the 
competition of global market shares. The partnerships are exemplified by long-
established business alliances between Japan, the host government, and Boeing, 
the American firm. Japanese manufacturers and Boeing have collaborated on 
several risk-sharing joint manufacture ventures, which include the Boeing B767, 
B777 and the “new generation” B787 airplane programs. The long-term alliance 
between Boeing and Japan enhanced Boeing’s success in Japanese marketplace 
where Boeing retained major market shares of airplane sales.  
                 Airbus alleged that the Japanese government subsidized the Boeing 787 
program. However, Airbus clearly understated its allegation because Airbus’s strong 
allegation on Boeing’s business relations with Japan could easily backfire and bring 
a negative effect on Airbus and EADS’s potential business in Japan. Therefore, 
Airbus was fully aware that it was not politically a sensible move to make a case out 
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of the Japanese government’s subsidy on the Boeing-Japan joint venture as it 
related to Boeing’s “new generation” B787 airplanes.   
New technological changes and globalization go hand-in-hand and bring 
about a “multiplier effect” on the large commercial airplane marketplace. First, 
globalization of the marketplace has been facilitated by newly developed 
technological changes such as the advancement of telecommunications, 
liberalization of trade (toward an eventual elimination of the customs barriers),  
better access to advanced communications, a better and cheaper air transport 
network around the globe. Second, globalization further expedited the advancement 
of new technological changes, facilitated the acceleration of technological 
development, and also shaped the new business environment. 
The two most crucial factors in the success of the large commercial 
airplane business are the developmental cost of the new airplane and on-time 
delivery of the airplane. This is mainly because the costly R&D expenditures of the 
new airplane program and the production time associated with it have gone up 
dramatically in recent years, meaning that failure in on-time delivery of the new 
airplane program could not only negatively affect the program, but could also have a 
negative financial effect on airframe manufacturers.  
  
THE CASE OF AIRBUS – BOEING DUOPOLY
66
 
In the previous three decades, Boeing had been dominating the commercial 
airframe industry. At various points in these decades, the Airbus vs. Boeing airplane 
subsidy disputes had almost led the EU and the US to the brink of a trade war in 
large commercial airplane business.  
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 In order to provide a clear insight and a better understanding of the EU’s 
monopoly policy, a clear definition is needed as to what monopoly and duopoly 
mean in economic terms. An industry with only a few producers is known as an 
oligopoly; a firm in such an industry is known as an oligopolist. An oligopoly 
consisting of only two firms is a duopoly and each firm is known as a duopolist. 
Airbus and Boeing are the case in point. Cini and McGowan (1998) argue that the 
existence of a monopoly (one firm dominating a market) or an oligopoly ( a very 
small number of large firms dominating a market) may also have a detrimental 
effect on competition. This certainly includes the on-going duopoly competition 
between Airbus and Boeing. They support the arguments that dominant firms (either 
on their own as monopolists, or together as oligopolists including duopolists) can 
abuse their position, using their market power to cut prices and drive out 
competitors (predatory pricing) or charging high prices where consumers have little 
alternative but to pay up. Did the existence of oligopoly or duopoly (two large firms 
dominating a market) have a detrimental effect oln the competition in the large 
commercial airplane markets?  
 During the 1980s the large commercial airplane industry was made of 
three players: Airbus, Boeing, and McDonnell-Douglas. They were the three 
oligopolists competing for large commercial airplane manufacturing, marketing, and 
sales. Since 1997 when Boeing merged with McDonnell-Douglas, the large 
commercial airplane industry has been in duopoly competition dominated by the 
only two aerospace giants, airbus and Boeing.  
 While on one firm has a monopoly in the large commercial airplane 
market, Airbus and Boeing, the two dominant airplane producers nonetheless know 
that they can affect market prices. Airbus and Boeing are in a situation where both 
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firms not only compete but also possess market power affecting market prices, 
hence, the large commercial airplane industry is characterized by imperfect 
competition.
67
  
 
Airbus – Boeing Competing in Prices versus in Quantities
68
  
In a duopoly situation, one can assume that firms choose a quantity of output and 
sell it at whatever the price the market determines. That can be a typical way some 
markets work. In other markets like automobiles, firms don’t set a production level; 
However, this does not apply to the large commercial airplane industry. For 
example, Boeing airplanes are made to order to meet airline customers’ 
specifications on their airplanes.  
 When firms ignore the effects of their actions on each other’s profits, they 
engage in “non-cooperative behavior”.
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 In choosing what to do such as choosing a 
level of output, or choosing a price, “an oligopolist must always be concerned about 
whether non-cooperative rival firm will respond by undercutting her.”
70
 Therefore, in 
a “non-cooperative” behavior situation such as a duopoly with only two sellers, 
Airbus and Boeing, each must take account of the other’s expected reactions.  
Duopoly competition theories conclude two types of competition: Cournot duopoly 
and Bertrand duopoly. 
 
Quantity Competition or Cournot (Behavior) Duopoly
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The Cournot duopoly is the two-firm case of Cournot competition – a market 
situation with only two sellers, each of whom fixes their own output on the 
assumption that the other will hold the quantity (produced) unchanged. This 
encourages the change in the production level (the quantity change) as a form of 
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competition. For Airbus and Boeing, deciding production capacity – how many 
airplanes they can produce over the next several years – is their most critical 
decision. This is because large commercial airplanes are large and assembled in 
batches, a few airplanes at a time in huge hangars: in case of Boeing one hangar in 
Renton for building one-aisle, standard-body B737 airplanes; the other in Everett for 
making wide-body airplanes including the B747, B777, and the “new generation” 
technology B787 airplanes. The critical factors of the monthly production rates on 
how many airplanes can be built are the size of the existing assembly plant facilities 
which take time to build, availability of the skilled labor force, and he level of  
efficiencies for the production of  airplanes.  
 Airbus delivered 434 airplanes in 2005, making it four years straight 
Airbus has topped Boeing, which delivered 398 airplanes. When Airbus decides to 
increase its annual maximum production capacity to 450 airplanes per year, Boeing 
can feel assured that Airbus will not increase its production rates any time soon. 
This, in return, has important implications prompting Boeing’s response and actions. 
If Boeing also decides on setting its production capacity at 450 airplanes per year, 
the assumption here is that Airbus’s capacity is given, constrained by limited 
production capacity and that this will result in the market share of 50-50 split 
between Airbus and Boeing. It was assumed that Airbus would not be able to 
respond by quickly increasing its output and taking some of Boeing’s customers 
away by offering them a lower price. The result is that the total output of the large 
commercial airplane industry is less than the output under perfect competition, and 
each firm earns a profit. This kind of behavior is referred by economists as quantity 
competition or Cournot behavior.            
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 The Cournot assumption, however, is not realistic because over time one 
would expect the firms to realize that the others do vary their quantities by adopting 
a more sophisticated forecasting technique. Krugman and Wells (2008) argue that 
the basic insight of the Cpournot duopoly model is that when firms are restricted in 
how much to produce, they would be able to easily avoid excessive competition and 
“divvy up” the market, thereby pricing above marginal cost and earning profits.
72
 
They also argued that this is because these firms can easily attain an outcome that 
“looks like collusion without a formal agreement.” So the next question is how do 
duopolists change their behavior when limited production capacity does not 
constrain them?  
 
Price Competition or Bertrand (Behavior) Duopoly
73
   
In Bertrand duopoly, each assumes that the other will hold the price unchanged. 
This encourages the use of price-cutting as a form of competition, particularly if the 
products are good substitutes. This leads to severe price competition. As price gets 
driven down towards, marginal cost it is hard to see how firms under Bertrand 
competition could even cover fixed costs.  
 In a real world, Airbus and Boeing are constrained limited production 
capacity. Because of the limited production capacity of the airplane producers, 
when airline customers place airplane orders with Airbus or Boeing, they place 
billions of dollars worth airplanes to be delivered over the next several years. For 
example, in 2008 before the very first fes of this prototype airplane model had not 
even completed flight tests, Boeing had already sold over eight hundred copies of 
the most popular “new generation,” “new technology” Boeing B787 twin-engine 
wide-body airplanes worth billions dollars to be delivered over the ne several years. 
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Airbus rival “new technology” super jumbo jet A380 with a triple deck has so far sold 
about 200 airplanes inaugurating its first delivery with no fanfare in late 2008.  
 When the economy is strong and many airline customers want to place 
orders with the duopolist airplane producers, Airbus and Boeing are likely find the 
number of airplanes they can produce constrained by production capacity – for 
example, how many airplanes to be built per month depending on the size of the 
company’s existing production facilities and their manufacturing environment, they 
are most likely to behave according to the Cournot model and price the airplanes 
above the marginal costs to earn profits. However, when the economy turns poor, 
both Airbus and Boeing would not be able to sell airplanes because airlines would 
stop placing airplane orders with Airbus and Boeing during the poor economic 
conditions. The worst case scenario is that the airline would cancel airplane orders 
and stop taking airplane delivery.  
 In a severe economic recession, airplane producers’ capacity constraints 
do not come into the picture. Since Airbus and Boeing would have excess 
production capacity, they are not able to sustain Cournot behavior. Krugman and 
Wells (2006) argue that as long as each firm finds that it can make additional sales 
by reducing price, each will continue cutting until price is equal to marginal cost. The  
case in point is Airbus’s phenomenal sales success in capturing the no-frill, discount 
airlines such as the Ryanair case. They also argue that further reducing price would 
cause them to incur avoidable loss. Economists refer to this type of behavior as  
price competition or Bertrand behavior. Krugman and Wells (2006) argue that the 
rationale behind the Bertrand model is that when firms produce perfect substitutes 
and have sufficient capacity to meet demand when price is equal to marginal cost, 
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then each firm will be compelled to engage in competition by undercutting its rival’s 
price until price reaches marginal cost – that is, perfect competition.  
 Krugman and Wells (2006) further argue that oligopolists would prefer to 
avoid Bertrand behavior because it earns them zero profits. Firms try to avoid direct 
price competition – such as producing  products that are not perfect substitutes but 
are differentiated. Airbus vs. Boeing competition is a duopoly, the simplest case of 
oligopoly. Airbus vs. Boeing duopoly competition is best described by Bertrand 
duopoly which leads to severe airplane price cutting competition. As compared to a 
Copurnot duopoly, Bertrand competition is closer to the real world of airplane 
duopoly competition where an airplane price often gets driven down towards 
marginal cost. In a highly competitive sales situation, airframe manufacturers 
(Airbus and Boeing) might offer the price package including customer support 
services, maintenance cost, and flight crew training cost.  
 The Cournot duopoly assumption is not quite realistic in the case of 
Airbus vs, Boeing competition. Cournot duopoly assumes that the other would hold 
the quantity (that the other produces) unchanged. In practice, Boeing produces 
each airplane in a batch order (made to order only after the orders received from 
the airline customers).  
 However, the price of the airplane is not the only airplane acquisition 
selection criteria. For example, in terms of airplane operating costs, the least 
operating costs result from an all Boeing airplane fleet or all Airbus airplane fleet 
instead of a mixed airplane fleet of Airbus and Boeing airplanes. This is simply 
because the commonality of the airplanes of the same airframe manufacturers 
enables the purchasing airline to lower the operating costs of the planes including 
airplane maintenance cost and flight training costs.  
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THE AIRPLANE SUBSIDY CASE IN THE WTO 
Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Lockheed were the three major suppliers of US 
military airplanes and contributed towards the development of new technology and 
its applications. Military programs for the US, such as the KC-135, paid the costly 
R&D expenses of the commercial airplanes, like Being 707, in the late 1950s. 
Boeing decided to reinvest $16 million of the company profits in order to develop the 
“Dash 80”, which became the prototype for the KC-135, the first jet aerial tanker, 
and then for the 707-120, the first line of Boeing commercial jetliner.
74
 Boeing 
inherited 707 airframe manufacturing technologies almost entirely from military 
programs and benefited from the use of already existing manufacturing facilities in 
(the city of) Renton, in the state of Washington. 
  Alongside Boeing, the development of the successful Airbus A300 
program, the first in a long line of Airbus commercial airplanes, was paid for by 
European government subsidy in the late 1960s. The A300 was the world’s first 
twin-engine twin-aisle commercial airplane. Like Boeing, Airbus’ heavy R&D costs 
were absorbed by the governments supporting it. Airbus’ A300 sales took off in 
1970, soon afterward, followed by the A320 and the A310, which was brought to the 
market in 1983. Airbus was the first to introduce digital fly-by-wire controls,
75
 with 
the A320 in 1988. Following this, Airbus successfully developed its full product line, 
including: the A330/A340, the twin aisle family that features wing commonality; the 
A350 retaining full operational commonality with the rest of Airbus airplane family; 
and the A380, the super jumbo airplane that brought further development of 
advanced technologies in an attempt to displace the widely accepted 747 out of the 
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high-density traffic segment of the market. The US alleges that Airbus developed  
its entire Airbus fleet with the aid of EU government subsidies.  
   As previously explored, after the demise of Lockheed in 1981, only three 
major players were left: Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Airbus. McDonnell 
Douglas operated a business of large commercial airplanes and military defense. 
However, Douglas Aircraft could not compete with Airbus and Boeing due to its 
limited line of products – wide-body Douglas DC-10 tri-jets and small-sized, short-
distance DC-9 jets.  
AIRBUS 
 
Airbus Industrie, the French-based European consortium, was formally established 
in December 1970 to challenge the dominance of US commercial jet makers. In the 
late 1960s, Europeans realized that a successful entry to the commercial airplane 
market would require several European companies to collaborate in order to 
compete against the American dominance of the industry. Airbus thus began as a 
consortium of European aerospace companies. In 1967, British, French, and 
German governments agreed to develop a 300 seat Airbus, the A300.  
 As Boeing introduced the 747 wide-body jet in 1970, Airbus started with 
the production of A300 airplanes in the same year, as a French-German consortium 
company, followed soon after by the A320 and the A310. Airbus has achieved a 
phenomenal success since its inception in 1970 by increasing its market share of 
airplane deliveries from 15 percent in 1990 to 57 percent of the market by 2005.   
 Consolidation of European defense and aerospace companies in 1999 
and 2000 allowed the establishment of a simplified joint-stock company in 2001, 
owned by EADS (80%) and BAE Systems (20%). After a protracted sales process 
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BAE sold its shareholding to EADS in 2006. Airbus employs around 52,000 people 
at sixteen sites in four EU countries: France, Germany, the UK and Spain. Final 
assembly production is at Toulouse (France), Hamburg (Germany), Serville (Spain) 
and, since 2009, Tianjin (People’s Republic of China). Airbus has subsidiaries in the 
US Japan, China, and India. Over the past four decades it has received orders for 
thousands of airplanes from 225 world-wide airline customers. 
 Several factors seem to have contributed to Airbus’s outstanding 
success: production of new technology airplanes; consistent technological 
innovation; a stable pool of highly skilled manpower; and a concept of airplane 
families that provides customers with cost savings in crew training, maintenance, 
and wide-range product lines that serve the various airline customers’ needs. Airbus 
management also states that “international composition of Airbus represents a 
competitive advantage in the global marketplace”.
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BOEING 
During the early 20
th
 century, four companies emerged and founded the US 
aerospace industry. They were the Boeing Company, Douglas Aircraft Co., 
McDonnell Aircraft Corp. and North American Aviation. Three players of the 
dominant US commercial jet industry, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Lockheed, 
all had their origins in military airplane production which contributed to the 
development of advanced airplane technology and its commercial application. By 
the end of the 20
th
 century, Boeing had become the culmination and consolidation 
of all these three American commercial airplane technology resources and 
manufacturing capabilities, which finally merged into one in 1916: the Boeing 
Company in the Puget Sound region of the Washington state. Boeing became a 
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leading manufacturer of military and commercial airplanes, and later, after a series 
of strategic mergers and acquisitions, became the world’s largest, diversified 
aerospace company.  
 
BOEING-MDC (McDONNELL-DOUGLAS CORP.) MERGER IN 1997 
In the United States, manufacturing firms become large, multi-unit enterprises by 
adding marketing and purchasing offices or by way of a merger and/or acquisition.  
During the 1980s, the large commercial airplane industry was made of three 
players: Airbus, Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas. These three oligopolists competed 
for the manufacturing, marketing, and sales of large commercial airplanes. 
McDonnell Douglas, with only tri-jet DC10s and small DC-9 regional jets, was no 
longer much of a competitor to Airbus and Boeing, both of which had a full product 
line of commercial jets. Therefore, Douglas only played a peripheral role in the large 
commercial airplane competition and eventually merged with Boeing in 1997
77
.   
 The 1997 merger with MDC made Boeing the largest commercial airplane 
company as well as one of the biggest defense contractors in the US
78
. The 1997 
merger of Boeing/MDC was, in fact, the inception of the duopoly competition 
between Airbus and Boeing. The Boeing/MDC merger filled Boeing’s critical need 
for defense business in military airplanes and weapons systems, which had been 
controlled by McDonnell. Thus, the 1997 merger of Boeing/MDC finally stabilized 
the cyclical nature of Boeing’s commercial airplane business and enabled Boeing to 
diversify and increase US government defense contracts on aerospace and military 
airplanes. As such, since the merger in 1997, Boeing has become a broadly 
diversified aerospace company, balancing the commercial airplane business and 
the more stable, long-cycle defense business inherited from McDonnell Douglas. 
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Since then, the large commercial airplane industry has been in a duopoly dominated 
by the only two aerospace giants, Airbus and Boeing.   
 The 1997 merger also provided Boeing with a great deal of business 
stability, diversification, and dynamic business performance. Prior to the merger, 
Boeing was susceptible to the business cycles of the commercial airplane business 
because about 80 percent of Boeing business was in the commercial airplane 
business and the rest generated from other avenues. Today, 50 percent of Boeing 
business comes from Commercial Airplanes, 48 percent from Integrated Defense 
Systems, 2 percent from others, with a better-balanced business mix, generating 
more than one and a quarter billion dollars a week in operating revenues.  
However, the 1997 Boeing/McDonnell merger produced differing views 
and positions from the EU and the US, and raised a number of controversial 
economic and legal questions. Differing conclusions have been drawn from this 
merger between the EU and the US reflect; as outlined by Fox (1998), there are  
“fundamental differences in the legal philosophies and economic assumptions of the 
US and European merger-review authorities.”
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BOEING’S GLOBAL BUSINESS 
In 2007, the Boeing Company achieved records for revenues, cash flow and 
backlog. Operating revenues rose 8 percent to a total of $66.4 billion, of which 
$33.4 billion or 50 percent came from Commercial Airplanes, and $32.1 billion or 48 
percent from Integrated Defense Systems. Net income grew 84 percent to $4.1 
billion; earnings per share increased by 85 percent; cash flow rose 28 percent to 
$9.6 billion; and total backlog increased more than 30 percent to $327 billion, nearly 
five times its total revenues of 66.3 billion.  
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 In the recent competition of “new generation” airplanes between the two 
airplane models, Airbus A380 vs. Boeing B787, Airbus received over 200 orders for 
the A380, while Boeing sold over 900 B787s. Airbus’s super jumbo triple-deck 
A380, comfortably accommodates 555 to 800 passengers directly from major airport 
to major airport. However, Boeing argues that the B787 carries 223 – 296 
passengers and flies longer distances, directly point-to-point from origin to 
destination. Furthermore, Boeing claims that the “new generation” B787 offers 20  
percent more fuel efficiency. This study finds that Airbus’ decision to launch the 
A380 is based on Airbus’ rather optimistic projections of the world passenger traffic 
demand. 
 The production problem of the Airbus A380 caused was a great financial 
setback to Airbus, mainly due to its almost two-year delayed delivery, while the 
record-breaking sales of B787 positioned Boeing ahead of the game. However, that 
caused delayed delivery, but was ultimately more of a success, because it appears 
to have filled the critical needs of airline customers as well as its customers’ 
customers, the travelling public. This is simply because Boeing seems to be offering 
an airplane most suited to the detailed specifications of what customer airlines 
need: maximum passenger comfort, environmentally sound, quiet with a further 
flying distance which will allow passengers to fly directly from origin to destination, 
point-to-point. Most importantly, from a financial standpoint, the right airplane is the 
one that provides the best economics to bring the best cash flow results (as well as 
the superior performance capability of the airplane).  
 Airbus is currently challenging Boeing by launching a two–engine Airbus 
A350 airplane to compete directly with the B787. The A350 airplane, has similar 
seating capacity and operating features to the Boeing B787, and is considered to be  
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Airbus’s hedging scheme that covers a potential risk of billions of dollars. This 
triggered Boeing’s allegation regarding unfair competition: Airbus is building the 
A350 with the sustained use of government subsidies in direct competition with the 
B787, Boeing’s latest invention in the recent years, expected to be debuted before 
the end of 2012.  
 Boeing has argued that Airbus has received about $40 billion in subsidies 
over the last three decades and has also received some $15 billion in launch aid 
from European governments since 1992. Boeing argues that Airbus has not repaid 
most of that aid and further suggests that if Airbus had borrowed that money on 
commercial terms, its parent companies - EADS and BAE Systems - would be $35 
billion in debt. Airbus immediately counter-argued that Boeing has taken $23 billion 
in subsidies through government-funded R&D work.  
 Considering the highly competitive strategic duopoly of Airbus and 
Boeing, market entry into large commercial airplane industry seems to be virtually 
closed to any individual firm. Despite this, a corporate takeover of Boeing through 
merger and acquisition is always a possibility in a free market, however remote 
such a prospect may seem. Mergers and acquisitions, even hostile takeovers, may 
become a real possibility if the market valuation of Boeing substantially declines. As 
Hall and Soskice suggest, “securing finance by large firms depends on their 
valuation in equity markets, where dispersed investors depend on publicly available 
information to value the company” (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p27). 
 It has been argued that Airbus has achieved market share growth, profit 
growth, and increased production/cost efficiency, equal to or better than Boeing in 
recent years because of its ability to combine production experience with the aid of 
continued subsidies from EU governments. By 1995, Douglas’ market share was 13 
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percent, Airbus’s 33 percent, and Boeing’s 54 percent. Douglas’ market share 
declined further to only 8 percent in 1997, at the time of the Boeing-McDonnell 
Douglas merger. After the merger, the production of Douglas commercial airplanes 
continued for a while but eventually discontinued.   
  
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO)
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As previously outlined, the WTO plays a critical role as the world’s dispute 
resolution mechanism. WTO rules are enforceable and governments are generally 
prepared to accept penalties but sometimes they defy DSM decisions. In relation to 
the WTO, the agent–structure debate is about how the (aforementioned) “structure” 
or rules can make Airbus and Boeing act in a certain way or how the actions of 
Airbus and Boeing are able to shape the rules or the relationship between these 
two. The existing political phenomena and ground rules are applied to the “agential 
factor” – the action or political conduct of two actors, Boeing and Airbus. The most 
critical issue of the on-going subsidy disputes is that their duopoly competition must 
take place in a “level playing field” according to the rules of the WTO which has 
more powers than the EU and the US governments, the two “agents.” 
                         Preliminary rulings at the WTO make the subsidy of the A380 illegal. It 
is, therefore, expected that the same ruling will apply to the A350. European 
subsidies to civil aviation are also likely to change in response to the serious US 
allegation in the WTO on the EU subsidization of the A350 program. Within the 
context of the international political economy, the two “agents” (the EU and the US 
governments) are disputing government subsidies, or agential factors, on behalf of 
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Airbus and Boeing in the WTO, an actor as well as an arbitrator. The agential 
factor, the action or political conduct of Airbus and Boeing is now under scrutiny in 
the WTO, which has the structure or enforceable procedures and rules to hand.  
The WTO, a multilateral trading system, ensures that trade flows as 
smoothly, predictably, and freely as possible to promote economic growth and to 
improve the welfare of the people based on a liberal trade principle. To do that, the 
WTO performs three major functions among others: administering WTO 
agreements; providing a forum for trade negotiations; and handling trade disputes. 
The WTO facilitates freer trade for countries by lowering their trade barriers so that 
they can produce goods and services for which they have a comparative 
advantage. The WTO’s primary concerns are commercial interest and development. 
The WTO facilitates trade liberalization and is thus a powerful force in free and 
positive economic competition by creating jobs and reducing poverty.  
 
SETTING DISPUTES AT THE WTO
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Dispute settlement is the core mainstay of the multilateral world trading system 
where the WTO makes a unique contribution to the stability of the global economy. 
The WTO’s procedures make the rules-based system more effective because the 
rules can be enforced under the rules of law, making the world trading system more 
secure and predictable.   
 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY (DSB)
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In the DSB, the first two stages of the dispute settlement procedure are: a 
consultation mediation between governments which seeks to settle their 
differences, followed by the appointment of a panel of experts. The DSB is the most 
 
 
67 
important actor and the law enforcement body of this dispute settlement process. It 
has the sole authority to establish “panels” of experts to consider the case and to 
accept or reject the panels’ findings or the results of an appeal. It monitors the 
implementation of the rulings and recommendations, and has the power to 
authorize retribution when a country does not comply with a ruling.   
Officially, the panel helps the DSB make rulings or recommendations. 
However, because the panel’s report can only be rejected by consensus in the 
DSB, its conclusions are often difficult to overturn. The panel’s findings have to be 
based on the agreements cited and the final report should normally be given to the 
disputing parties within six months. In cases of urgency, the deadline is shortened 
to three months. A complete breakdown of the main stages of the panels’ work by 
target time is detailed in the Exhibit 8 of the Appendix. 
 
THE WTO’S 1994 AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND THE COUNTER-VALING 
MEASURES 
After the termination of the 1992 GATT bilateral agreement in late 2004, the EU and 
the US came up with a negotiation framework at the beginning of 2005 toward 
developing a new agreement on how to end airplane subsidies. This called for both 
sides to forge a new agreement based on a restrictive definition of “subsidies” from 
the WTO’s 1994 agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures. The WTO’s 
1994 agreement was a multilateral pact, which was signed by the EU, the US, and 
more than 125 other nations. This was an important step towards ending subsidies. 
The EU and the US agreed that both sides would not pursue the litigation at the 
WTO nor seek new subsidies while negotiations continue and developed a secure 
and comprehensive new agreement to end subsidies.
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The EU seemed to finally agree on the use of the WTO’s 1994 agreement 
as a basis to form a new agreement on subsidies between the EU and the US. This 
is the first time both sides had agreed to work towards the end of government 
subsidies and Boeing observed “Europe’s willingness to agree to using the 1994 
definition as part of the negotiation framework signals that it may be slowly coming 
to grips with the idea that Airbus needs to operate on the same commercial 
principles as Boeing.”
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APPEALS PROCESS  
Either Airbus or Boeing can appeal against panel’s ruling. Since Boeing won the 
preliminary ruling of the on-going Airbus vs. Boeing subsidy dispute case in 
November of 2009 (and then won again for the last time in late 2011 in the final 
ruling) it is unlikely that Airbus will appeal against the case at the WTO in 2012. 
Airbus has the right to appeal against a panel’s final ruling but it is highly unlikely 
that Airbus will appeal against the final ruling of 2011 which ruled in favor of Boeing.   
 Appeals are strictly based on points of law, such as legal interpretation. 
As such, appeals cannot re-examine existing evidence or examine new issues. An 
appeals process is a legal process through which each appeal is heard by three 
members of a permanent seven-member Appellate Body broadly representing the 
range of WTO membership.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
69 
Airbus vs. Boeing disputes reflect the common driving forces from two different 
political-regimes from Europe and the US, which finally engaged in the government 
subsidy disputes in Airbus vs. Boeing case at the WTO in Geneva. Both Airbus and 
Boeing are making great contribution to the balance of payments and economic 
growth of their countries. Both airplane manufacturers are the country’s defense 
and will be used in case of national emergencies. However, The research finds that 
there is a distinctive difference in modus operandi between Airbus and Boeing. The 
EU governments and Airbus clearly take a firm stand, which is different from the US 
government and Boeing, a private and free enterprise. In fact, Airbus takes a full 
advantage of getting government subsidies, which are widely accepted in Europe 
but not quite overtly in the US.   
 Subsidization of Airbus became a serious threat to Boeing in 2003. Airbus 
finally overtook Boeing as a market share leader in 2004 with the financial aid of the 
EU governments. As soon as the news media reported Airbus’s new leadership, 
Boeing initiated a law suit against Airbus by filing complaints at the WTO to prevent 
Airbus’s further attempts to market share maximization efforts. Airbus had no choice 
but face Boeing’s legal complaints at the WTO court and, therefore, Airbus followed 
suit immediately by filing the complaints against Boeing on the same day.   
 The European Union and the United States are two dominant players on 
the global stage. Their relationship roles are critically important in all aspects of 
global politics and economy by impacting the major political arena around the world. 
The United States no longer dominates the state-business relationship, while Airbus 
is critically important in European aerospace industry primarily because the 
European airplane industry depends on the state industry including all phases and 
every aspect of aerospace technology. For example, the state-business relationship 
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is critically important because of the dependence of the British airplane industry on 
the state.  
 Boeing decided to take legal actions against Airbus and, therefore, took 
the case to the WTO to stop Airbus’s market share aggression. It seems likely that 
Airbus was fully aware that Boeing clearly had the legal edge over Airbus in the law 
suit case, but Airbus had to face Boeing at the WTO. Boeing, being a typical 
American company, is totally profit-oriented and strives for maximization of wealth 
for stockholders, while Airbus, a multi-European firm, prioritizes the market share 
increase at cost instead of profit maximization.   
 There was no surprise in the preliminary ruling of the WTO as one would 
expect in a quasi-judicial setting. Boeing took an initiative and brought this case up 
to the WTO to prevent Airbus from further attempt to increase their market share 
gain with the continuous financial aid from EU governments. Boeing won a 
preliminary ruling as expected. Boeing decided to take a legal action against 
Airbus’s continuous use of government subsidies because Boeing seemed to have 
a solid ground to win the case. Boeing initiated a law suit to prevent Airbus from 
receiving a financial aid from the EU governments. Airbus had no choice but to 
follow Boeing and faced the US complaints at the WTO court.  
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CHAPTER 3 
MAKING/MARKETING LARGE COMMERCIAL 
AIRPLANES  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter elaborates on the business strategies of manufacturing and marketing 
large commercial airplanes in order to provide the context in which the airplane 
disputes can be analyzed. This it does by: explaining the differing and conflicting 
views of the EU and the US on government subsidies; elaborating on whether and 
how the subsidies would seriously harm competition at the expense of the 
consumers; presenting the EU-US subsidy disputes with focus on the conceptual 
framework of the international political economy. The chapter also addresses 
Airbus’ recent problems and financial setbacks from the delayed delivery of the 
A380 that led to the top management shake-up of Airbus and EADS.  
As outlined in chapter two, Airbus and Boeing are the “hub of a complex 
and interdependent web of supplier firms”
85
. For example, Boeing is the hub of the 
lucrative Japanese marketplace where Boeing has a major market share of the 
large commercial airplane sales, while Airbus has been trying to break into this 
marketplace for years. Boeing has a risk-sharing joint venture agreement with three 
major Japanese manufacturing firms known as “three heavies”: Kawasaki Heavy 
Industries; Fuji Heavy Industries; and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. They are 
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Boeing’s major outsourcing and joint-venture undertakings for the large commercial 
airplanes. 
Global strategy is critical in the commercial airplane industry, which is 
global, homogeneous, and highly competitive. The industry is not in perfect 
competition but has what economists call “increasing returns to scale and huge 
barriers to entry”, characterized by a high fixed cost for R&D development of “new-
generation” airplanes. The new Airbus A380’s original budget was $10.7 billion for a 
one-time R&D cost.
86
 It takes at least 12 years and between $10 billion to $15 billion 
to develop a new airliner from drawing board to test flight. The more orders 
received, the more widely the huge development cost can be spread, bringing down 
the unit cost of an airplane. There are also benefits of scope economies in that the 
technology can be spread across a family of products.
87
  
 
MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
88
 
 
The large commercial airplane market is affected by several factors: passenger 
demand for air travel; cyclicality or seasonal demand fluctuations that affect air 
travel; domestic and international regulations and deregulations that airlines abide 
by; and the rate of replacement and obsolescence factors of airlines’ airplane fleet. 
Changes in passenger demand are precipitated and often lead to short-term market 
imbalances, several factors of which can act as a catalyst: the performance, 
competitiveness, and strategy of airlines, cargo operators, and leasing companies; 
external environments under which airlines operate such as political unrest; 
extraordinary events such as global financial crisis and wars.   
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Future Economic and Traffic Growth 
Passenger demand for air travel is dependent on economic growth. According to 
Boeing’s projection over the next twenty years (2003 – 2022), worldwide economic 
growth will average 3.2 percent per year; passenger traffic growth will average 5.1 
percent per year; and cargo traffic growth will average 6.4 percent per year. Boeing 
projects that the world’s long-term economic prospects remain healthy. According to 
Boeing, in the short-term, air travel is influenced by economic and business cycles, 
consumer confidence, and external events. However, in the long-run, economic 
cycles will smooth out, and GDP, international trade, lower fares, and network 
service improvement trends will become paramount.  
   
Future Airplane Demand
89
 
 
From 2007 to 2026, Boeing projected that the number of airplanes in service would 
double from 18,230 in 2006 to 36,420 by 2026.
90
 In terms of airplane demand from 
2007 to 2026, airplane deliveries world-wide from 2007 to 2026 will be 28,600
91
 new 
airplanes at $2.8 trillion delivery dollars, according to the 2006 manufacturers’ list 
prices. Airbus’s projection over the 20-year period from 2004 to 2024 is 17,328 new 
airplanes (as compared to Boeing projection of over 18,000 new airplanes) valued 
at $1.9 trillion.
92
 Airbus’s projection of market demand for large-sized airplanes led 
to the development of the super jumbo jet A380 that carries 500 to 600 passengers 
depending on the seat configuration of airplanes.
93
 
 What, with retrospect, would have happened if Airbus decided to develop 
the new “generation”, “high technology” large commercial airplane, the same size 
airplane as the B747, or perhaps, slightly bigger than the B747?  For argument’s 
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sake, it can be called the “Euro challenge” Airbus A400, the European’s direct  
answer to the B747, with a 400-seat capacity with the basic seat configuration just 
like the B747, which was originally developed four decades ago. However, this 
version of the new generation, high technology B747 size airplane could have better 
fuel burn efficiency with a better direct operating cost, superior to Boeing’s old 
technology based B747. Therefore, if Airbus had decided to build the Euro 
Challenge Airbus A400, the result could have been a lot better than that witnessed 
by the very limited sales result of the A380 with 500 -600 passenger seats – which 
were developed to capture the market potential with only no more than 200 jets. 
However, this version of the new generation, high technology B747 size airplane 
could have a better fuel burn efficiency with a better direct operating cost, superior 
to Boeing’s old technology based B747. Therefore, if Airbus has decided to build the 
“Euro Challenge” Airbus A400, directly challenging the B747, its chances could 
have been a lot better than that witnessed by the A380 with 500 - 600 passenger 
seats, which were developed to capture the market potentials projected to be about 
only 200 super jumbo jets with over 500 seat capacity. But, of course, Airbus never 
challenged the B747 and, thus, the B747’s monopoly in this 400 seat wide-body 
market segment continues. Thus,  
 Boeing will finally roll out the first “new generation” “high technology” 
B787 in late 2012 to start delivering some of more than 900 of the new jets. It will 
take several years to fill the orders based on a production pace of about ten B787s 
a month. The B787 is one of the most successful innovations in decades and will 
soon improving Boeing business and also making a positive contribution to the US 
balance of payment.    
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 It is expected that the world’s commercial aviation will expand to provide 
long-term opportunities projecting a market value of $3.2 trillion over the next 20 
years, according to Boeing’s 2009 annual report. The same report projects an 
addressable defense, space and security market of nearly $1trillion over the next 
five years between 2010 and 2014.   
 
Cyclicality 
The market of large commercial airplanes remains prone to the cyclicality of the 
global economy and impacts airlines’ operating revenues. For instance, airlines can 
postpone airplane acquisition decisions until the economy improves. In fact, when 
the economy slows down, customer airlines can delay or even cancel airplane 
orders and delivery. So far, there has not been any cancellation of airplane orders. 
However, by contrast, in the economic upswing of 2005, both Airbus and Boeing 
had a record year for airplane orders. One of the key areas requiring careful 
management is, therefore, the planned obsolescence and replacement of an 
existing airplane fleet.    
 
Planned Obsolescence and Replacement of Airplane Fleet 
Obsolescence and replacement of the old airplane fleet are major factors affecting 
the commercial airplane market, according to Porter (1998). Airplane obsolescence 
is oriented towards the technological obsolescence of an aging fleet which is 
associated with increasingly higher operating costs and has also been affected by 
the recent increase in fuel costs.
94
 As the airplane fleet ages, direct operating cost, 
including fuel cost and maintenance cost of aging fleets, becomes increasingly 
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higher and results in a higher cost-per-seat for airlines. The oil price hike, if or when 
it happens, could have a negative impact on the US economy. 
 
Airbus – the Industry Leader 
 
As outlined above, Airbus overtook Boeing in 2003 in terms of market share  
through airplane delivery, and has been a leader of the large commercial airplane 
industry for the past several years. Boeing argues that Airbus’s sustained use of 
government subsidies has enabled Airbus to develop its complete family of products 
from the 107-seat A318 to the 555-seat A380. Boeing also argues that with the aid 
of government subsidies, Airbus has been able to compete head-to-head with 
Boeing, pursuing an aggressive marketing strategy toward maximization of global 
market share in the large commercial airplane industry. In fact, Airbus has captured 
a major market share of no frill/discount airlines.  
 Although Airbus and Boeing seem to have an equal status in Europe and 
the United States in terms of the market share, Airbus is and has become the leader 
of the large commercial airplane industry. 
 A private American firm like Boeing will struggle to compete with Airbus if 
it continues to be financed by European governments. The Airbus vs. Boeing case 
confirms that the European system works well because no other company except 
Airbus has been able to take Boeing on and take the leadership away from the most 
successful American aerospace firm of all time.  
MAKING AIRFRAMES
95
   
  
Airbus and Boeing manufacture a complete line of large commercial airplanes
96
 to 
meet the demands of airline customers as well as the needs of their ultimate 
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customers, the travelling public. They have developed state-of-the-art technology in 
making airplanes based on the detailed specifications of airline customers. Both 
airplane makers deploy sophisticated sales/marketing expertise to stay ahead of the 
strategic duopoly competition in a global marketplace.  
EFFECTS OF SCALE AND SCOPE ECONOMIES 
 
Klepper (1994) characterizes airframe manufacturing as effects of scale and scope 
economies contributing to the cost efficiency of future airplanes (scope economies) 
and learning in production (scale economies), outlined as follows:  
 
 Static economies of scale (R&D and start-up investment) 
 Dynamic economies of scale (learning in production)  
 Economies of scope (learning effects transferred to derivative airplanes) 
  
Economies of scope can be explained by the learning effects transferred to 
“derivative” airplanes. In other words, the learning effects acquired in the production 
of original models can influence the marginal cost of producing updated versions of 
an airplane, the so-called “derivative” models (Klepper, 1994).  
 
 “Derivative” Models 
When airframe manufacturers develop a new airplane program, its “original” models 
are always followed by “derivative” models, an extended and improved version of 
the original models. The “derivative” airplanes tend to get bigger with more seat 
capacity (than the original) in stretched-model versions, and fly further (long-range 
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capability) by extended-range or long-range versions. For example, the Boeing 777 
is available in six models: the 777-200 (original models); the 777-200ER (extended 
range) models; the 777-300, the new derivative model of the original -200 models; 
the 777-300ER, a new extended-range model; the 777-300LR (Long Range), the 
world’s longest range commercial airplane; and the 777F Freighter, an all-cargo 
airplane model. These effects of “derivative” models can be captured by scope 
economies, which are the learning effects (of manufacturing the original airplane 
models), transferred to the manufacture of derivative airplane models.  
 
MARKETING LARGE COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES 
 
While enhancing the quality and effectiveness of airplane performance, large 
commercial airplane manufacturers deploy product differentiation. Both airplane 
makers argue that their airplanes are different and better than the other – that is, 
they engage in product differentiation.
97
 
 
Product Differentiation 
According to Krugman (2006), “Firms engage in product differentiation when they 
try to convince buyers that their product is different from the products of other firms 
in the industry”. In order to be branded, products need to be differentiated (Kotler 
and Keller, 2009).  
 In recent years, Boeing has created a basis for product differentiation of 
the B787’s superior airplane performance by marketing 20 percent better fuel 
efficiency of the B787 than any of the comparable large commercial airplanes in the 
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market.
98
 Clearly, Boeing seems to have convinced their airline customers that the 
“fuel efficient” B787 provides airlines with a competitive edge over the Airbus super 
jumbo A380 and Airbus’ new airplane, the A350.   
 Both Airbus and Boeing go to huge efforts in sales and marketing to 
convince their airline customers that their airplanes are better equipped than the 
competitor’s airplanes in terms of airplane performance, economics, maintenance, 
and others. They are thus “creating a basis for differentiation”
 
of products amongst 
large commercial airplanes, according to Porter (1985).  
 A highly competitive duopoly between Airbus and Boeing led to a series 
of product and service differentiations including product innovations and strategies 
and quality-control processes. In terms of airplane operational capabilities and 
airplane economics (e.g. airlines’ airplane cash flows), both Airbus and Boeing 
claim better airplane economics (i.e. fuel efficiency), better airplane performance 
capabilities, better passenger cabin comforts, and so on. Both Airbus and Boeing 
airplanes are equally well branded and differentiated.   
 
Market Segmentation 
Market segmentation is defined as a “sub-division of the market into identifiable 
buyer groups, or sub-markets, with the aim of reaching sub groups with a particular 
marketing mix”.
99
 Through market segmentation, companies divide large, 
heterogeneous markets into smaller segments that can be reached more efficiently 
and effectively with products and services that match their unique needs.
100
 The 
concept behind “market segmentation” is that markets are made up of different 
types of customers. For example, within each total market, there exist sub-markets 
which express distinctive product preference. There are four major variables that 
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might be used in segmenting markets: geographic, demographic, psychographic, 
and behavioral variables.
101
  
 Large commercial airplane marketing has been more or less based on the 
geographic segmentation - the US market, European market, Asian market, and 
others. However, Airbus successfully deployed market segmentation based on the 
buyer’s “behavioral segmentation” variables that - “divide buyers into groups based 
on their knowledge, attitudes, uses, or responses to a product”
102
. Thus, Airbus 
captured the no-frills, low-cost airline market exemplified by easyJet, which is 
Britain’s biggest low cost airline. Airbus also successfully penetrated the US no-
frills, low-cost market, including JetBlue, America West, and Frontier. Boeing 
alleges that Airbus’s deal with the low cost airline market is most likely based on a 
below market airplane price, possibly a loss leader.
103
 
 
Airplane Fleet Commonality  
 
In addition to the fuel efficiency of the airplane, the commonality of airplanes is one 
of the most important factors affecting the airlines’ equipment acquisition 
decision.
104
 Airplane fleet commonality is referred to as the common features and 
characteristics of the family of airplanes manufactured by the same airplane 
manufacturer. 
  Airbus and Boeing both promote the “family concept” which equates with 
the fleet commonality, because the commonality philosophy to reduce development 
costs of the airplanes also provides airlines with  substantial savings in flight crew 
training costs, spare parts and maintenance costs, and aircraft scheduling. In a 
critical airplane sales competition, airframe manufacturers seem to offer the airline 
customers the most competitive airplane price (including airplane spare parts and   
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maintenance cost concessions), to get business in long-term. In the recent past, 
Airbus has been successful in the price cutting competition allowing it win Europe’s 
no-frills/low-cost operators. Political influence is also deployed to affect the airlines’ 
airplane acquisition decision.   
 
AIRBUS MARKETING STRATEGIES   
 
The strategic goal of Airbus is “to deliver the first-rate economic returns in a 
sustainable manner by continuing to develop a superior family of products and 
taking half of the world commercial aircraft market over the long-term.”
105
 It seems 
that Airbus could possibly achieve the dominant market share, 65% or higher, with 
continued use of government subsidies, but this could not perhaps be maintained if 
heavy political pressures and complaints from US politicians and the US 
government followed (as it undoubtedly would). So what is the equilibrium market 
share in duopoly competition?  
Airbus’s Marketing Focus
106
 
In order to achieve its stated goal, Airbus actively sought to focus on a number of 
important areas. These included: “completion of the most comprehensive line of 
products targeted to customer needs”,
107
 which required Airbus to deliver the first 
A380 to customers before the end of 2006 (this was, however, ultimately delayed by 
two years); gradually extending freight applications (such airplanes are called 
freighters or all cargo airplanes) to the range of Airbus airplanes; continuously 
maintaining the existing models’ competitive edge in the market; and entering into 
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military business through new airplanes such as the A400M or the development of 
military derivatives products based on the A330 airframe. 
Airbus also “focuses on key geographic markets”,
108
 such as China and 
Russia, and has consolidated its position in the difficult US airline marketplace, 
where most of the airlines face financial difficulties when the economy takes a 
downturn affecting air travel. Further to this, Airbus has sought to “expand its 
offering of customer services”, which will help enable it to stay ahead in the industry 
by “best serving customers evolving needs” and “ensuring optimal Airbus placement 
along the industry’s value chain.”
109
 Airbus management is focused on “capturing 
the benefits of integration to enhance its response to changes in volume and mix 
and carry out A380 related investments with a strong focus on flexibility and 
efficiency.”
110
    
Airbus’s Concept of Hub and Fragmentation
111
 
Airbus uses the term “hub and fragmentation” to describe the hub and 
spokes/connection traffic, while Boeing uses a similar concept called the “hub and 
spokes”. Airbus argues that in the trans-Atlantic market, the development of new 
non-stop services between secondary cities will drive demand for intermediate 
wide-body airplanes such as the A330 or the A350. However, Airbus prioritized the 
development of the A380 designed to accommodate high-density passenger traffic 
from hub-to-hub airports and compete directly with the Boeing 747. This is because 
Airbus did not seem to realize that the “new generation” “high technology” airplane, 
Boeing B787 is “the game changer” that provides a point-to-point direct service 
instead of an old hub-and-spokes way of traveling through the congested hub 
airports. Boeing prioritized the needs of travelers and also capitalized on the point-
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to-point direct service by the “new generation” B787, which became the hot selling 
“direct service” high technology airplane.   
 Despite this, Airbus A380 has been successful in penetrating a high- 
density passenger market segment. However, the market potential of the super 
jumbo A380 jets seems to be quite limited. So far, Airbus has sold about 200 A380s 
as compared to Boeing sales of over 800 B787s. Slow sales of Airbus A380 might 
set Airbus back several years behind Boeing. While Airbus is building the “new 
generation” high technology A350 in an attempt to catch up with the Boeing B787, 
the marketing opportunities of mid-range, medium sized airplanes for direct point-to-
point services may have already been captured by the Boeing B787, which is fully 
booked for the next several years. Airbus argued, however, that it is well-positioned 
to meet future market requirements with its complete product lines from the 107-
seat A318 to the 555-seat A380. Airbus has changed its original marketing blitz of 
the A380, which is a breathless, colossal-sized, triple-deck super jumbo airplane.  
 Having realized that “air travel is largely a commodity that is dreaded by 
anyone who flies frequently”,
112
 selling the A380 based on its immense size was not 
an effective marketing strategy, according to some industry critics. Stephen 
Forshaw, Singapore Airlines’ vice president of public affairs
113
 argued that “At the 
end of the day, it’s what’s on board the airplane that differentiates you.” As such,  
Singapore Airlines, which is one of the A380 “launch” (or “takeoff”) customers,
114
  
emphasizes the intimacy, personal touches, and amenities inside its passenger 
cabin.  
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Airbus A380 Launch Customer – Singapore Airlines 
Who is a launch customer? An airframe manufacturer and its key potential airline 
customers start working together to develop the definition of a particular airplane 
model they are looking for, which will eventually lead to the development of the 
airplane specifications, the design of the proto-type model and a mock-up built to 
scale. Based on the full commitment of the airline, the airplane manufacturer will go 
ahead and proceed from the proto type to the production stage of the new airplane 
model. Launch customers - or take-off customers - are the airlines that make a firm 
commitment and down payment to purchase at least 15 to 20 or more new airplane 
models before the production stage. Based on the full commitment of launch 
customers (or what might be called the “green light” in industry circles), the airplane 
manufacturer will go ahead and proceed from the proto type/mock-up -to the 
production stage of the new airplane model. 
 Singapore Airlines installed 471 seats in its A380, about 100 more 
passengers than the Boeing 747 jumbo jet, but could accommodate as many as 
853 passengers in “all economy” seat configurations. Airbus’s selling points of the 
A380 emphasized maximum passenger cabin comfort and smart interiors of the 
super jumbo plane. However, Airbus admitted later that the earlier, original 
promotion of the A380 inadvertently focused on the exterior of the A380, such as 
the big sleek wings and giant engines of the enormous sized A380 super jumbo jet.  
 The Airbus A380 program was delayed several times. There is nothing 
unusual about the delayed production of an innovative new airplane program such 
as the A380, considering the enormous complexity required of airplane 
manufacturing. However, as a result, its R&D cost of the A380 went up almost 50 
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percent, well over its $12 billion budget. Because of this, Airbus shunned its 
marketing blitz for the A380, but found a new way forward with a low-key marketing 
campaign message: “Flying full, the plane is more environmentally friendly than a 
subcompact car.”
115
 The effectiveness of the new Airbus ads on the A380 remains 
to be seen.  
Airbus’s Strategies
116
 for Asia 
Sandholtz and Love (2001) argue that there are three primary forces shaping the 
operating environment of Airbus strategies in the large commercial airplane 
marketplace in Asia (Sandholtz and Love, 2001). First, there are the technical 
constraints that exist in building modern large commercial airplanes. Second, there 
are the fast growing demands of world and regional markets. Third, the structure 
and objectives of the consortium itself shape the business environment in which  
Airbus strategies operate.  
The outsourcing of Boeing airplane programs to Japan has been very 
successful and recently Airbus seems to have been following Boeing’s strategy. In 
2006, it disclosed its outsourcing scheme by building an assembly plant for the 
A320 in China. It has also reportedly transferred the technology for the 
manufacturing of wing components for the A320 to China.
117
 The scale of Airbus’ 
outsourcing to China is not yet comparable to Boeing’s long-term full risk-sharing 
partnership with the three Japanese “heavies”,
118
 and Boeing keeps the major share 
of the Japanese marketplace. It seems that Airbus has learned that the best way to 
capture an increasingly large share of the Chinese market is to form a risk-sharing 
partnership with China, just as Boeing formed a risk-sharing partnership with Japan. 
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Airbus’s Portfolio Mix 
Airbus, an airplane manufacturing subsidiary of EADS, generated the operating 
revenues of 29.97 billion Euro dollars in 2010 and a net income of 1.597 billion 
Euros. Based in Blagnac, France, a suburb of Toulouse, and with significant activity 
across Europe, the company produces more than half of the world’s jet airliners 
across Europe.  
 
BOEING’S MARKETING STRATEGIES  
 
Boeing’s Direct Expansion 
Boeing achieved steady growth through direct expansion for almost three decades 
from 1970 to 1997 when the merger with McDonnell Douglas took place. This was 
achieved by increasing commercial airplane sales, expanding production capacity 
and capabilities, and manpower. Growth strategy is a corporate-level strategy 
aimed at increasing the level of an organization’s operations including quantitatively 
measurable results such as operating revenues and including sales revenues, 
manpower levels, market share, etc. Growth can be achieved through direct 
expansion, vertical integration, horizontal integration and related diversification.
119
   
Vertical and Horizontal Integration 
A company has a choice to grow by vertical integration which controls inputs, 
outputs or both.
120
 Boeing has no vertical integration. In general, Boeing does not   
employ a hands-on approach to building airplanes from the bottom up choosing 
instead to have major airplane parts manufactured outside of the US. Boeing calls 
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itself a “system integrator” rather than an airframe manufacturer. Although Boeing 
fully engages in the process from drawing to flight test, it is not fully engaged in the 
various phases of airframe manufacturing121.  
In horizontal integration, a company grows by combining operations with 
competitors. Boeing has achieved horizontal integration by combining airplane 
manufacturing operations with its former competitor, McDonnell Douglas. However, 
the problem with this is that, by definition, combining with competitors decreases 
competition in the commercial airplane industry – which violates the US anti-trust 
law, the 1890 Sherman Act. The US Federal Trade Commission (USFTC) is 
chartered to assess the impact of any such proposed merger, and on the other side 
of the Atlantic, the European Commission, as counterpart of the USFTC, will pass 
the final decision. There were some political concessions at both ends of the 
Atlantic that allowed the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger to go through.  
Boeing’s “Core Competencies” and “Market Shaping” Strategy
122
  
Airbus and Boeing have become the most competitive companies in the aerospace 
industry developing core competencies, detailed customer knowledge specifications 
and focus
123
. Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that in order to resolve coordination 
problems, which are central to their core competencies, firms need to develop 
relationships in the following five spheres: industrial relations, vocational training 
and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and their own 
employees.
124
 Firms seek to develop and exploit core competencies or dynamic 
capabilities as capacities for developing, producing, and distributing goods and 
services profitably (Teece and Pisano, 1998).
125
 As Boeing’s 2009 annual report 
suggests: “Markets” is an active concept. The best companies do more than 
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respond to market conditions. They shape the markets of tomorrow.” ‘Market 
Shaping’ strategy is a part of Boeing’s business strategy
126
and reflects proactive 
and innovative management. It has been in place for many years
127
.  
Boeing Marketing Strategy: Boeing B787 vs. Airbus A380/A350 
While Airbus focused on the production and delivery of the A380, Boeing’s major 
focus was on the development of the mid-size “new technology” airplanes capable 
of performing point-to-point direct service. Boeing has developed the most 
innovative, “new generation, high technology” B787 to be delivered late this year in 
2012, according to industry sources. Airbus is trying to catch up with the B787 and 
is currently focusing on the development of the Airbus A350, which is scheduled for 
completion a few years after the first delivery of the B787 late this year. The B787 is 
one of the most highly anticipated, inventions to come out of Boeing in recent years, 
but Airbus’s “new generation” A350 is going to be a new challenger to Boeing’s 
most fuel efficient, state-of-the art airplane, the B787.  
 The air travel market is now an open market, and because of this, routes 
will continue to be broken into fragments, with more passengers flying point-to-
point. This is shaping the air travel market by developing and promoting an Air 
Traffic Management system that will allow point-to-point operations to grow and 
flourish.
128
 In fact, Boeing established its Air Traffic Management business unit in 
2000 in order to create an infrastructure that will enable the commercial airplane 
business to grow in response to market forces and not to be infrastructure-
constrained, according to John Hayhurst, President of Boeing Air Traffic 
Management
129
.     
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 The B787 is in direct competition with the very successful Airbus A330, 
currently in service in the large, lucrative 250-seat passenger market. Airbus’s “new 
generation” A350 was expected to counter the B787, but Boeing has denied that it 
has had any effect on B787 sales. However, according to a reliable industry source, 
the A350 effect seems to be significant for the following three main reasons:  
 
Being the replacement airplane natural for the A330 with a world-wide customer 
base, the A350 would capture the existing customer base of the A330;  
 
(1) Being the replacement airplane natural for the A330 with a world-wide 
customer base, the A350 would capture the existing customer base of the 
A330; 
(2) Airbus could charge airlines less to buy the A350 because they could 
possibly spend less than Boeing did to develop the B787; 
(3) The A350 could make savings in its pilot training cost. For example, the 
A350 could be designed so that any pilot certified to fly the A330 could 
also fly the A350 without retraining.  
 
 The first Airbus A380, triple-deck super jumbo jet, was delivered to 
Singapore Airlines, the launch customer. Airbus projected that they could build 200 
A380 super jumbo jets to meet the current market demand of the world’s largest 
triple deck jumbo jet.  So what accounts for the huge success of Boeing 787 over 
the Airbus A380?  
 There are two inter-playing critical determinant factors that carve out the 
customer airlines’ equipment acquisition decision: right airplane in the right 
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marketplace. Boeing seems to have built the right airplane – the most fuel efficient, 
mid-sized “new generation” high technology B787 airplane in the right place, which 
is in an origin to destination, point-to-point marketplace. When Airbus started talking 
to customers, and eventually committed to the super jumbo A380 with a hub-and-
spokes concept, Boeing seemed to have responded by launching the right airplane 
- the B787 with a completely different philosophy from Airbus A380: the B787 was 
developed to satisfy the passengers’ critical demand for a non-stop, direct point-to-
point service.  
 When Airbus and Boeing’s long-term projection for the period 2004 to 
2024 was released, Airbus’s projection of a much smaller number of airplanes 
suggested a larger number of large-sized airplanes. It seems that Airbus’s overly 
optimistic projection led to Airbus’s idea of the A380 jumbo jet, which was supposed 
to directly challenge the 747. In fact, the 747 has monopolized the 400 passenger 
seat airplane market for the last four decades.  
 The rationale behind Airbus’s strategy of building the A380 turned out to 
be a miscalculation of the airlines’ critical need for mid-sized “new generation” high 
technology airplane, like the Boeing 787. Clearly Airbus was not fully aware that the 
market demand had shifted from the old concept of the hub and spokes to the direct 
point-to-point direct service (from origin to the destination). Therefore, Boeing 
quickly captured the marketing opportunities for the fuel efficient B787, which best 
fitted-the specifications of the airline customers. As aforementioned, to counter this 
mistake, Airbus has begun developing the A350. However, the A350 is three or 
more years behind the Boeing B787, which has completely sold out for the next 
several years.  
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 The on-going Airbus vs. Boeing duopoly competition has escalated into a 
high gear ever since Airbus announced the 555 seat A380 in 2000. The two-year 
production delays of the A380 in recent years have not only cost Airbus an 
additional $3 billion but also have lost them the edge they could have had over the 
Boeing 787.  Meanwhile, Boeing has announced that the B787 will be ready for test 
flight in late 2012. This has put Boeing a head of the game in terms of the number 
of airplane orders received, allowing Boeing to achieve its best quarterly profit in 
four years at $1.1 billion. Moreover, in the first half of 2007 Boeing’s revenues 
increased to $16.3 billion, with a 13 percent increase on airplane deliveries from  
the previous year. Boeing’s backlog of orders increased 47 percent, to a record 
$208 billion, over seven times the Commercial Airplane Group’s 2006 revenues.  
 Airbus made an optimistic market projection of the super jumbo A380 
airliner marketplace. The Airbus “new generation” super jumbo A380 was originally 
meant to be Airbus’s serious challenge to displace the Boeing 747 airplanes which 
had been monopolizing the high-density passenger market sector for almost four   
decades. However, Boeing quickly responded by directly challenging the A380, 
(which is the hub-and-spokes airplane), by marketing the fuel efficient two-engine 
B787, which became the best seller airplane that can provide the direct point-to-
point service.   
 Boeing proved to be right about marketing the B787 airplane. In fact, the 
passenger preference and the modern air travelling trend seem to have shifted 
considerably from the old hub-and-spokes way of travelling to the new way of 
travelling direct point-to-point which brings substantial savings in total transit time 
exemplified by the B787, according to Boeing. This provides not only substantial 
savings in total transit time but also a high level of passenger cabin comfort with 
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more oxygen. Therefore, the “new generation” B787 became the best selling “direct 
service” high technology airplane.  
 The B787 also directly challenges the very successful Airbus A330 
currently in service in the large, lucrative 250 seat passenger market. Airbus’s “new 
generation” A350 was expected to counter the B787, but Boeing has denied that it 
has had any effect of the A350 impact on the B787 sales.
130
 The B787, made 
largely of carbon fiber composite, is worth more than $114 billion in sales with over 
900 orders from more than 50 customer airlines and is completely sold out until 
2015 delivery. However, while Boeing denies any impact of Airbus A350 strengths 
on the B787 sales, the A350 seemed to be significant.
131
 
Boeing’s Business Strategy
132
  
Boeing continues to improve its performance in the immediate and long term – over 
the next five to ten years - targeting both accelerated growth and improved margins 
of cash generation.
133
 Boeing’s business plans are consistent with its strategy to 
operate as the leading broad-based aerospace company.
134
 According to Boeing’s 
2007 annual report, it is “selectively developing in-house capabilities that, when 
combined with the best of the industry, meet the enduring needs of the customers 
and enhance its strategic position in a competitive marketplace.”
135
 Its continued 
focus on transforming the commercial airplane business brought a dramatic 
upsurge in new orders and strong financial results.
136
 Boeing was a leader of all 
major US aerospace companies in terms of share-price appreciation during 2005 
(see Exhibit 3 in the appendix for a summary of Boeing’s five-year 2001-2005 
financial results). 
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Two-Year Delays of Boeing’s “New Generation” B787 
Recent manufacturing problems of the B787 delayed its flight-testing by four 
months. Boeing initially insisted that it would deliver the first B787 in May 2008 as 
promised, is suggesting that it was possible to overcome the four-month delay to 
meet the delivery target of the first jet. However, Boeing then announced that the 
schedule was tight and they needed to have about 42 airplanes ready for delivery 
by the time the test flight program was completed.
137
  Delays threatened to disrupt 
the production schedule for up to two years, jeopardizing Boeing’s credibility with its 
airline customers and leaving Boeing exposed to hefty penalty payments. Boeing 
insisted that the delay would not have a major impact on Boeing’s financial 
projections, even if the delivery delays were as great as four months. It has since 
reserved almost $2 billion for an additional research-and-development fund to help 
cover additional costs associated with the B787 delays.
138
 
Boeing’s Portfolio Mix  
Boeing was not a major defense company back in 1995 when its commercial 
airplane business accounted for 71 percent and the Integrated Defense Systems 29 
percent of the total operating revenues of $19.5 billion.
139
 Since the merger with 
McDonnell Douglas in 1997, Boeing has become a well-balanced company with the 
right mix of a large commercial airplane business and military defense business. 
Between 1995 and 2007, Boeing became an aerospace company exhibiting strong 
growth, more than tripling its total operating revenues of $19.5 billion in 1995 to 
$66.4 billion in 2007.
140
 Commercial airplanes generated $33.4 billion in 2007 
accounting for 50 percent of total revenues. Its integrated defense systems totaled 
$32.1 billion, accounting for almost half of its total revenues. Boeing has positioned 
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itself to achieve long-term growth by increasing company’s sales, production 
capability and manpower to meet the demands of airline customers. 
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CHAPTER 4  
THE TERMINATION OF THE 1992 EU-US  
AGREEMENT   
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter explains the 1992 GATT agreement, examines EU-US trade relations, 
and investigates the trail of events that led to the termination of the 1992 EU-US 
bilateral pact in 2004.  
 In October 2004, the US government filed the WTO case against the EU 
over unfair Airbus subsidies. The US alleged that launch aid and other government 
support to Airbus qualifies as a subsidy under the agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) and that such subsidies are “actionable” giving 
ground for a lawsuit because they cause adverse effects or are “prohibited” 
because they are export-contingent. The 1992 bilateral agreement does not 
preclude the United States or the European Commission from taking a case to the 
WTO. The terms and obligations of the 1992 bilateral agreement are separate and 
distinct from the terms and obligations of the 1994 SCM Agreement.  
 What were the deficiencies and deficits of the 1992 GATT bilateral 
agreement between the EU and the US? Should the agreement have been 
amended? Do Airbus and Boeing need a new bilateral agreement to ensure a “level 
playing field”? By October 2004, after 12 years, the US believed the 1992 
agreement had outlived its usefulness and terminated it. After the US pushed the 
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EU to revise the bilateral agreement on airplane subsidies, both the EU and the US 
filed complaints at the WTO.      
THE 1992 GATT AGREEMENTS AND THE 2004 TERMINATION 
 
The 1992 GATT bilateral agreement between the EU and the US allowed 
“reimbursable launch investments” of up to one-third of the total research and 
development costs of new large civil aircraft programs. “Reimbursable launch 
investments” used by Airbus, refers to the launch aid which is typically given by 
European governments. Airbus argues that this type of government funding is 
typically a Department of Defense and NASA (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration) mechanism used in the US.
141
 In the United States, manufacturing 
firms become large, multi-unit enterprises in two ways: by adding marketing and 
purchasing plants, or by way of a merger, according to Chandler.
142
  
 The case of the 1997 Boeing/McDonnell merger demonstrates the 
differing views and positions of the EU and US on the merger, including: identifying 
and explaining the antitrust law enforcement agencies of the EU and US 
government. When Boeing merged with McDonnell-Douglas in 1997, Boeing 
became the only commercial airframe manufacturer in the US that produced a full 
product line of commercial jets in various sizes, from the short, medium, to long-
range flight capability.
143
 Boeing, however, is not the European equivalent of the 
“national champion” manufacturer invested in their national interests. The US 
government adheres to the principle of free competition and remains hands-off from 
the publicly traded American companies like Boeing.
144
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The European Commission approved the merger of Boeing with 
McDonnell-Douglas in 1997 on the condition that Boeing license to Airbus any 
government-funded patent that could be used in the manufacture or sale of large 
civil aircraft.
145
 However, Airbus has made no commitment to sharing any 
government-funded technology available with Boeing. Therefore, the US sought a 
mutual commitment to share any government-funded technology from either side in 
a new bilateral trade agreement.  
Airbus feared that the overspill resulting from Douglas’s experience with 
defense production and related research and development would enable Boeing to 
increase its commercial airplane business.
146
 Moreover, Airbus objected to Boeing’s 
exclusive 20-year contracts with three US airlines: American Airlines, Delta Airlines, 
and Continental Airlines. Because of this, Airbus threatened to retaliate against 
Boeing, and consequently, Boeing agreed to meet Airbus’s demand not to seek 
exclusive agreements with those three airlines. The Boeing/Douglas merger 
exemplified the “political-economic linkages”
147
 and “major political implications”
148
 in 
the merger decision of two American multi-national companies.  
1992 GATT Agreement  
The EU-US non-aggression pact on trade and civil aircraft limited the participating 
government subsidies to one-third of total research and development  
expenditures.
149
 Under the terms of the pact, Airbus received government loans on 
preferential terms and Boeing carried out government-funded research. The 
agreement did not encourage competition, but it allowed both sides to continue the 
level of subsidies that had been agreed upon, according to Mandelson, the 
Commissioner of the EC.
150
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 However, the 1992 GATT agreement worked well in principle but it did not 
work well in practice for two reasons. First, no clear definition was provided nor 
agreed to as to “indirect support”. Second, the agreement was not enforceable. 
There was no agreement as to enforce any provisions of the agreement and relied 
on biannual meetings to review publicly available information on direct and indirect 
government support. The term “launch aid” was not even clearly defined.     
 Although Airbus argued that the 1992 GATT bilateral agreement provided 
a level playing field for government support, reflecting the needs of both Europe and 
the US, it was thought that the GATT bilateral offered Airbus a strategic advantage 
over Boeing. This is because the bilateral pact not only legitimized but also 
institutionalized Airbus’s government subsidies that accounted for the thirty-three 
percent of the total research and development costs.151 After twelve years of 
continuous EU government subsidies under the 1992 bilateral agreement, Airbus 
was able to succeed in taking the leadership away from Boeing, prompting   Boeing 
to file the WTO case against the EU in October 2004.  
The 2004 US Termination of the 1992 Bilateral Agreement
152
 
The United States exercised its right to terminate the pact by filing the WTO case 
against the EU over unfair subsidies. The European Union immediately responded 
to the US action and also filed the termination of the 1992 bilateral pact on the very 
same day the US filed the case.    
 The US allegation was that launch aid and other government support to 
Airbus qualified as a subsidy under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM). The 1992 bilateral Agreement does not preclude the American 
officials or the European Commission from bringing a WTO case as the terms and 
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obligations of the 1992 bilateral Agreement are separate and distinct from the terms 
and obligations of the 1994 SCM Agreement. Compliance with one is not a defense 
against claims of non-compliance with other.  
 The first step in the WTO process is to file a request for consultations, 
which begins after a period of no less than 60 days, allowing the parties to consult 
in an effort to resolve the case. In the Airbus-Boeing case, after 60 days the parties 
were unable to reach an agreement, and the US was authorized to request that a 
WTO panel be established to begin with the fact findings. This is consistent with the 
United States’ view that it was time to end Airbus’s new subsidies by the filing of the 
request at the WTO. The US Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick called for 
fairness and free from government subsidies as follows: “This is about fair 
competition, and a level playing field. Since its creation thirty-five years ago, some 
Europeans have justified subsidies to Airbus as necessary to support an “infant” 
industry. If that rationalization were ever valid, its time has long passed. Airbus now 
sells more large civil aircraft than Boeing.”
153
  
 Europe and the US both recognize the value and appropriateness of the 
WTO process as a means to resolve trade disputes. The US had been urging the 
EC (European Commission) to negotiate a new agreement to replace the 1992 EU-
US bilateral agreement on Large Civil Aircraft. Europe and the US have worked 
closely together on many economic and trade fronts, and most importantly on the 
advancement of trade liberalization in the Doha Round negotiations. The WTO was 
created to serve such purposes, and Europe and the US have since brought about 
a number of dispute cases against each other at the WTO; for example, in the area 
of agricultural trade which has been another area of considerable trade tensions. 
Zoellick, the US Trade Representative (USTR), also made the following comments, 
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asking the EU to provide no new airplane subsidies to airplane manufacturers in 
compliance with WTO rules: “We urged the EU to agree that neither of us should 
provide new subsidies to aircraft manufacturers. We offered to simplify our task by 
using the subsidy definition that the EU and the United States had already agreed to 
in the WTO. We even were willing to accept subsidies in the pipeline – but then 
draw the line. That’s a fair offer […]”. Then Zoellick announced the US 
government’s decision to pursue a resolution with a dispute resolution panel at the 
WTO: “… since we could not agree, the United States decided to pursue resolution 
through the agreed procedures of the multilateral trading system, by a WTO case 
before an international dispute resolution panel.” The US’s decision to pursue a 
resolution by a WTO panel may or may not be the right course of action. However, 
European counterparts, EC representatives and Airbus attorneys appeared with the 
US attorneys representing Boeing and the USTR (US Trade Representative) Robert 
Zoellick at the WTO hearing in Geneva.    
The 2004 US’s Allegations and Assertions
154
  
According to the official complaints filed by the US at the WTO, the American 
government alleged that European governments provided loans to Airbus on non-
commercial terms at much better terms than Airbus could get in the commercial 
market. The US also alleged that European governments provided government 
funding for A380-specific infrastructure improvements, such as runway extensions, 
factory facilities, etc. The Americans also alleged that Airbus has benefited from the 
European governments’ “forgiveness of debt”, including substantial amounts of its 
“repayable” launch aid. Airbus had been directly aided by significant grants and 
equity infusions from European governments.  
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 The American government claimed that the real issue here was that every 
time Boeing developed a new airplane it assumed full market risk, while Airbus did 
not. This was because the most distinctive difference between Airbus’ and Boeing’s 
business practice was that Boeing operated on commercial market-dependent 
practices, while Airbus conducted its business based on government-subsidized 
practices. Therefore, American officials asked that Airbus work on the same set of 
free competition rules and that launch aid for Airbus would end immediately.   
Boeing’s new airplane program, like the “new generation” 787 airplane, 
had the option of being funded either through corporate profits or by financing the 
program at commercial rates from commercial banks. Airbus, however, received 
money upfront in the form of launch aid, on special non-commercial terms from 
European governments. While Boeing had to return its loans from commercial 
banks on time at commercial rates regardless of whether an airplane program was 
successful or not, Airbus had the luxury of repaying its launch aid only if the 
subsidized airplane program became successful and profitable. 
 Under Airbus’s loan agreements with European governments, the first 
repayment threshold kicked in only when airplane sales reached 40 percent of the 
target total sales. Airbus started paying back the loan, but all that was due back at 
that point was 20 percent of the total launch aid for a given airplane. For example, 
by 2011, Airbus had received nearly $4 billion in launch aid for the “new generation” 
550-seat A380. It had projected a market for 1,500 A380s, so had to sell 40 percent 
of the 1,500 A380s (or 600 A380s) before it needed to pay back 20 percent of the 
$4 billion launch aid received. So far, Airbus had sold just over 200 A380s. It was 
estimated that the market for the A380 was much smaller than the 1,500 A380s 
projected, and it was unlikely that the market was big enough for Airbus to be able 
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to sell 600 A380s. Therefore, according to Boeing, the European airplane maker 
never needed to pay back any of the $4 billion in launch aid for the “new generation” 
triple-deck “super jumbo” A380. It has further argued that Airbus had borrowed an 
incredible amount of some $15 billion in launch aid, which was a no strings attached 
government loan, but Airbus has not repaid most of that aid
155
.   
 As a result of these sustained government subsidies, Airbus made great 
progress and developed a full product line in record time, achieving market share 
parity with Boeing in 2004; and yet, continued receiving massive government 
subsidies. Boeing brought the allegation of these government subsidies to the US 
government, and asked the American officials to facilitate the end of Airbus’s launch 
aid. American government officials opened dialogue with their European 
counterparts about the market distortion effect of European Union government 
subsidies on the Airbus-Boeing competition. This is because only governments 
have the authority to take necessary action on trade-related issues between 
governments.  
The American government complained that Airbus had benefited from 
taxpayer-funded “launch aid” that had helped Airbus develop every new airplane.
156
 
The Americans argued that this had given Airbus an unfair advantage over Boeing, 
because these subsidies had allowed Airbus to unfairly speed up the development 
of a full product line of large commercial airplanes.
157
 Further, partly because of the 
direct support and loans that Airbus had received on preferential terms from 
European governments, Airbus was able to undercut Boeing airplane prices, thus 
taking unfair advantage in the marketplace and, consequently, harming the US 
aerospace industry. The American government claimed that Airbus had received 
about $40 billion (£32.6 billion) over the last three decades from when the disputes 
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were launched.
158
 Boeing calculated that Airbus had received at least $15 billion in 
a government aid from Germany, France, Spain, and the UK since 1992. However, 
the EU argued that Airbus has already repaid $6.5 billion.
159
  
The strength of the American government’s argument was based on the 
fact that the European governments’ soft loan to Airbus, worth $4 billion dollars in 
launch aid, amounted to about $40 billion over the last thirty years.
160
 The 
implication of this is that the European governments’ subsidies to Airbus placed 
Boeing, a private US firm, in competition with the unlimited financial resources of  
European governments.   
 
THE EU’s ALLEGATIONS AND COMPLAINTS 
 
The EU countersuit filed with the WTO alleged that the financial incentive packages 
passed by the states of Washington and Kansas for the development of the B787 
airplanes constituted a subsidy to Boeing.
161
 In addition, the EU complained that 
Boeing benefitted significantly from research and development contracts with NASA 
and the US Departments of Defense and Commerce. The European Union also 
alleged that Boeing illegally benefitted from tax breaks under the now-repealed FSC 
(Foreign Sales Corporations) tax program, as well as from research and 
development tax credits, from the US government.      
The EU further claimed that the US government had provided Boeing with 
$23 billion (£18.66 billion) in subsidies since 1992, largely through government-
funded R&D (research and development) contracts from NASA, the Department of 
Defense and the Department of Commerce.
162
 In addition, the state of Washington 
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and other local authorities had also provided $3.2 billion in tax incentives for the 
“new generation” Boeing 787 airplane after Boeing agreed to keep the final 
assembly of the new airplane in the Washington state.
163
 The EU also claimed that 
Boeing had benefited from cross-subsidization by way of technology transfers from 
state-of-the-art military airplanes to commercial airplanes.  
 
THE EU-US DISPUTES OVER FOREIGN SALES CORPORATIONS (FSC) 
 
In 2000, the EU asked the US to “adjudicate on the so-called Foreign Sales 
Corporation (FSC) dispute”
164
 (or judicially determine the FSC dispute). The FSC 
was an American law taxing American exports more favorably than production 
outside of the United States
165
. Consequently, the EU alleged that Boeing benefitted 
from a tax break from the FSC.   
 In 2003, the WTO ruled that the FSC, the Foreign Sales Corporation, 
was illegally benefiting American exporters and authorized the European 
sanctions.
166
 In fact, Boeing was the biggest beneficiary of the FSC tax breaks. 
However, the EU left Boeing off its sanction list because many European airlines 
are big customers of Boeing and they did not want to “shoot” their own operators in 
the “foot”
167
. The US Congress adopted legislation that scoops up new tax breaks to 
a wide range of American businesses in return for doing away with the FSC.  
Boeing appeared to receive FSC benefits for far longer, because the airplanes that 
had already been ordered were providing a legal protection of prior rights from the 
effects of a new law. Therefore, European officials were to determine for how many 
years and by how much Boeing had benefited from the FSC tax breaks. The 
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Europeans claimed that the FSC continued to benefit Boeing to the tune of $200 
million annually.
168
 The EU contended that these subsidies had significantly helped 
Boeing and had harmed Airbus.
169
 The allegation was that “the effect of the 
measure was significant price suppression and lost sales.”
170
 The WTO ruled that 
the tax break from the FSC constituted an illegal export subsidy and ordered the 
Americans to rewrite its tax law. The WTO authorized the EU to collect as much as 
$4 billion in retaliatory sanctions from the US companies.
171
  
 Regarding the allegations made from on both sides about the subsidies 
Airbus and Boeing received, neither side has given up the subsidies to date.  The 
2004 Geneva meetings provided an opportunity for the European and American 
governments to seek answers to questions about each other’s assertions and 
allegations. Both the Europeans and the US have expressed interest in the 
continuation of consultations, but it is clear that there exists a significant division 
between the European and American governments.  However, there has been a 
“notable shift of European thought” about airplane subsidies, said Ted Austell, 
Boeing Vice President of International Trade Policy. “Increasingly, recognition is 
growing in Europe that a mature and profitable company like Airbus no longer 
needs to be propped up by government funding.”
172
 
 The fact remains that under WTO rules, the airplane subsidies are illegal. 
However, the 1992 bilateral agreement allowed Airbus to continue to secure new 
launch aid for the A380 or any new airplane program whenever Airbus wanted. 
According to Austell, Boeing’s VP, “without the cover of the 1992 agreement, it is 
inconceivable that Airbus could successfully solicit new launch aid it might seek for 
the A350 or any other program”; he further adds, “We believe that the launch aid 
that has been historically disbursed just does not conform to international trade 
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rules. That puts Airbus and its sponsor governments in a vulnerable position.”
173
 
According to the industry officials in the US, while clear differences existed on the 
issue of subsidies between the EU and the US, the two sides continued working out 
the differences by exchanging information. The early November, 2004 meetings in 
Geneva kicked off the first step in the WTO’s consultation procedure
174
  
 
THE WTO CASE ON AIRBUS SUBSIDIES 
 
Over its 35 year history, Airbus has benefited from a substantial infusion of funds 
from EU member states and EU subsidies that allowed the company to develop a 
full product line of commercial airplanes and gain a 50 percent share of large 
commercial airplane sales and a 60 percent share of global airplane orders.  This is 
simply because every single major Airbus airplane model was financed, in whole or 
in part, by EU government subsidies taking the form of “launch aid” – that is, so 
called “soft loans” in US financing terms, with no or low interest rates and 
repayment contingent upon the success of sales of the airplanes. In fact, EU 
governments have in the past forgiven Airbus’s debt, provided capital infusions and 
infrastructure support, and provided substantial amounts of research and 
development funds for commercial airplane programs.   
 Since 1985, the United States has conducted several major rounds of 
negotiations with Airbus partner governments and the European Commission with 
the objective of achieving greater disciplines over the subsidies provided to Airbus. 
In 1989 and 1991, the United States brought two cases to the GATT challenging 
Airbus subsidies. The first case involved challenging a German program that offset 
 
 
107 
adverse exchange rate fluctuations on sales of Airbus airplanes: this ended in a 
victory for the United States after a GATT panel determined that the exchange rate 
scheme constituted a prohibited export subsidy. The European Commission 
blocked adoption of the panel report, which was permitted in the old GATT 
agreement before the creation of the WTO, but Germany subsequently withdrew.
 The second case was a broader case that challenged overall subsidies to 
the Airbus consortium. This was withdrawn in July 1992 after both sides negotiated 
a bilateral agreement limiting government support for large civil aircraft programs. 
This agreement prohibited future production support and limited the share of 
government support for the development of new airplane programs to 33 percent of 
the project’s total development costs
175
.   
 The United States expected the 1992 agreement to lead to a progressive 
reduction of subsidies. Instead, the 1992 agreement became a legitimate instrument 
to be used as an excuse for EU governments to continue subsidizing Airbus
176
. The 
$3.2 billion launch aid that EU governments have committed for the new Airbus 
A380 is the largest amount of funding committed to a single airplane program. The 
EU has since provided further loans and infrastructure that has pushed the total 
amount of A380 subsidies to approximately $6.5 billion to date. Airbus also plans to 
launch the A350 to compete directly with the most successful B787. While Airbus 
intended to request subsidies for the A350, the American government made major 
efforts to oppose Airbus’s subsidies and the United States specifically opposed the 
subsidized financing for the A380. 
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NEGOTIATION OF NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENT 
 
The United States government made major efforts to address the issue of subsidies 
to Airbus from 1999 - 2000, when it specifically sought to oppose subsidized 
financing for the A380. At that time a possible WTO case was considered but 
Boeing did not support the option for its own business reasons. Consequently, the 
Clinton Administration dropped the option of a possible WTO case. One of the key 
reasons for not pursuing the WTO case at the time was that the 1992 GATT 
agreement was still in force and Boeing sought a negotiated settlement first. 
Litigation against Airbus seemed to be the last resort at the time and therefore, 
Boeing did not take it to court until 2000.     
 However, the issue of Airbus subsidization became more pressing in 
2004 when Boeing faced the critical issue of Airbus’s new subsidies for the A350, 
as Airbus’s market share continued outpacing Boeing’s in terms of number of 
airplanes delivered. Consequently, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
Robert Zoellick continued dialogues about ending new subsidies with EU Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy in late spring and early summer 2004. The personal 
relationship between Zoellick and Lamy was exceptionally good and this may have 
facilitated discussions. USTR and EU trade officials had meetings in July and 
September in order to secure a commitment to end new subsidies. In August 2004, 
President Bush instructed Zoellick to pursue all possible avenues to end Airbus 
subsidies, inclusive of an option of the filing a WTO case.  Subsequently, USTR 
sought to end subsidies through the negotiation of a new bilateral agreement.  
However, the EU remained unwilling to agree on the goal of ending all new 
subsidies, and much less on how to achieve this goal. Zoellick met with EU Trade 
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Commissioner Lamy on September 30, 2004 to discuss ending the subsidies, but 
without resolution.  
 The US remained committed to resolving the question of subsidies to 
Airbus through the negotiation of a new bilateral agreement. However, considering 
the EU’s unwillingness to end subsidies through negotiations, filing a WTO case 
was imminent and quite necessary to ensure, one way or another, a move to level 
the playing fields.  
Some critics saw Boeing’s termination of the accord as a strategic 
management option to pressure Airbus to delay the “launch aid” to redesign.
177
 Its 
new long-range A350 would directly compete against Boeing’s “new generation” 
B787. The subsequent discussions between the US and the EU governments did 
not result in agreement: as Boeing Commercial Airplanes President and CEO Alan 
Mulally stated that “the intent of the 1992 bilateral (agreement between the United 
States and European Union) was to reduce launch aid. Clearly Airbus has 
institutionalized launch aid. So it’s appropriate that the United States terminated the 
agreement for cause and is asking Europe to renegotiate the agreement.” Mulally 
also stated: “The goal is to negotiate a new agreement, or for everybody to move 
toward operating in the framework established by the World Trade Organization - 
which doesn’t support Airbus launch aid.”shared  He supported the view that the EU 
and the US move toward a more rule-based trading framework.      
Boeing stated that the company fully supports the action taken by the US 
government after unsuccessful government-to-government attempts to resolve the 
issue. “It is clear that the 1992 agreement does not reflect current market realities 
and has outlived its usefulness,” according to ex-Boeing President and CEO Harry 
Stonecipher. Boeing took the view that Airbus subsidies were leading to market 
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distortion in the commercial airplane marketplace. Boeing shared the US 
government’s view that EU subsidies to Airbus must cease and that competition in 
the large commercial airplane market must not be distorted by such subsidies.  
 
FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS 
 
January 11 2005 was a critical date in the ongoing disputes between EU officials 
and the US trade representatives.
178
 That day, officials from the two governments 
agreed to create a framework which enabled the continuation of negotiations to end 
government subsidies for commercial airplane development and production. The 
agreement for this round of negotiations was that both sides would spend 90 
days
179
 negotiating to end subsidies. This included three main objectives: ending 
subsidies to airplane manufacturers; creating a bilateral agreement between the 
European Union and the United States; and creating an agreement with strong 
transparency and enforcement mechanisms. 
However, at the end of the 90 day negotiation period, the two 
governments had not reached an agreement and there was no indication of what 
would happen next. The US government stated that it was willing to continue talks 
under the terms of the January 11 agreement, and Boeing agreed to provide full 
support to the US government’s efforts to end subsidies to Airbus. The US Trade 
Representative’s office also made a statement that in the event that the EU 
proceeded with additional subsidies for Airbus large civil aircraft, the United States 
would return to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
180
 However, in direct 
response to the Americans, Airbus went straight to the press and announced that it 
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would seek launch aid from its sponsor governments for its proposed A350 airplane. 
Despite an intensive negotiation just concluded, the EU and the US had not 
reached an agreement to eliminate such aid.   
 One reason for the lack of progress on the issue of launch aid was the 
fact that the EU governments seemed to take actions which entirely contradicted 
the three key objectives agreed upon by the two governments for the negotiating 
period. A large part of the problem was that the EU is not a government. Despite a 
moratorium on new subsidies that the EU officials agreed on, then-Airbus CEO Noel 
Forgeard clearly stated that Airbus would seek launch aid from its European 
sponsor governments for its proposed A350 airplane.
181
   
 Although the European Union initially agreed to bilateral talks only with 
the United States government, to be followed at a future date by talks with other 
nations as appropriate, the European Union invited Japanese participation into the 
negotiations before the European Union and the United States had a chance for 
substantive discussions.
182
 The Japanese declined the invitation and the reason 
why was not disclosed.  
 Once the January 11 2005 agreement expired after 90 days, former US 
Trade Representative Robert Zollick wrote a letter to the European Union Trade 
Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, asking for clarification on the Europeans’ position 
on the dispute, the negotiations and the agreement between the two governments 
made on January 11 2005.
183
 Zollick asked if the Europeans were “willing to 
continue to negotiate under the terms of the January 11 2005 agreement, including 
the standstill on subsidies.”
184
 Mandelson’s response to this was not revealed, but 
he apparently supported the view that Airbus no longer needs government 
subsidies.    
 
 
112 
Clearly, Airbus’s sustained use of government subsidies represented a 
widely accepted business practice in Western Europe and other parts of the world. 
However, Mandelson’s decision that Airbus no longer needed subsidies signaled an 
advisory mandate to Airbus to operate on free enterprise principles without  
governmental aid.  Mandelson directed the European Union to accept that 
government subsidies for commercial airplanes should be ended instead of going 
through the prolonged settlement procedures of the WTO.
185
  
             Mandelson’s decision is consistent with the subsidy–neutral principles of 
free trade and fair competition of the world trading system. His decision was 
influenced by his experiences in the on-going EU-US subsidy disputes and his 
background as a member of the New Labour government in Britain. However, 
Airbus may or may not agree with the same American principles as Boeing that 
ending subsidies brings fair competition, develops the most competitive airplanes, 
and creates long-term jobs.  
There is no clear indication of whether Mandelson’s decision (that there is 
no need for subsidies) reflects a major shift in EU policy on airplane subsidy issues 
or if it is/was an expression of his own personal stance. However, it could be seen 
as a clear sign of Europeans’ understanding of the political-economic necessity for 
a departure from old EU trade policy. Whether the dialogues between the EU and 
US will bring about a major political shift in EU policy depends on the determination 
of the US to put political pressure on Europe about its attitude towards sustained 
use of government subsidies.  
 What were the core factors and driving forces influencing Mendelson’s     
position on subsidies? The US was most likely to win the WTO case if or when the 
US took action to litigate this through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM)). 
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Mandelson’s view was further confirmed by the US government’s clear message to 
end subsidies. Boeing made concerted efforts with the US and reiterated its strong 
support for the US’s efforts to end Airbus’s launch aid, either through a continued 
negotiated settlement or litigation at the WTO. Mandelson was arguably correct in 
his view that Airbus should no longer need government subsidies.  
 The EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson’s view seemed to reflect 
the Zeitgeist of Europe’s general consensus, in line with the WTO rules, that there is 
no need for continued government subsidies. Accordingly, senior Airbus officials 
had been reiterating that Airbus had the funds to develop the A350 without launch 
aid. However, contrary to Airbus officials’ public statements like “no need for 
government aids”, the A350 program is, in reality, nothing less than Airbus’s partner 
governments committing launch aid to be used as a pipeline to the development of 
another subsidized airplane.   
  As the airplane subsidy disputes continue between the EU and the US, 
editorials in printed news media have continued to weigh in on the subject. They are 
uniformly critical of the launch aid subsidies that Airbus is currently getting and 
seeking for the future. “The US has offered a fair solution that the Europeans should 
accept. Subsidies already in the Airbus pipeline (including $3.5 billion for the A380) 
would be grandfathered
186
 or forgiven, but Airbus would be prohibited from getting 
more – including launch aid for the A350 that Airbus is now seeking. Airbus and the 
Europeans know that the US  probably would win  a [World Trade Organization] 
challenge, and a bruising trade war is in no one’s interest.”
187
  
The EU should have accepted the fair solution offered by the US and should have 
discontinued the Airbus pipeline of subsidies from EU governments. However, 
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Airbus continued seeking more aid through the financial aid pipeline provided by the 
EU governments.   
 Another critic states that “This [dispute] isn’t about defense contracts, 
local tax breaks or supplier subsidies. It’s about the launch aid: upfront money to 
develop planes.….  Airbus gets launch aid. Boeing doesn’t. If the [European Union] 
doesn’t get that, then the US has no choice but to litigate this to the end at the 
WTO.”
188
 The general consensus among industry circles was clearly on the 
American side to take Airbus’s illegal subsidy matter to the court. The American 
government finally filed the litigation against Airbus at the WTO. Questions still 
remained as to why Airbus continued getting launch aid against WTO rules in spite 
of the strong objections of the US government and against Mandelson’s view that 
Airbus no longer needed subsidies.  
 Airbus and Boeing are media-savvy and seem to use the media to their 
advantage. Airbus deploys a sophisticated approach to getting a message across to 
Boeing and the public and seems to be responsive and proactive in their approach 
to the subsidy disputes with Boeing. For example, when Boeing terminated the 
1992 GATT agreement and filed its complaint at the WTO in 2004, Airbus 
immediately responded to Boeing’s complaint to the WTO and registered a similar 
complaint to the WTO within a matter of hours.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The 1992 EU-US agreement outlived its useful life and finally terminated in 2004. 
Since the termination of the 1992 EU-US bilateral agreement, Airbus and Boeing 
 
 
115 
have no longer a bilateral agreement to comply with or abide by. Over its 35-year 
history, massive amounts of subsidies have enabled Airbus to develop a full product 
line of large commercial airplanes and capture a major market share of the large 
commercial airplanes. Airbus’s extraordinary success, however, was built upon 
launch aid subsidies granted by the governments of France, Germany, the UK and 
Spain. Without the prevailing bilateral agreement, the EU and the US have no 
agreement nor rules to comply with and abide by except for the WTO rules and 
obligations.  
 The US came to the realization that Airbus has been taking a full 
advantage of the 1992 GATT agreement for twelve years by legitimizing the EU 
governments’ subsidies up to one third of the total R&D expenditures according to 
the 1992 GATT agreement. Airbus’s rapid growth and achievement were 
extraordinary and finally overtook Boeing to become the leader of the large 
commercial airplane industry. The US complained that Airbus is continuously 
subsidized by the EU governments. In 2004, the US terminated 1992 GATT 
agreement and filed the complaints about Airbus’ illegal use of governmental 
subsidies at the WTO.  The EU’s general consensus was that Airbus did not need 
continued government subsidies. The UK’s Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson 
supported the official view that Airbus no longer needed government subsidies, and 
this view was shared by a senior Airbus official in a public statement announcing 
that Airbus had the funds to build the A350 without any launch aid from the EU 
governments. Mandelson seemed to be well aware of what was going to take place. 
The US registered complaints at the WTO and started proceeding with the litigation 
against Airbus. Why didn’t the US go for the negotiated settlement? That remains to 
be unanswered. However, it was expected that the US would take Airbus’s subsidy 
 
 
116 
case to court at the WTO to end the EU-US large commercial airplane subsidy 
disputes through litigation.  
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CHAPTER 5   
THE CASE OF THE EU AT THE WTO 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter explains Airbus’s contention on how the US Government subsidized 
the large commercial airplane industry (WTO case DS353). The first panel hearing 
in the case took place during 26-27 September 2007.  
 Core arguments made by the European Commission and Airbus appear 
consistent with Lawrence’s (2001) seminal study on the US subsidies on the large 
commercial airplane industry.
189
 Lawrence (2001) argues that historically, America 
dominated the commercial aerospace industry, particularly the large commercial 
airplane industry, which came into being on the back of defense technology 
developed and paid for by the US defense department. The frame of reference that 
Lawrence (2001) used for his study is the WTO rules and disciplines on subsidy, 
which can be found in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASCM).   
THE EU’s ALLEGATIONS AT THE WTO  
 
United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (DS353). 
A summary of the first written submission by the European Communities (Geneva, 2 
April 2007): 
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1. In its written submission, the European Communities (EC) attempted to 
establish its prima facie case that the United States has granted $23.7 
billion in specific subsidies to the division of the Boeing Company 
(“Boeing”) that produces large civil aircraft. (“LCA”).  The EU allegation 
goes on to show that these subsidies are: (1) prohibited subsidies 
contingent upon export performance; (2) and/or actionable subsidies that 
cause serious prejudice, and therefore adverse effects, to the interests of 
the European Communities and its LCA manufacturer – Airbus S.A.S. 
(“Airbus”).  
 
2. Boeing and the US Government have collaborated closely to advance the 
state of US aeronautics technology, and to improve the competitive 
position of Boeing vis-à-vis international competition. This close 
relationship continues today, as valuable support pours into Boeing on an 
annual basis from multiple agencies of the US Government – none of 
which is ever repaid. The governments of states and localities also aid 
this partnership in a very significant way, adding to the wealth of grants, 
tax breaks, and other support to which Boeing has become accustomed 
on the Federal level. With Boeing surpassing Airbus in LCA orders by a 
large margin in 2006, and at the same time continuing to drive down 
prices, the direct results of this support have never been clearer.  
 
3. The 23.7 billion before the Panel comprises numerous measures 
implemented by various federal, state, and local governmental entities. 
Beginning with state and local subsidies at issue, the States of 
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Washington, Kansas, and Illinois, and various localities therein, have 
provided over $800 million in benefits for Boeing, and have committed to 
provide over $4 billion in additional benefits beginning in 2007. 
 
4. In particular, the State of Washington has committed to provide almost 
$3.5 billion in tax breaks of benefit to Boeing over the next 20 years 
through the House Bill (“HB 2294”), as well as almost $500 million in 
other incentives, including training facilities and infrastructure 
improvements, in connection with production of the 787. The bulk of these 
incentives are in the form of export-contingent tax incentives tied to the 
production of Boeing LCA.  
 
5. The city of Wichita, Kansas, has provided property and sales tax 
abatements associated with almost $4 billion in industrial revenue bonds 
issued on behalf of the Wichita facilities used to produce parts for Boeing 
LCA. 
 
6. In Illinois, the state and municipalities therein have provided Boeing with a 
generous and long-term incentive package in connection with its decision 
to relocate its corporate headquarters to Chicago, Illinois, in 2001. 
 
7. Boeing has received almost $17 billion in funding and support from the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the 
Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Commerce (DOC) and 
the Department of Labor (DOL). The bulk of this funding is provided by 
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NASA and DOD, primarily through their aeronautics research and 
development (R&D) subsidies.  NASA and DOD also grant Boeing 
intellectual property rights to valuable research results, including patents, 
trade secrets, and data rights; they reimburse Boeing for certain R&D 
costs incurred solely pursuant to the terms of a contract; and they provide 
facilities, equipment, and employees for LCA-related R&D.  
 
8. The following features are evident from an examination of the R&D 
subsidies: 
 
 The US government and Boeing have had a very close and 
long-standing relationship that has helped Boeing to succeed in 
the LCA market.  
 
 Both the US government and Boeing often admit in public 
statements that the LCA sector is unique in its ability to benefit 
from lavish government funding. 
 
 Federal R&D funding and support greatly reduce the need for 
Boeing to finance its own R&D for developing new and 
improved LCA, and shift the risk of new product development to 
the US government. 
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 Federal R&D funding and support lead to the development of 
valuable technologies for Boeing’s LCA division, and this 
technology remains with Boeing (rather than in the public 
domain) through intellectual property rights and other 
technology transfer restrictions.   
 
9. US Government-supported aeronautics R&D will benefit all of Boeing’s 
LCA models in the future. Even in those instances where US government 
R&D support is purportedly for military aircraft technology, such support 
often benefits LCA technology. 
 
10. The US LCA industry is “unique” among US manufacturing industries in 
having received federal government support for R&D since its inception. 
 
11. Specifically, NASA research has contributed to numerous advances 
applicable to LCA in areas as aerodynamics, flight dynamics, structures 
and materials, flight systems, noise reductions, and operating problems. 
Altogether, NASA has provided over $10.4 billion in support to Boeing’s 
LCA division.  
 
12. Among the aeronautics R&D subsidies at issue are NASA’s Advanced 
Subsonic Technology Program and High Speed Research Program, 
which provided over $2.3 billion for research that was deemed by NASA 
itself as vital to the future of the nation’s civil aircraft industry. Much of this 
funding benefited Boeing’s LCA division, and benefits from this funding 
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continue today. One of the policies of these programs was to restrict the 
transfer of valuable information outside of the United States because, in 
NASA’s words, “it is critical for the US to maintain its lead over foreign 
competition in aerospace technology.” 
 
13. The legacy of these programs has continued in other multi-billion dollar 
NASA aeronautics programs that have funded LCA-related research by 
Boeing, such as the High Performance Computing and Communications 
Program and the Aviation Safety Program.  
 
14. Boeing’s ability to launch its “new generation” high-technology B787, 
using more than 50% composite materials was made possible through 
decades of funding and support provided by NASA including Advanced 
Composites Technology (ACT) Program. These programs were focused 
on increasing the use of composites in LCA. For example, NASA’s stated 
goal for the ACT program in the 1990s was to increase the 
competitiveness of the US aeronautics industry by putting the commercial 
transport manufacturers in a position to expand the application of 
composites beyond the secondary structures in use today to wings and 
fuselages by the end of the 1990s.   
 
15. Boeing and NASA employees have worked closely together in integrated 
teams to create technology for Boeing’s LCA, with the personnel cost for 
highly skilled NASA and Boeing employees being paid by the US 
government.  
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16. Almost $2.4 billion in support through contracts under DOD’s research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) Program have also directly 
benefited Boeing LCA, without any requirement that Boeing repay any 
portion of the commercial benefits to the US Government.    
 
17. In addition, NASA and DOD have transferred valuable patent and other 
intellectual property rights to Boeing, without any demand for payment or 
license fees. Boeing is free to use the patented technologies for itself, or 
to license them to others for profit. 
 
18. Over $3.1 billion in independent research and development (IR&D) and 
bid and proposal (B&P) funding provided by NASA and DOD, in a highly 
secretive program of the US Government, has further allowed Boeing to 
develop its LCA at government expense. 
 
19. The US DOC and US DOL have provided support to Boeing that 
particularly benefits the development of the Boeing 787. 
 
20. In addition, the US Government has provided almost $2.2 billion in export 
contingent tax relief to Boeing under the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) 
and Extraterritorial Income (ETI) Excursion regimes that impact the sales 
of Boeing LCA. 
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21. The United States has carefully designed all of these subsidies for the US 
LCA industry particularly to enhance Boeing’s competitiveness and, in 
turn, to cause harm to Boeing’s only remaining competitor in the LCA 
market, the European Communities’ manufacturer of LCA, Airbus.      
 
 The EU argued that the US government provided Boeing with $23.7 
billion worth of the governmental subsidies. However, the EU had not been able to 
provide the evidential proof on how and when the $23.7 billion had been granted to 
Boeing by the United States government. The EU also argued that Boeing received 
cross-subsidization, which is the technology transfer to the large commercial 
airplanes from the technologies developed from Boeing’s defense contracts with the 
US Defense department. However, the cross-subsidization was hard to prove. 
Therefore, Airbus’s allegation suffered from a lack of validity and substance 
because Airbus had not been able to prove to the WTO how the $23.7 billion had 
been granted or loaned out to Boeing. On the other hand, Boeing had a hard 
evidence against Airbus, a copy of the loan agreement between Airbus and the 
European Governments: this clearly showed the government loans to Airbus at a 
below market price, which was legally considered to be the government 
subsidies.
190
 
THE EU’S LEGAL CLAIMS 
 
The European Governments claimed that the US Government, the states of 
Washington, Kansas, and Illinois including municipalities had granted a total of 
$23.7 billion in subsidies to Boeing. Therefore, the Europeans sought a WTO ruling 
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that the United States withdraw the subsidies in violation of its obligations under the 
SCM Agreement. The following table depicted the WTO processes. The table 
depicted the original schedule, called for the completion date of 16
th
 of June 2008, 
which had already been six months behind the original schedule. In fact, the final 
ruling of the case reached almost three and a half years later in late 2011.   
 
WTO DISPUTE PROCESSES FROM 2007 TO 2008 
 
 
 EU WTO Challenge to US Subsidies to Boeing (WTO case DS353) 
 
22 March 2007: EU filed confidential version of First Written Submission 
6 July 2007: US filed confidential First Written Submission 
26-27 September 2007: First panel hearing  
28 September 2007: EU’s non-confidential First Written Submission on its website 
16-17 January 2008: 2
nd
 panel hearing (rebuttals submitted on 6 November 2007) 
7 April 2008: issuance of the confidential interim Panel report (to the Parties) 
16 June 2008: issuance of the final Panel report 
Publication of the final report: (after translation – approximately 2-4 months) 
Source: European Commission  
 
 
 
THE EU WTO CHALLENGE TO US SUBSIDIES TO BOEING (WTO case 
DS353)
191
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In its WTO case against the US, the EU made numerous allegations on various US 
subsidies to Boeing as follows:  
 
 The EU alleged that “following the United States’ unjustified and unilateral 
withdrawal from the 1992 bilateral EU-US Agreement on Trade in large 
Civil Aircraft (LCA) and the initiation of WTO dispute settlement 
procedures against the EU, the EU for its part on 6 October 2004 decided 
to mirror the US steps by initiating WTO dispute settlement procedures 
regarding a number of US measures, including federal and state 
subsidies.” A WTO panel was set up thereafter.  
 
 The EU also advanced the argument that “the EU has undertaken 
numerous good faith attempts towards a negotiated solution to the 
differences of opinion between the EU and the US, without success to 
date.” 
First Panel Hearing
192
  
The EU asserted that the core of the EU’s challenge is the “lavish R&D support” that 
the US Department of Defense (DOD) and NASA provided through various means, 
as well as Boeing-specific support provided at both state and local level, such as 
subsidies specifically made for Boeing in the states of Washington, Kansas, and 
Illinois. Clearly, the R&D support from the US DOD had the effect of weakening 
Airbus’s stance and competitiveness, and strengthened Boeing’s assertions. 
Although the US tried to dismiss Airbus’s challenges by using exaggerated claims, 
the US government law makers including the high ranking US officials and 
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politicians acknowledged their critical roles and support that have been given to  
Boeing.193 However, the US argued that Airbus is also getting the cross-
subsidization from EADS, but the EU dismissed such claims from Boeing insisting 
that there is no proof for such exaggerated US claims.  
The US Reply to the EU’s Challenge Filed by European Commission
194
   
The US’s reply to the EU’s challenge was filed on 6 July 2007. The European 
Commission offered the following points which were the focus of the hearing before 
the WTO panel hearing on 26-27 September 2007:
195
 
   
1. The US readily acknowledged that the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) 
and the succeeding schemes prohibited export subsidies and that Boeing 
was a main beneficiary. However, the US argued that Boeing no longer 
received any benefits post-2006 even though an internal IRS (Internal 
Revenue Service) memorandum allowed for such benefits to be claimed 
by companies like Boeing. The EU claimed that the US had failed to 
provide any documentation that Boeing no longer received any such 
benefits.  
 
2. For subsidies that were granted by the state of Washington and the state 
of Illinois, the US put up a less than vigorous defense and appeared to 
agree with the EU that subsidies have benefited – and would continue to 
benefit – Boeing. The EU’s argument was that in both states, the 
subsidies were clearly marked for the exclusive benefit of Boeing. The EU 
continued to argue that the US claims that these subsidies were generally 
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available, or not designed for the benefit of Boeing lacked credibility. 
Indeed, these incentive packages had been designed in negotiations with 
Boeing, and even included a contractual promise by the state of 
Washington that would provide a US$ 4 billion subsidy regardless of form. 
 
3. However, the EU’s argument against the US was short of any convincing 
substantive arguments because the EU provided no evidential support for 
its own defense. The US’s claim that these subsidies are generally 
available to public companies appeared to be credible and factual: for 
example, the US’s claims regarding NASA’s research results being 
available to public are widely known. Furthermore, the EU has in the past 
made use of NASA’s aeronautical research results that are available in 
the public domain.  
 
4. For other subsidies, such as those granted by the state of Kansas, the US 
claimed that Boeing had not benefited, and will not benefit in the future. 
The US provided no evidential back-up for these claims. The EU argued 
that these bonds are referred to as “Boeing Bonds” simply because they 
are for the benefit of Boeing.  
 
5. The European Commission, in the face of the US’s challenge to EU 
support in the DS316 document, provided detailed breakdown of all Large 
Civil Aircraft (LCA) – related research and technology (R&T) support and 
offered to submit all original documentation regarding such support upon 
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the Panel’s request. The EU questioned why the US is not equally 
forthcoming like the EU.  
 
6. The US argued that certain R&D support should be excluded for 
purposes of the WTO dispute as it resulted from military or dual-use 
technologies which are subject to stringent US export controls and cannot 
be included in LCAs for exportation. However, the EU countered that the 
US conveniently overlooked the fact that while such technologies may not 
be part of exported LCAs as such, they may be – and frequently are – 
used in the actual production of LCAs. Furthermore, the EU argued that 
the press and a former Boeing engineer have reported suspicious Boeing 
practices of recreating research to work around ITAR (International Traffic 
in Arms Regulation) controls and use military data for the B787 despite 
US restrictions. The EU argued that this is another example of how the 
US hides behind general statements about US laws and regulations 
whilst refusing to disclose the actual information and evidence related to 
R&D support to Boeing.  
 
7. The EU argued that various US federal, state and local subsidies that 
supposedly benefitted Boeing amount to $23.7 billion. These subsidies 
are, in fact, WTO inconsistent subsidies which are not in compliance with 
the WTO rules in the past two decades up to 2024 as shown in Exhibit 9 
in Appendix, Overview of US subsidies to Boeing Large Civil Aircraft 
division.  
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The EU is further alleged that this number would reach $300 
billion if the EU were to use the same calculation method as used by the 
US in reaching the inflated subsidy numbers in its case against alleged 
support to Airbus. 
However, equally it can be argued that whilst having 
government subsidies of such duration may not be particularly unusual in 
Europe, the fact remains that having government subsidies over many 
years does not encourage competition between Airbus and Boeing. The 
argument supports the Bush administration’s doctrine that forgives all  
past subsidies in order to carry on with a fresh start under the subsidy- 
neutral condition.    
 
8. At federal level, the EU claims that Boeing benefitted from numerous 
types of R&D support provided by NASA and the Department of Defense 
(DOD). The EU argued that this support includes contracts for R&D work 
to be carried out by Boeing (ultimately benefitting Boeing’s LCA division 
and Boeing’s aircraft models), reimbursement of Boeing’s own R&D 
expenses, extensive cooperation with NASA and DOD engineers at no 
cost to Boeing, and the use of testing facilities and equipment, also at no 
cost to Boeing. This support is coupled with the transfer of patents and 
other vital knowledge to Boeing, and reinforced by stringent restrictions 
on the application and use of such knowledge by foreign competitors. The 
EU estimates the benefits of US federal research programs to Boeing at 
around $16.6 billion over the last two decades.  
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9. According to the EU claims, the US predictably sought  to argue that this 
constitutes payment for “services” which the US claimed are not covered 
by the WTO disciplines on subsidies. The EU firmly disputed this and it is 
arguably one of the areas where the EU is on relatively strong ground: 
despite the fact that some of NASA’s activities relate to general public 
interest areas such as space exploration, the fact remains that the 
specific NASA R&D programs challenged by the EU amount to fake 
transactions solely intended to provide funding and support to the US 
aeronautics sector/Boeing in very specific and costly areas of research. 
The EU argues that the resulting R&D is consistently applied to Boeing’s 
airplane models. These so-called “purchases of services” completely lack 
the basic characteristics of normal purchase of services – the US has 
failed to demonstrate what NASA actually “procures”.  In short, the EU’s 
argument was that NASA had funded 100% of specific R&D (i.e. no 
contribution from Boeing whatsoever), but Boeing undertook the research 
and ultimately retained all resulting technologies and knowledge. The EU 
argued that this notably includes any resulting patents where the 
ownership is explicitly waived for the benefit of Boeing. This allows 
Boeing to freely apply technologies and knowledge to its LCAs at no cost.  
 
10. The US further sought to argue that the US government was not 
overpaying and had followed procurement procedures, just as it argued 
that Boeing received “adequate consideration” in return for what it 
provides.  The US failed to provide any support whatsoever for these 
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claims and simply referred to various Department of Defense 
Regulations. 
 
11. At federal level, Boeing also enjoyed significant tax breaks under the 
Foreign Sales Corporation and successor legislation. That legislation had 
already been found to constitute prohibited export subsidies by multiple 
WTO panels and the WTO Appellate Body. The EU estimated these tax 
benefits at a value of $2.2 billion to Boeing’s LCA division over the period 
1989-2006. The US neglected to address the EC’s actual claim: a recent 
official IRS Memorandum allowed US exporters, including Boeing, to 
continue to benefit from the illegal tax breaks even after the end of 2005 
which should have marked the end of all benefits under the FSC and 
successor legislation.  
 
12. At the state and local level, subsidies to Boeing included a $4 billion 
package in the state of Washington (combining tax breaks, tax 
exemptions or tax credits, and infrastructure projects for the exclusive 
benefit of Boeing) and a $900 million package in the state of Kansas in 
the form of tax breaks and subsidized bonds, some of which are known 
as “Boeing Bonds”. These will be enjoyed by Boeing until 2024. 
 
13. The EU demonstrated before the WTO panel that the lavish subsidies 
benefitting Boeing had allowed Boeing to engage in aggressive pricing of 
its airplane which had caused lost sales, lost market share and price 
suppression to Airbus on a number of selected markets. It also 
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endeavored to show that Boeing received illegal export subsidies in 
addition to the Foreign Sales Corporation program: the Washington state 
package was made contingent upon Boeing’s export performance.  
Finally, the EU also claimed that the US had caused serious prejudice to 
the EU’s interests by violating the EU-US 1992 agreement.  
 
14. The EU stated that it remained open to negotiating a solution. However, 
the starting point for such negotiations should be realistic, balanced, and 
pragmatic.  
 
In reply to the US’s complaints about the EU government subsidies to 
Airbus, the EU argued that there are several US subsidy programs that benefitted 
Boeing which were as follows: (1) the US state and local subsidies; (2) NASA 
subsidies; (3) the US Department of Defense subsidies; (4) the US Department of 
Commerce subsidies (National Institute of Standards & Technology); (5) the US 
Department of Labor; and (6) the US federal tax incentives. 
 
The following are the EU’s arguments in reply to the US’s complaints: 
 
1. The US State and Local Subsidies 
The EU argued that the US state and local subsidies came from the 
states of Washington, Kansas, and Illinois. The Washington state’s 
incentive package of measures benefitted the development, production 
and sales of US’s large commercial airplanes.  These Kansa incentives 
are not only limited to tax and other advantages, but also inclusive of 
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bond financing and other advantages to the US‘s large commercial 
airplane industry. Illinois’ incentives included tax incentives, relocation 
assistance, and other advantages to the US’s large commercial airplane 
industry.  
      
2. NASA Subsidies 
The EU argued that NASA transfers economic resources to the US large 
commercial airplane industry on terms more favorable than available in 
the marketplace by several ways and means. NASA subsidies are 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. NASA allows the US large commercial airplane industry to 
participate in research programs, and makes payments to the US 
large commercial airplane industry under those programs. NASA 
enables the US large commercial airplane industry to exploit the 
results thereof by means including (but not limited to) the foregoing 
or waiving of valuable patent rights, the granting of Limited Exclusive 
Right Data (“LERD”) or otherwise exclusive or early access to data, 
trade secrets, and other knowledge resulting from government 
funded research.   
2. NASA provides the services of NASA employees, facilities, and 
equipment to support the R&D program listed above and pays 
salaries, personnel costs, and other institutional support, thereby 
providing valuable services to the US large commercial airplane  
industry on terms more favorable than available on the marketplace. 
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NASA provides Independent Research & Development, and Bid & 
Proposal Reimbursements.  
3. NASA allows the US large commercial airplane industry to use the 
research, test and evaluation facilities owned by the US government, 
including NASA wind tunnels, in particular the Langley Research 
Center. NASA enters into procurement contracts with the US large 
commercial airplane industry for more than adequate remuneration.  
4. NASA grants the US large commercial airplane industry exclusive or 
early access to data, trade secrets and other knowledge resulting 
from government funded research. NASA allows the US large 
commercial airplane industry to exploit the results of government 
funded research including the foregoing or waiving of valuable 
patent rights or rights in data. 
 
3. The US Department of Defense Subsidies 
The EU supported the argument that the US Department of Defense 
(DoD) transfers economic resources to the US large commercial airplane  
industry on terms more favorable than available in the marketplace as 
follows:  
 
1. DoD allows the US large commercial airplane industry to participate 
in DoD-funded research, making payments to the US large 
commercial airplane industry to exploit the results of such research, 
by means including, but not limited to, the foregoing or waiving of 
valuable patent rights. Furthermore, the DoD allows the US large 
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commercial airplane industry to use research, test and evaluation 
facilities owned by the US government, including the Major Range 
Test Facility Bases. 
  
2. DoD also enters into procurement contracts including those for the 
purchase of goods from the US large commercial airplane industry 
for more than adequate remuneration including: the US Air Force 
contract with Boeing for the purchase of certain spare parts for its 
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) airplane and other 
programs.
196
  
 
3. DoD also allows the US large commercial airplane industry to exploit 
the results of government funded research including the foregoing or 
waiving of valuable patent rights or rights in data.   
 
4.  The US Department of Commerce subsidies (National Institute of  
Standards & Technology) 
The US Department of Commerce transfers economic resources to the 
US large commercial airplane industry on terms preferable to those 
available on the market  through the Advanced Technology Program 
operated the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, as 
amended, and the American Technology Pre-eminence Act of 1991, by 
allowing the US large commercial airplane industry to participate in this 
program, making payments to the US large commercial airplane industry 
under this program, including the foregoing or waiving of valuable patent 
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rights, and the granting of exclusive or early access to data, trade secrets 
and other knowledge resulting from government-funded research.  
 
5. The US Department of Labor Subsidies  
The US Department of Labor transfers economic resources to the US 
large commercial airplane industry on terms preferable to those available 
on the market through the Aerospace Industry Initiative, an element of the 
President’s High Growth Training Initiative, under the authority of the 
Workforce Investment Act by granting funds to Edmonds Community 
College in the State of Washington for the training of aerospace workers.   
 
6. The US Federal Tax Incentives 
The US government transfers economic resources to the US large 
commercial airplane industry through the federal tax system, and in 
particular through the following tax measures: Sections 921-927 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (prior to repeal) and related measures 
establishing special tax treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” 
(“FCSs”); FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000; 
and the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The EU supports the argument that historically, America dominated the commercial 
aerospace industry particularly, the large commercial airplane industry which started 
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on the back of defense technology developed and paid for by the US Defense 
Department. The frame of reference that Prof. Lawrence used for his study is the 
WTO rules and disciplines on subsidy, which can be found in the WTO Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).  
 The EU claims seem to be consistent with the theoretical arguments 
developed by Lawrence (2001). However, Airbus’s arguments needed the legal 
defense better than, or comparable to Boeing’s legal arguments. Airbus strongly 
contended how the US government illegally subsidized Boeing through cross 
technology transfer from Boeing’s defense technology to commercial airplane 
manufacturing capability. Airbus’s arguments on cross-technology transfer have two 
problems. First, it is very difficult to prove how much military/defense technology 
was cross-transferred to commercial airplane manufacturing technology. Second, if 
Airbus was able to prove the cross-technology transfer from military airplane 
manufacturing to large commercial airplane manufacturing at Boeing, this same rule 
will also apply to the EADS’s military technology to Airbus commercial airplane 
manufacturing.    
 The EU-US subsidy dispute was focused on the EU’s WTO challenge to 
US subsidies of Boeing (WTO case DS353). The European Communities alleged 
that the states of Washington, Kansas, and Illinois, and the US government have 
granted $23.7 billion in specific subsidies to Boeing.  However, the biggest problem 
with the EU’s argument is the lack of the solid evidential proof: the support given 
lacks validity and authenticity. The EU’s claims of $23.7 billion worth of 
governments subsidy that Boeing gets from the US government is mostly based on   
how the EU quantified each items in dollars and cents that Boeing is supposedly 
getting from the US governments. However, during an interview with Charlie Miller, 
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Director of Boeing UK in London in October 2009, Miller argued that Airbus gets so-
called “soft loans” which are below market rates with lenient payback terms from the 
EU governments. He also confirmed that Airbus’s “soft loan” from the EU 
governments is on public record.   
 According to Professor Lawrence, “the US large commercial airplane 
industry sector received federal financial contributions or subsidy in the years of 
1996 and 1997 of more than one billion dollars a year from NASA and DOD”
197
. The 
European Communities claimed that the United States provides prohibited 
subsidies through various federal, state and local measures and provides actionable 
subsidies that have caused, and continue to cause, adverse effects to the interest of 
the European Communities. Consequently, the European Communities asked that 
the United States withdraw its subsidies.    Although the EU made a strong case out 
of NASA’s technology transfer to Boeing, it is very difficult to quantify how much 
technology was transferred in terms of dollars and cents. However, Boeing’s claim 
regarding “soft loan” that Airbus received from the EU governments is a strong case 
for Boeing. At the end of the day, this gave Boeing a much stronger case than 
Airbus in the eyes of juries at the WTO. Boeing finally won the case in 2011. 
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CHAPTER 6  
THE CASE OF THE US AT THE WTO 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The United States formally filed its consultation request at the WTO in July 2007and 
charged that the Europeans provided Airbus with substantial subsidies
198
.
 
In a quick 
response to the US claim, the EU also filed the same charges against the US on the 
same day by requesting consultations at the WTO. The EU stated that they filed  a 
consultation request as a prompt response to the US challenge
199
. 
The EU’s case was against alleged US subsidies through adverse effects 
claims and its subsidy claims. The EU’s case against Boeing is a mixed blessing to 
both Airbus and Boeing because, on the one hand, its case gets a lot of 
media/publicity attention and on the other hand its case gets a lot of scrutiny.  
The EU alleged that Boeing is just as heavily subsidized, if not or more 
so, than Airbus. The US argues that the EU simply ignored the mass of evidence, 
enhanced its allegation and even requested the Panel to accept it without any 
evidential support
200
. The US also claims that, by lodging the WTO case, the EU 
expected the WTO examination of the case to end up with “assured 
embarrassment” to both Boeing and Airbus for violating trade rules
201
.  The US 
argued that this was a clear indication of the EU’s intent to move focus away from 
the EU’s embarrassment by creating the impression that the US provides subsidies 
even more than the EU and its member states do.   
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The US also complained that the EU’s claims and allegations were 
inaccurate and erroneous. The US argued that the EU systematically exaggerated 
and misstated subsidy amounts involved in the subsidy disputes and inaccurately 
characterized the nature of the programs at issue. The US evaluated the programs 
at issue, according to the requirements of the “Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement (“SCM Agreement”). The evaluation of the program confirmed 
from the US perspective that the amounts of the subsidy at issue were substantially 
less than the amount alleged by the EU.  
Two major arguments emerge from the various allegations made by the 
EU and the US governments. The first is built on the EU’s adverse effects 
arguments which hinge on four theories: “knowledge effects”, “price effects”, 
“technology effects”, and “subsidy effects”.  These four adverse effects arguments 
are discussed in section 7.2. “The US Rebuttal of The EU’s Adverse Effects 
Allegations and the EU’s Adverse Effects Arguments.” The second major argument 
is the “EU’s Subsidy Allegations” to be discussed in section 7.3, “The US Rebuttal 
of the EU’s Subsidy Allegations.” The EU alleged that Boeing receives “indirect” 
support from the US government by claiming the US government’s purchase of 
Boeing services as “grants.”         
The EU and the US both started making a series of challenging 
allegations in their disputes. The US challenged the EU’s subsidy allegations on the 
ground of gross exaggeration of R&D costs, misinterpretation of the US government 
tax systems, and a catch-all sweeping rebuttal against the US allegations.  
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US ARGUMENTS - THE US REBUTTAL OF THE EU’s ADVERSE EFFECTS 
ALLEGATIONS (DS353)
202
 
 
The United States made a large number of points in its first written submission to 
the WTO regarding the EU’s allegation that certain US programs were specific 
subsidies that have caused adverse effects.
203
 However, the US counter-argued 
that the programs identified by the EU had not caused any adverse effects to the 
EU’s interests. The United States argued that Airbus had made a phenomenal 
progress and had overtaken Boeing contrary to the EU’s claim that the US 
government’s subsidies to Boeing caused adverse effects to Airbus and EU 
interests. In fact, Airbus’s market share jumped by 20 percentage points in just six  
years from 39% in 2000 to 59% in 2006. The US argued that although Airbus had 
some difficulties with production delays of its A380 and in the design phase of its 
A350, Airbus even concedes that these problems have nothing to do with the 
alleged subsidies.
204
  
FOUR MAJOR “ADVERSE EFFECTS” ARGUMENTS (THE US COUNTER-
ARGUMENTS) 
 
The US argued that there are four major adverse effects to Airbus: these are based 
around “knowledge effects”, “price effects”, “technology effects”, and “subsidy 
effects”. The US argued that in order to successfully proceed with its actionable-
subsidy claims, the EU had to show that the US programs caused adverse effects 
to Airbus. This is a key point in its counter arguments. The US argued that the two 
actionable claims, “knowledge effects” and “price effects,” hinged on two theories: 
first, that certain US R&D programs had “knowledge effects” enabling Boeing to 
develop the Boeing B787 earlier than it otherwise would have; and secondly, that all 
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challenged programs had “price effects,” whereby Boeing received “free cash” that 
was used to “price down” the Boeing B787, B737, and B777.
205
  
 
(1) “Knowledge Effects” Arguments by the US 
The US argued that, contrary to Airbus’s claims, there were no “knowledge effects” 
on the Boeing B787. When Boeing committed its resources to the B787, Boeing and 
Airbus both had access to the same composite and other cutting-edge technology. 
Airbus frequently boasted of its leadership in the field and of the composite content 
in the A380. The US, therefore, argued that Airbus made a decision to go in another 
direction and that the EU blamed Airbus’s setbacks on alleged “knowledge effects” 
on the B787.  
 
(2) “Price Effects” Arguments by the US 
The EU argued that all challenged programs effectively gave Boeing the “free cash” 
that was used to drive down the prices of B787, B737, and B777. However, Boeing 
strongly argued that there were no “price effects” on the Boeing B787, B737 or 
B777. By its own admission, the expert’s model did not apply to companies whose 
access to the capital markets was not constrained, as was the case with Boeing 
which had relatively little debt and regularly repurchased large amounts of its stock. 
The EU’s theory ran headlong into the balance of evidence that suggested that 
Airbus, not Boeing, had driven prices down in order to increase its market share.  
 
(3) “Technology Effects” Arguments by the US 
The EU’s contention was that the subsidies which Boeing received had a great 
impact on the development of the Boeing B787 much sooner than it actually did. 
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The EU claimed that “the ‘nature’ of the subsidies gave rise to ‘technology effects’ 
on the B787.”
206
  However, the US argued that the EU provided no evidence, nor 
any ground to substantiate its claims that the alleged subsidies helped Boeing 
develop the B787 sooner than it did. The EU provided no evidence that in the 
absence of the alleged subsidies, Boeing would have developed the B787 later than 
it did or differently than it did.
207
 The US further argued that the NASA research at 
issue was a case in point and was widely available in the commercial marketplace. 
In fact, Airbus was a leader in composites technology at the time of its decision to 
launch the A380.
208
 
 
(4) “Subsidy Effects” Arguments By the US 
While Airbus has experienced some problems and difficulties with its A380 and 
A350, its situation continued to improve with its first A380 finally delivered in 
October 2007, almost two years after the original delivery date. Three basic 
arguments were made by the EU to support its claim that the alleged subsidies 
seriously prejudiced Airbus in terms of price suppression, lost sales, and market 
displacement or impedance.
209
  
 First, the EU argued that the magnitude of the alleged subsidies was so 
great that they must have caused serious prejudice. The US government argued in 
response that EU’s calculations grossly exaggerated the value of the alleged 
financial contributions and any benefit they could conceivably have conveyed to 
Boeing.  
Second, the EU claimed that the nature of the alleged subsidies caused 
Boeing to lower its civil aircraft prices below what they otherwise would have been; 
gave Boeing an opportunity to further lower its large commercial airplane prices 
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below what they otherwise would have been; and gave Boeing a technology 
advantage in developing the 787 that it would not otherwise have had. The EU 
argued that these effects in turn caused price suppression, lost sales, and 
displacement or impedance. However, the US argued that the EU had 
misunderstood the nature of the programs it attacked. The programs did not 
increase non-operating cash flow. However, the US suggested that this EU’s error 
should in itself be conclusive. The US further argued that the EU then made another 
error, - asserting that increases in non-operating cash flow would lead a company 
like Boeing to change its pricing practices. The US strongly argued that the EU’s 
assumptions and conclusions were basically flawed. The US argued that it is the 
market, and not changes in cash flow, that determines Boeing’s prices (although 
one might note that the market for civil aircraft has some rather distinctive 
characteristics as argued in earlier chapters). The EU’s conclusion that cash flow 
affects Boeing prices is based on a series of propositions set out in the Cabral 
Report
210
.  The US argued that the EU’s Cabral Report is fundamentally flawed 
because it is based on the wrong assumptions
211
  
 Third, the EU might have calculated precisely how the alleged subsidies 
collectively reduced the prices charged by Boeing on particular transactions. 
However, these calculations were derived from Cabral’s economic model, which 
accepted as given what the US viewed as the EU’s exaggerated calculation of the 
magnitude of alleged subsidies and the erroneous propositions noted above. 
Therefore, Cabral’s reliance on invalid data and an invalid methodology produced 
invalid results.  
Finally, by undercutting Boeing’s prices, Airbus had set pricing 
expectations in the marketplace at a level that is lower than would otherwise have 
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been the case. This might well be of particular concern to Americans in a market 
where there are only two suppliers. Such choices of business practice that Airbus 
made are the cause of any difficulties that Airbus might now face, and they had 
nothing to do with the alleged subsidies.  
THE US REBUTTAL OF THE EU’s SUBSIDY ALLEGATIONS
212
  
             
The US government counter-argued the EU’s assertion that Boeing continues 
receiving “indirect” support by labeling the purchase of services as “grants,” grossly 
exaggerating the dollar amounts of research and development, challenging 
programs that are not “specific” and misrepresenting the US government state tax 
systems. Boeing argued that the EU’s rhetoric on its subsidy claims cannot alter the 
essential underlying facts:
213
 the US government’s rebuttal to the EU claim is that 
the EU distorted and wrongly labeled the US government’s procurement, 
specifically the DoD’s (the Department of Defense’s) and NASA’s procurement of 
research services, as “grants.” The heart of the EU’s case was against the US 
government’s procurement of research services from private contractors. However, 
Boeing argues that the purchase of services is not subject to the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement disciplines. In fact, services are 
purchased by the DoD and NASA to support government work that is entirely 
unrelated to large commercial airplane (LCA) development and production.  
The US argued that the EC claims are exaggerated. Two-thirds of the 
challenged support (that amounts to $12.8 out of $19.1 billion that the EU claims 
Boeing has received through 2006) is directly related to DoD and NASA research 
activities. The fact of the matter is that Boeing received only a fraction of this 
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amount. To reach $12.8 billion, the EU treated portions of the DoD and NASA 
budgets as 100% subsidies to Boeing, inclusive of all government overhead 
expenses and payments that were made to other companies. The EU claims were 
way out of proportion and grossly exaggerated.  
The US argued that EU misconstrued US Government cost-based 
contracting. The EU portrayed the US government’s reimbursement of overhead 
costs, such as independent research and development (IR&D) and bid and 
proposed costs (B&P) as a subsidy payment. The EU ignored that for cost-based 
contracts, where government payments are made based on the costs incurred, the 
recovery of overhead cost reflected commercial-pricing practices. The EU also 
ignored that the US government contracts with Boeing for its services in the same 
way the government contracts for services with all of its suppliers, across all 
agencies.   
The US argued that the EC misrepresented US state tax systems. 
Washington state’s Business and Occupancy Tax (B&O Tax) has different tax rates 
for different activities. In the case of aerospace manufacturing, a 2003 law gave a 
two-stage reduction in the B&O tax rates for different activities from one of the 
highest levels to the middle of the range. This was tax equalization – not a subsidy 
– and also applied to other aerospace businesses. Then what’s the difference one 
might ask? However, what’s the difference one might ask? The EU also 
misrepresents two widely-available bond programs in Kansas as Boeing subsidies – 
one which has been used for decades by many companies from a wide variety of 
industries. 
The US also argued that the EU attributed funds to Boeing that it did not 
receive. The EU attributed funds paid to companies other than Boeing as if they 
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were payments to Boeing. But if the Boeing was an indirect beneficiary, what’s the 
difference one might ask? The EU treats billions of NASA operations, as a financial 
contribution to Boeing. At the state level, the EU treated bond payments or tax 
adjustments to companies that are independent and unrelated to Boeing as benefits 
to Boeing, without any evidence – or existence – or such a pass-through. 
The US rebuttal of the EU’s subsidy allegations started with DoD (The US 
Department of Defense) research. The US government argued that the EU 
challenged the payments which are actually payments by DoD for the R&D services 
conducted by Boeing and other contractors. So the payments in question are not a 
US government’s financial contribution for purposes of the “SCM Agreement” (the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures).   
Moreover, DoD, NASA, and other aeronautics research operations 
undertake business based on cost-based contracts which are commonly used 
practice in dealing with these types of costs. This practice derives from U.S. 
government procurement rules that apply to all agencies in all sectors for their 
acquisition practices.   
 
(1) SUBSIDY DISPUTES ON US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) 
 
(a) The EU’s Subsidy Allegations on DoD’s RDT&E (The US Department of 
Defense’s Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation)
214
  
 
The EU claimed that in return for the payment to Boeing for conducting research, 
DoD got nothing in return for its money. Boeing counter-argued that DoD did not, as 
the EU claims, get nothing in return for its money. Boeing argued that, in fact, on the 
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contrary to the EU claims, DoD did obtain valuable technology and information for 
military purposes. Then the EU conceded and recognized that, at a minimum, all of 
DoD’s RDT&E projects have a military application in addition to the alleged civil 
application perceived by the EU. The US argued that the EU greatly exaggerated 
the number and value of DoD RDT&E contracts for research into technology with 
even a theoretical civil applicability. However, the EU claims that much of the 
research has “dual uses” that advanced Boeing’s production of large civil aircraft. 
The US argued that the evidence disproves this EU assertion on the following 
grounds:  
First, there is no question that the DoD engages in some research into 
“dual use” technologies from evolving civil technologies into military applications. 
The US argued that DoD’s reference to “dual use” means the adaptation of civil 
technologies for military usage but not the other way around, as the EU asserts. 
However, the US argument here is not quite convincing. For example, the first 
commercial jet B707 and DC8 were the derivatives of the military aircraft. The B707 
exemplifies the adaptation of military technologies for civil usage 
Second, the US argued that DoD research is focused on military 
capabilities not relevant to civil aircraft. The US argued that the C-17 research is a 
case in point. The EU challenged the C-17 research but this research is nothing but 
the development of an airplane that has capabilities of taking off from a short, 
underdeveloped air field and able to air drop paratroopers and cargo from in-flight 
opening doors. Such capabilities are completely useless and of no practicality for 
large civil aircraft. It might be useful in aid operations in the Global South by 
governmental agencies such as the AID (Agency for International Development). By 
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getting rid of the doors, it would be a useful aircraft with short takeoff and landing 
capabilities for aid operations for developing countries with short runways.    
Finally, the US argued that even if some DoD funded research developed 
a theoretical applicability to large civil aircraft, US export control laws make it 
practically impossible to apply any such technology to large civil aircraft. Strict laws 
and an enforcement process clearly prohibit US government contractors from 
receiving more than adequate payments. Therefore, there exists no basis to 
conclude that DoD research made a financial contribution or provided a benefit to 
Boeing’s large civil aircraft. However, there still remain some questions on the 
probable technology transfer as to an applicability of useful military design work to 
large civil aircraft. For example, the development of the defunct commercial SST 
program didn’t start completely from scratch because there existed the aerospace 
technology and the capability to build the military fighter jets that fly on a supersonic 
speed. However, the technology transfer from the military airplanes to commercial 
jets remains controversial.  
 
The US Department of Defense (DoD) Purchases of R&D Services
215
  
This is the first problem identified and the point of counter-argument made by the 
United States – the EU’s assertion that DoD and NASA received nothing in 
exchange for the funds they devoted to purchasing research and development 
services from Boeing. This assertion by the EU is particularly critical to the EU’s 
argument because it is necessary both for the claim that these two agencies’ 
contracts with Boeing are really grants, and that the magnitude of any benefit is 
equal to the price that the agencies paid for Boeing services. It is also critical 
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because the EU’s claims regarding R&D services account for almost two thirds of 
the alleged subsidies by value.  
The US disagreed with the EU’s assertion that DoD and NASA received 
nothing in return for purchasing R&D services from Boeing. The procurement 
contracts and agreements challenged by the EU required the contractor to 
undertake specified work and to provide deliverables.  Therefore, payment is 
contingent upon completion of those requirements - those specified work and 
deliverables. These contracts meet the ordinary meaning of the term “purchase,” 
namely, acquisition by payment. Research and development is a service. Hence, 
these payments are purchases of services.  
Deputy Director at DoD Dick Ginman testified before the Panel members. 
The US Defense Department’s procurement section undertook DoD’s acquisition of 
goods and services to meet military objectives.  Ginman worked in the area charged 
with developing policies and providing guidance and oversight that effectively 
deliver equipment and services to the armed forces and other DoD agencies and 
ensuring that the government’s funds were well spent.
216
 Ginman’s testimony was 
summarized as follows:
217
 
             DoD acquires goods and services to meet military objectives. DoD is not 
interested in civil aviation. Nor does it structure its program to promote civil aviation. 
DoD’s acquisition of RDT&E (Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation) 
services proceeds first from an identification of military needs. One of the armed 
services or a DoD agency identifies an R&D objective and the need to contract out 
for the R&D services or a DoD agency identifies an R&D objective, and the need to 
contract out for the R&D services to met that objective, often because DoD 
scientists are occupied with other projects or do not have the requisite knowledge. 
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Then a notice is issued to the general public seeking proposals for how to meet that 
objective. Based on any proposals received, DoD conducts a competition and 
evaluates which proposal provides the best value, in the form of meeting DoD’s 
objectives. It then negotiates a contract or other agreement with the winning 
contactor. 
What does DoD get under an RDT&E contract or other agreement? Most 
importantly, DoD obtains the work of knowledgeable contractor employees directed 
toward meeting the DoD objectives. An RDT&E contract typically states a research 
objective and describes the steps the contractor will take to meet that need. The 
contractor is required to provide reports and briefings for DoD employees on the 
progress of the work. The contractor also grants the government the right
218
 to use 
any patented invention hat the contractor develops under the contract. This work 
and any resulting information or technologies thereof are of great value to DoD in 
advancing U.S. defense objectives. RDT&E activities performed by contractors may 
identify a new technology that leads to a new weapons system, may improve the 
performance of an existing weapons system, or may decrease the cost of acquiring 
or using existing weapons system. 
 DoD operates under a set of regulations that are designed to ensure that 
the U.S. government gets the best deal possible for the money it is spending. 
Where there is a market price, DoD pays the lowest available market price. Where a 
good or service is not commercially traded, DoD develops an acquisition cost that 
reflects the commercial cost of providing the good or service. This approach, which 
results in what is called ‘cost-type” contracts, is also a market-based approach, in 
that the cost are based on the contractor’s market-based costs for inputs, including 
materials and labor, and overheads. DoD’s acquisition regulations require 
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competitive bidding – a practice that forces contractors to provide the best value for 
the lowest price. The competitive process provides DoD with an insight into a 
contractor’s costs and capabilities that can be used to better negotiate when that 
contractor is a sole bidder.  
However, there remain some unanswered questions here. All this 
Ginman’s testimony is true, but it doesn’t exclude the possibility of “unintended” 
benefits for civilian purposes, or an unintentional military technology transfer for 
commercial benefits.  
Once a contract has been signed, there is a subsequent process to 
ensure that the contractor meets its obligations. The contracting officer monitors 
compliance, supported by the Defense Contract Management Agency (“DAMA”). 
For a major contractor like Boeing, DAMA has a staff that specializes in the 
contractor’s operations and who work to ensure that all of its requests for payment 
are in fact justified. In addition, the Defense Contract Accounting Agency (“DCAA”) 
provides an audit function to ensure that contractors are maintaining financial 
systems that ensure accurate claims for payment, consistent with all of our 
applicable rules. These rules exist precisely because, contrary to what the EU 
stated in its first written statement, DoD does get value in return for its money – and 
wants make sure that the contractor does what it promised to do.         
 
(2) SUBSIDY DISPUTES ON NASA CONTRACTS  
          
The EU’s Subsidy Allegations on NASA R&D
219
  
The EU has also argued that NASA research programs provided grants, and goods 
and services to Boeing for free. When NASA purchases R&D services from Boeing 
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to fulfil NASA’s objectives, the EU called them research “grants” to Boeing. It 
seemed that the EU’s allegation was heavily dependent on the NASA and DoD (the 
US Department of Defense) being the great benefactors subsidizing Boeing’s 
airplane programs. Basically, the EU’s allegation and defense came right out of 
Professor Lawrence’s allegation that the US dominance in commercial aerospace 
and LCA (Large Commercial Aircraft) sector is almost entirely backed by the 
defense technology paid for by the US government. Professor  Lawrence’s 
allegation was that although the actual transfer of technology transfer is difficult to 
quantify, “a financial benefit of roughly $560 million a year was transferred from 
DoD programs to the US LCA sector.” The financial benefit of $560 million a year to 
Boeing was nothing but a mere conjecture on the part of Professor Lawrence. 
There’s no evidential support to back it up. It was highly unlikely that this kind of 
defense held water in the WTO litigation. In fact, Airbus lost in the preliminary ruling 
in late 2009. As it stands right now, Airbus’s chance of winning the on-going 
litigation against Boeing seems bleak.  
                Perhaps Airbus misjudged or underestimated Boeing’s capability of 
winning the corporate litigation. Typical American firms listed in the US stock 
exchange have their own in-house attorneys for legal advice. In case of corporate 
takeover, M&A (merger and acquisition), and other important legal matters, big 
American corporations including Boeing hire one of those well-known reputable 
Wall Street law firms in New York. They are the most powerful law firms in the US. 
They can even take up on the lawyers from the Department of Justice of the US 
government. The chances are that these powerful law firms are capable of winning 
the case against the US government. In the past, the US government took IBM, 
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Microsoft, and others to court for Sherman Act antitrust law suit in an attempt to 
break them apart.  
                In retrospect, it was Airbus’s misjudgment to take the litigation up against 
Boeing at the WTO. Airbus management should have known better, because is no 
winning case for Airbus. If Airbus management had a foresight, they should have 
taken the option of negotiated settlement which could have given Airbus a better 
deal than losing the case at the WTO. It was rather shocking to find that Airbus 
management is rather naïve to think that their legal defense primarily based on 
Professor Lawrence’s book about NASA would hold this case against Boeing’s 
professional legal counselors. It is not known if Airbus management is fully aware of 
the fact that big American corporations’ strategies especially in the case of pending 
legal litigation going on, each move is measured and heavily counseled by the legal 
experts very well familiar with international litigation. In the recent past Airbus’s 
move is rather irrational not deliberate when it comes down to dealing with Boeing 
on various critical issues ranging from market share, airplane subsidy disputes. 
There seems to be no initiative of solving the subsidy dispute issues, market share 
issues as they are directly associated with airplane subsidy issues and resulting 
conflicts of interest in the unique duopoly competition environment  instead of 
accusing each other.  Another surprising thing about Airbus is that Airbus so far 
following Boeing’s initiative and battled it out at the court and lost. Should Airbus 
take an initiative and talking over the rule of engagement concerning what’s 
acceptable and what’s not.        
                 The US argued that, as with DoD’s research purchases, NASA 
purchases of R&D services were not financial contributions within the meaning of 
the SCM Agreement (Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures). The 
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US argued that the alleged provision of goods and services were in fact value-for-
value exchanges pursuant to Space Act Agreements, which required the user to 
compensate NASA by providing money or other things of value equivalent to the 
value of the goods or services. The US claimed that Boeing received nothing for 
free.  
For both the R&D purchases and provision of goods and services, NASA 
focuses on basic, fundamental R&D covering a broad range of aeronautics topics. 
NASA does not fund the development of particular products, or promote the 
interests of particular companies. NASA disseminates the resulting knowledge to 
the broadest possible extent. 
                  NASA’s resulting knowledge is available to public that includes EADS 
and Airbus. NASA can provide American aerospace industry with NASA’s research 
in aerodynamics and the benefits. Some of NASA’s work will be available to the 
general public. In fact, Airbus has often turned NASA-based research into 
innovative improvements in its aircraft and also draws on the military programs of its 
parent company, EADS.
220
  
The US supported the arguments that there is no ground to support the 
conclusion that NASA research made a financial contribution or provided a benefit 
to Boeing’s large civil aircraft.
221
 The US also argued that the EU greatly 
exaggerates the value of any NASA payments to Boeing. The US further argued 
that where the EU claims subsidies worth $10.4 billion, the contracts with Boeing 
under those programs amounted to less than $750 million spreading out over 
decades.
222
 
Regarding NASA purchases of R&D services, NASA Deputy Director Bill 
Wilshire,
223
 Deputy Director of the Aeronautics Research Directorate at NASA 
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Langley Research Center, testified before the Panel members. His testimony also 
included the EU’s argument on its treatment of financial contributions to companies 
that are not related to Boeing. He testified NASA operations at the first substantive 
meeting of the Panel with the parties on September 26, 2007. Willshire’s testimony 
is summarized as follows:
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              NASA, as a US federal agency, operates under the same basic legal 
framework of the US government procurement laws as the US Department of 
Defense when it comes to contracting for research and development services. 
However, NASA’s mission is quite different from that of the Department of Defense. 
This means that NASA’s needs and ways of meeting those needs are also different. 
For one thing, NASA is a civilian agency, and does not acquire or develop weapon 
systems. The other thing is that NASA’s mission is to develop knowledge and to 
disseminate that knowledge as broadly as possible. So NASA’s authorizing 
legislation, known as the Space Act, makes this point very clear. Therefore, NASA’s 
objectives as a civilian agency are set as follows:
225
 
 
 The expansion of human knowledge of the earth and of phenomena in 
the atmosphere and space; 
 
 The improvement of the usefulness, performance, speed, safety, and 
efficiency of aeronautical and space vehicles; and 
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 Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of 
nations in work done pursuant to the Space Act
226
 and in the peaceful 
application of the results thereof. 
 
            NASA’s research is aimed at advancing the general state of knowledge for 
the public good.  NASA does not conduct or contract research on the commercial 
projects of any company.    
           The EU alleged at several points that NASA’s research has an effect on the 
competitiveness of the United States in general, and on the air transport sector in 
particular. The EU also noted that one of NASA’s statutory objectives is “the 
preservation of the United States pre-eminent position in aeronautics and space 
through research and technology.” NASA pursues that objective in the context of 
NASA’s other statutory mandates. Therefore, NASA’s aeronautical research 
portfolio has always been very broad, emphasizing fundamental research potentially 
applicable to the widest range of applications. Many research areas have little 
relevance to large civil aircraft manufacturers. In short, NASA does not conduct 
research to develop particular large civil aircraft models. 
              NASA performs extensive research in air traffic management and air traffic 
safety. However, its research has little relevance to the production of large civil 
aircraft. For example, any improvements in air traffic management provide no 
advantage to Boeing or any other aircraft. Any improvement in any air traffic safety 
helps all airplanes equally be they Boeing, or Airbus. More importantly, the travelling 
public will be the ultimate beneficiary of safer air traffic system in the US and 
throughout the world.          
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              More efficient fuel consumption is another area where NASA’s work most 
directly contributes to airlines and the travelling public. For example, one recent 
NASA’s project studied ways to modify airplane flight paths to decrease the fuel 
consumption and noise impact during landing. Again, the airlines and the travelling 
public will be the beneficiary because of the decreased fuel consumption and the 
resulting lower fuel costs to airlines and the reduced aircraft emissions benefiting 
living environment. And, again, more efficient flight paths may be applied to any 
airplane, so therefore, there is no particular advantage to Boeing. Propulsion is 
another area where NASA performs extensive work that is not applicable to Boeing 
because Boeing does not manufacture engines. However, NASA’s propulsion 
research may benefit jet engine manufacturers including P&W, GE, Rolls Royce 
and others.  
            In line with NASA’s broad objectives, NASA develops its research objectives 
for civil aviation and obtains a broad range of input. NASA seeks advice of the 
NASA Advisory Council, which consists of individuals from universities, former 
government employees, private research companies, aerospace companies, 
companies in other industries, and also from the broader public. Based on all this 
input, NASA develops ambitious, long-term research goals. 
            To implement research plans, NASA develops request for proposals for 
research work and activities that will be needed to accomplish these research goals 
and objectives. NASA then evaluates various proposals from bidders, and proceeds 
with combined in-house and outside research activities that will do the most to meet 
NASA’s goals and objectives. NASA scientists conduct research and also other 
government agencies conduct research. And NASA awards a grant to a university, 
or sign a contract with a private research entity such as a private research institute 
 
 
160 
or a commercial entity. NASA generally makes contracts for outside R&D services, 
if not available in-house, to meet NASA objectives.  
             Not surprisingly, given the requirement for technological expertise, when 
NASA makes contracts with major companies, they include Boeing, Northrup 
Grumman, Lockheed, Honeywell, or Raytheon. However, the EU’s claim that 
Boeing gets some special advantage over others is not correct. In bidding 
competition for NASA R&D, Boeing is subject to the same evaluation criteria and 
rules as other companies. However, there’s a difference between rules themselves 
and how they are applied in practice.  When NASA decides to select Boeing among 
other competitors, the terms and conditions of the contract are the same as those 
published in the competitive solicitation and the Federal Acquisition Regulations, 
which all other contractors are subject to.  
The EU’s view of NASA research being primarily directed to advancing 
Boeing’s interests is simply untrue. The EU’s claim that NASA gets nothing in return 
for their purchase of R&D services is also untrue. NASA was established to promote 
“the expansion of human knowledge of the Earth and of phenomena the 
atmosphere and space” and “the improvement of the usefulness, performance, 
speed, safety, and efficiency of aeronautical and space vehicles.”
227
The most 
important return that NASA gets for its expenditures on aeronautics research is 
knowledge and technology, documented in reports and other information generated 
by R&D activities. And NASA provides the widest practicable and appropriate 
dissemination of information. The results of NASA research are ultimately shared 
globally by providing the basis for future discoveries and advancements in the US 
and world-wide within a reasonable timeframe. NASA maintains the world’s largest 
open database of aeronautics research and information. Accordingly, NASA has 
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created and continues to be a primary contributor to the world’s library and that 
NASA’s global aero-science knowledge base will be used as a foundation for 
education. 
The EU had made another allegation that NASA furnished government-
owned property, provided institutional support, and dedicated federal scientists, 
engineers, and research facilities to Boeing’s development of large civil aircraft in 
return for nothing from Boeing. NASA personnel are responsible for achieving 
NASA objectives. The US’s view and the American work ethics are that when NASA 
devotes scientists, research engineers, or facilities to work on NASA programs, they 
are there to achieve NASA’s goals, not Boeing’s. What the EU fails to see is that 
NASA personnel’s loyalty totally lies in NASA simply because that’s where their 
paychecks are coming from. They are not providing goods or services to Boeing. 
They are instead working to produce research results to achieve NASA objectives 
and then to disseminate the research results to the broader community.   
The EU recognized that NASA sometimes provided goods and services 
to outside entities including Boeing, pursuant to the Space Act Agreement which 
requires a private signatory to give NASA value – money, goods, or services – 
equivalent to what NASA provides to the signatory. There is no support for the 
assertion that NASA got nothing in return for facilities or services that NASA made 
available to outside entities.  
Another problem with the EU argument is its treatment of financial 
contributions to companies and persons other than Boeing. The main problem here 
is the EU’s view that payments to Boeing’s competitors in the military aerospace 
market, payments to public universities, payments to Airbus suppliers, including 
even salaries paid to government employees who have nothing to do with Boeing – 
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all get treated as subsidies to Boeing. Surprisingly, the EU proposes to treat these 
expenditures as financial contributions to Boeing without any credible evidence of 
receipt by Boeing of a government payment, good or service. It seems clear that 
Airbus is rather weakening its case and losing effectiveness by overstating it.   
In its discussion of the Washington State Business and Occupancy Tax 
(“B&O Tax”) rate adjustment, the EU recognized that tax rate reductions for other 
aerospace manufacturers apply to all entities engaged in aerospace manufacturing, 
not just to Boeing. Some of the entities that receive the B&O tax adjustment for 
aerospace manufacturing activities do not even supply to Boeing. However, the EU 
claimed that the full value of the tax rate adjustment over 20 years is a financial 
contribution to Boeing. The EU treated financial contributions to Boeing’s suppliers 
as benefits to Boeing based on the assertion that these independent and unrelated 
companies somehow passed the alleged subsidies on to Boeing, which could 
happen indirectly if it made their processes more efficient. 
            When it comes to NASA, the EU included contracts with other, non-Boeing 
suppliers of R&D services, and grants to universities as financial contributions to 
Boeing. And then it took the further step of treating NASA’s payments to its own 
employees as financial contributions to Boeing. In fact, the EU alleged subsidies 
worth $10.4 billion, whereas NASA actually paid Boeing less than $750 million. The 
remaining $9.6 billion, which represents the majority of the EU claim, consisted of 
payments to universities, payments to contractors other than Boeing compensation 
for NASA employees, and other operating expenses. With regard to NASA’s 
budget, the EU provides neither evidence nor reasoning as to why such payments 
not made to Boeing should be treated as subsidies to Boeing. The EU simply 
ignored the distinction between Boeing and the actual on-Boeing recipients, and 
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alleged that a benefit to Boeing exists without providing sufficient supporting 
evidence. In short, the EU treated a financial contribution to one entity as a benefit 
based on nothing more than assertions unsubstantiated by any evidence.  
 
(3) SUBSIDY DISPUTES ON DOD & NASA CONTRACTS  
 
The EU’s Subsidy Allegations on Intellectual Property Rights under DOD and NASA 
Contracts
228
  
 
With regard to patent and data rights, the US argued that one critical point was that 
the treatment challenge arises only when a private party enters a contract with the 
US government. Under US law, patent rights accrue to the inventor. Therefore, the 
intellectual property clauses in a government contract do not confer rights on the 
contractor. Instead, they confer certain right on the government to use inventions or 
data conceived by the contractor during performance of the contract. As such, the 
rights retained by contractors are not given for free, but are part of an overall 
commercial transaction.   
      
(4) SUBSIDY DISPUTES ON IR&D (Independent Research and 
Development) and B&P (Benefit and Proposal) and ATP (Advanced 
Technology Program)  
 
EU’s Subsidy Allegations on IR&D and B&P
229
  
 
The EU also made allegations with regard to the independent research and 
development and benefit and proposal. These two are not separate payments to 
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contractors. IR&D/B&P are indirect costs or “overheads”, which are normal costs of 
doing business incurred by a company, but not related to particular transactions. 
Commercial operators recover such costs by passing them onto their customers as 
part of the prices charged to their customers. The government reflects these costs 
under certain procurement contracts by spreading them over the affected business 
of a company, and then including the share allocated to each contract in the 
acquisition price. The government must cover these costs in the prices it pays, or 
commercial suppliers won’t do business with it. 
   
The EU’s Subsidy Allegations on Advanced Technology Program (ATP)
230
  
The EU claimed that the US Department of Commerce’s grants under the Advanced 
Technology Program to a wide range of US industries are a WTO-inconsistent 
subsidy. However, the US argued that the ATP is not specific and thus is not an 
actionable subsidy, contrary to the EU’s allegations. The US also argued that these 
grants are broadly available to multiple industries and have been used by them, 
while Boeing has received a very small proportion of the total grants provided under 
this program.  
   
(5) SUBSIDY DISPUTES ON WASHINGTON STATE TAX MEASURES  
 
The EU’s Subsidy Allegations on Washington State Tax Measures
231
  
 
The US argued that the Washington state Business and Occupation (“B&O”) tax 
adjustment provided to commercial airplane manufacturers does not constitute a 
WTO-inconsistent subsidy. An essential element of a subsidization claim under the 
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SCM Agreement is a financial contribution by a Member government. The EU 
contends that Washington state, by applying the B&O tax adjustment to Boeing, is 
impermissibly foregoing revenue that would otherwise be due. Boeing argued that 
they simply applied the B&O tax adjustment which is legally deductible under the 
Washington state B&O tax adjustment.  The US also argued that this EU argument 
ignored the relevant facts and the applicable state tax law. 
The US further argued that under Washington state’s B&O tax structure, 
a good is taxed at each stage in the chain of production, leading to higher effective 
tax rates for more complex business activities. In order to address these 
discriminatory effects, referred to as “pyramiding”, Washington state applies a B&O 
tax adjustment to certain industries. In the case of Boeing, the effect of the 
adjustment is to bring Boeing’s tax rate inline with the average tax rate for all 
business activities in Washington state. Without the adjustment, Boeing’s effective 
tax rate is significantly higher than other business activities in the state, because of 
pyramiding. The B&O tax rate for Boeing after the adjustment is not a preferential 
rate; rather, the adjustment makes Boeing’s tax rate less discriminatory.  
 The US asserted that Washington state is not “due” a higher rate of 
revenue from aerospace manufacturing than from other businesses.  Since the B&O 
tax rate does not confer a preferential rate on Boeing, the state is not foregoing 
revenue that would otherwise be due. Thus, there is no financial contribution. The 
US argued that the EU’s claim fails on this basis. However, even if the Panel were 
to find that there is a financial contribution, the B&O tax adjustment is not specific to 
an industry or enterprise because several industries in Washington state also 
receive a B&O tax adjustment. Therefore, the B&O tax adjustment is not actionable 
under the SCM Agreement.  
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 Airbus examined Boeing’s Washington state’s tax returns in search for 
any irregularities in its tax return. Airbus examined Boeing’s corporate tax 
adjustment and deductible amounts but found nothing to discredit Boeing. Airbus’s 
arguments on Boeing’s corporate income tax returns have a rather negative effect 
on Airbus’ on-going subsidy arguments. The basic question is the rationale behind 
why Airbus brings Boeing’s US tax returns into the on-going airplane subsidy 
disputes? Clearly Airbus was investigating Boeing’s tax returns in an attempt 
uncover any kind of irregularity to discredit Boeing. Airbus did not succeed in finding 
anything worthwhile. Boeing reputation remains intact while Airbus’ action of digging 
into Boeing tax returns seems to be out of focus.  
 
EU’s Subsidy Allegations on Washington State Infrastructure
232
  
The US argued that Washington state infrastructure and other measures are not 
WTO-inconsistent subsidies. The EU contended that Washington state’s expansion 
of two public roads, I-5 and SR 527, as part of a state-wide infrastructure 
improvement plan constituted a subsidy. The EU claimed this as a subsidy despite 
the fact that the SCM Agreement explicitly excludes general infrastructure from its 
subsidy disciplines. The expansion projects that the EU challenged are in fact 
quintessential general infrastructure, as they are open to public and their use is in 
no way limited to anyone – let alone Boeing. A state commission that examined 
Washington State’s transportation requirements identified the two public roads, I-5 
and SR 527 as priorities because of congestion and accident rates. I-5 is a public 
road and a part of the U.S. Interstate Highway System. It is used by the countless 
businesses, tourists, and citizens, and runs from Canada to Mexico. SR 527 is 
considered to be a principal arterial highway” with mostly residential and 
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commercial” developments. Therefore, there is no factual or legal basis for the EU’s 
claims that these projects to expand two major public roads are subsidies.  
 
(6) SUBSIDY DISPUTES ON WICHITA & KANSAS BONDS 
     
EU’s Subsidy Allegations on City of Wichita Industrial Revenue Bonds (IRBs)
233
  
The US also argued that the EU’s challenges to bonds issued by the State of 
Kansas are completely filled with legal and factual inaccuracies. First, the IRBs 
issued by the State of Kansas neither provided a financial contribution to Boeing nor 
were they specific to Boeing. The EU alleged that an IRB program of Kansas State 
is merely a scheme to give Boeing certain tax breaks. However, in making this 
allegation, the EU ignored the mass of countervailing evidence. In fact, the tax 
exemptions are no longer relevant to Boeing because Kansas State has stopped 
assessing property tax and sales tax on commercial and industrial machinery and 
equipment. The vast majority of property that Boeing has financed with IRBs is 
machinery and equipment, which would be tax exempt regardless of the IRB 
program. Therefore, the US argued that Kansas State had not foregone revenue 
that would be otherwise due.  
  Further, the US argued that the IRBs are not specific to Boeing because 
they are broadly available to “any person, firm or corporation.” They are also not de 
facto specific. The US also claims that the percentage of IRBs issued to Boeing is 
not disproportionate, nor is Boeing a “predominant” user.  
 
EU’s Subsidy Allegations on Kansas Development Finance Authority (KDFA) 
bonds
234
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Not a single bond under this program has even been issued to Boeing. Instead, 
these bonds were issued to an independent entity, unrelated to Boeing. The US 
claimed that the EU repeatedly attempts to argue that financial contributions to 
entities other than Boeing pass through to Boeing. However, the US claimed that 
there is no basis for these arguments.    
 
(7) SUBSIDY DISPUTES ON ILLIONOIS PROGRAMS
235
  
With respect to the EU challenges to measures by the state of Illinois, the US 
argued that the EU fails to establish that these measures are specific. The state of 
Illinois has established criteria to encourage businesses to locate their corporate 
headquarters in the state. The US argued that these criteria are not specific to and 
industry or enterprise; thus, they do not constitute an actionable subsidy under the 
SCM Agreement.    
(8) SUBSIDY DISPUTES ON EXPORT CONTINGENCY
236
   
Export contingency is the third point on the EU’s subsidy allegations. In challenging 
the EU’s subsidy allegations, the US argued that there is no evidence to support the 
EU assertion that the Washington state tax measures under HB 294 were export-
contingent subsidies. The EU noted that the tax measures were not to become 
effective until the state and “a manufacturer of commercial airplanes sign a 
memorandum of agreement regarding an affirmative final decision to site a 
significant commercial airplane final assembly facility in Washington state.” A 
“significant commercial airplane final assembly facility”(the Washington state tax 
measures under HB 2294, 17 (1)(a)) is defined as a ‘location with the capacity to 
 
 
169 
produce at least thirty-six super-efficient airplanes a year” (HB 2294, 17 (2)(d)). The 
US claimed that the Boeing 787 production facility satisfies this definition.  
  
CONCLUSION 
 
The strongest of the US legal defense came from the best legal defense undertaken 
by the lawyers from one of the best law firms in the US. Boeing’s in-house legal 
counselors included a potential candidate for the US Supreme Court.  Boeing’s 
legal counselors including a former US federal judge made a difference when it 
came down to the international disputes at the world court of justice. Perhaps the  
caliber of the US legal defense counselors outranked Airbus legal team. There’s no 
surprise in Boeing’s case winning the international disputes in the world court at the 
WTO. It’s not about whether Boeing was right or Airbus was wrong. It’s about who 
did well and who won the case at the WTO. Like any other legal battle, the EU’s 
subsidy allegation was generally considered gross exaggeration of the R&D cost, 
misunderstanding of the US tax systems, and alteration of facts and catch-all  
rebuttals. However, the weakest of the US side’s arguments was that the US was 
not able to prove at the WTO court that Boeing production process is equal to or 
better than that of Airbus’s “new generation” technology in terms of the “cost 
efficiency” of the modern airplane manufacturing process. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
EU-US AIRPLANE SUBSIDY DISPUTES  
 
This study started with several research questions: why have the Airbus and Boeing 
disputes been one of the longest political issues between the EU and the US? And 
why was the 1992 GATT agreement kept rather quiet for twelve years? But since 
the 1992 GATT agreement collapsed in 2004, to update this thesis, a third question 
was added: what has the intensity of the duopoly competition brought about?  An 
analysis highlighted the on-going duopoly competition between Boeing, an 
American private enterprise, and Airbus, a successful state-sponsored European 
consortium company. Airbus made an astonishingly quick ascension to the 
leadership position in the large commercial airplane industry in 2003. Ever since, 
Airbus has been in a commanding post, a leader of a multi-billion dollar large 
commercial airplane industry. It seemed that Airbus has proven its technological 
excellence which is equal to or better than Boeing. And Airbus’s phenomenal 
success seemed to have made a great contribution to the EU’s exports, and hence, 
significant contribution to the EU’s balance of payments.   
 However, the US filed a complaint to the WTO in 2004 over alleged 
European subsidies to Airbus to the amount of $205 billion during the last thirty 
years. The WTO provided a mechanism for arbitration, and, potentially, resolution of 
disputes over alleged European subsidies to Airbus. The US denied Airbus’s claim 
that Boeing had an unfair advantage over US government contracts, pointing out 
that Airbus’s market share increased by 20 percent at Boeing’s expense from the 
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year 2000. The US government’s Trade Representative’s office announced that the 
EU’s claims were to distract attention from its own massive subsidies.  
 The EU allegation was made in the first hearing of their case against the 
US before the World Trade Organization on the 26
th
 September 2007. Airbus 
complained to the WTO that it had lost $27 billion in revenues over the previous 
three years, primarily due to the US government’s illegal subsidies to Boeing.
237
 The 
EU argued that these subsidies had allowed Boeing to use an aggressive price war 
against them on a number of select markets. The EU also complained that Boeing 
received subsidies in the form of tax breaks, development of funding and outright 
grants, which were illegal and clearly aimed at weakening Airbus’s position and 
competitiveness. 
   
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
 
Almost all academic research derives from an analysis and evaluation of the 
variables that have been considered relevant and critical to the outcome of the 
research.  In order to better understand and assess the EU-US political-economic 
disputes in the case of Airbus vs. Boeing, this study identified key political-economic 
variables which may have helped the decision makers to resolve the EU-US 
disputes. First, the most essential variable is the political-economic environment 
where the EU and US dispute. It was argued that the EU-US political-economic and 
business environment has in recent years increasingly necessitated governmental 
subsidization, a process which eventually became one of the most critical issues of 
the EU-US disputes in the Airbus vs. Boeing case. The second variable considered 
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was the politicization of government subsidies as the locus of the EU–US disputes. 
The US government still seems to have a political-economic edge over the EU 
governments, and salvaged the potential loss of Boeing against unfair competition 
from Airbus. The third variable considered was the government-business 
relationship between Europe and the US. The free trade and free competition, 
which have been given, as it has been taken for granted, were considered to be one 
of the most critical variables, promoting entrepreneurial freedom and success in 
capitalism. Finally, the political-economic power of the US government played an 
important role in preventing governmental subsidies and promoting free competition 
and free trade. The political-economic power, as it seems, of the US government 
carried a political leverage to win the government subsidy case. 
 
FINDINGS  
 
The financial support to private businesses by governments became the most 
contentious issue of the duopoly between Airbus and Boeing, eventually leading to 
legal disputes at WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The preliminary ruling by the WTO 
in September 2009 sided with Boeing, concluding that EU countries have funded 
billions of dollars in illegal subsidies to Airbus.
238
 The WTO’s interim ruling also cited 
that preferential government loans for the Airbus super jumbo A380 passenger jet 
constituted an illegal export subsidy. Consequently, the WTO’s interim ruling 
potentially provided the US government and Boeing with a legal advantage to 
contest future government funding for Airbus. Although it is expected the EU will 
challenge the ruling, the WTO’s ruling has greatly impacted the $3.2 trillion global 
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marketplace in large commercial airplanes, in which Airbus has surpassed Boeing 
since 2003 to date and highlights the WTO’s increasingly important role in this 
dispute reflected the centrality of the WTO in the global trade politics of EU-US 
government subsidy politics. 
At stake was not only the political-economic relationship that the EU and 
US governments have nurtured over decades, but also billions of dollars controlled 
by only two producers: Airbus and Boeing. The depth, strains, and length of the 
political-economic disputes on government subsidy issues only exacerbated the 
political relations between the EU and US. It is believed that eventual settlement of 
the subsidy disputes at the WTO ruling saved the good EU-US political-economic 
relations by preventing any negative impact from prolonged disputes.  
In 2011, the WTO finally ruled against Airbus’s allegation of the US 
government aid to Boeing. The Panel and Appellate Body at the WTO upheld the 
US’s claim against the EU’s launch aid to Airbus by stating that every single grant of 
launch aid to Airbus over the past four decades conferred a subsidy that caused 
adverse effects on the United States. The Panel Body at the WTO concluded that, 
first, the launch aid was fundamental to Airbus’s ability to launch and bring to 
market each of its models of large commercial airplanes; second, either directly or 
indirectly, launch aid was a necessary precondition for Airbus’s launch of the A380 
in 2000 and, therefore, it would not have been possible for Airbus to launch the 
A380 by financing it entirely at a commercial market rate.  
The Appellate Body disagreed with the EU’s argument that, without any 
launch aid, Airbus could have launched an A320 series of airplanes in 1987, as well 
as an A330 series of the large commercial airplanes in 1991. Therefore, the EU 
finally conceded that without subsidies Airbus would not have been able to launch 
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the series of Airbus large commercial airplanes including the A300, A310 and A340 
airplane programs in the 2001- 2006 period. The EU’s concession has strongly 
impacted the decision of the Panel and Appellate Body. 
 The WTO’s interim ruling was the first step in a process that suggested a 
final ruling could be reached in 2011, or possibly several years later if Airbus kept 
appealing against the WTO’s ruling. EADS, a parent company of Airbus, could be 
forced to repay billions of dollars in past government aid to Airbus. The WTO does 
not have the power to impose sanctions itself, but it can allow a nation that has 
been harmed – in this case the United States – to raise tariffs or impose other 
barriers to imports inclusive of large commercial airplanes from an offending country 
or countries: – in this case European countries.  
Having the US agree with an out-of-court settlement seemed to be an 
option, or even a necessity, for Europe to prevent further escalation of the dispute   
in the Disputes Settlement Body (DSB) at the WTO. However, it was not known 
whether the EU member state governments saw it that way. During interviews 
undertaken in Geneva between the 13
th
 – 15
th
 October 2009, officials from the 
European Commission and the WTO declined to discuss the issues relating to the 
subsidy disputes between the EU and the US for the reason that the disputes were 
still going on at the WTO in Geneva as of October 2009.     
Boeing and Airbus, however, offered a vastly different account of the 
governmental aid and its impact on the market. The US, on behalf of Boeing, 
argued that the launch aid provided for all of Airbus’s previous airplane programs 
were illegal subsidies. So far, the prompt and concerted action taken by the US and 
EU governments seems to have circumvented the imminent global economic 
slowdown. However, a bleak economy impacted the Airbus vs. Boeing dispute to 
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the advantage of Boeing. This was mainly because the US administration, under the 
Democrats, was ready to save big US corporations, especially in the aftermath of 
the collapse of auto-makers, including General Motors and Chrysler, which, in all 
likelihood, could not have been saved. Airbus, on the other hand, has been well 
protected from economic recession: this is because if anything went wrong with 
Airbus, the European governments were likely to pay for it. Therefore, Airbus will 
remain infallible and perpetuate as a European consortium company regardless of 
whether their large commercial airplane business loses money or not. In that sense, 
Boeing is almost like competing against the infallible European treasury. Continued 
governmental subsidy to Airbus can be justified by the potential welfare cost of the 
unemployed Airbus workers. In so as far as French government is concerned, 
Airbus is the most successful business undertaking in the recent years. Therefore, 
Boeing argues that as long as the European governments continue financing Airbus 
in the below market terms, Airbus and Boeing are not competing in a level playing 
field.    
The US government can no longer crusade the laissez-faire principle of 
the late1960s when Boeing almost went bankrupt with absolutely no aid whatsoever 
from the US government. However, a great deal of government policy changes took 
place in the US administration’s policy since President Barack Obama. Ex-president 
Bush adhered to a traditional no-bail-out US policy which means that the US 
government does not save any failing nor failed private enterprise with the aid of tax 
payers’ money. However, the Obama administration reserved millions of dollars in 
government funds ready to disburse to rescue some failing American enterprises in 
order to sustain US economic growth and political stability so as to make a positive 
contribution to protect the welfare of the American people.  
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Today, the US government takes a more proactive role in stabilizing US 
businesses and the economy, helping minimize the negative impact of seasonal 
economic fluctuations. The US stimulates economic growth through the monetary 
policy. The US monetary policy includes the effective use of interest rates by the 
government or central bank as well as to control the money supply to effect steady 
economic growth
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. The US also provides the governmental aid to promote the US 
export that contributes to the US balance of payment. Boeing and Airbus, however, 
offered vastly different interpretations of the use of governmental aid and its impact 
on the market. The US argued that the governmental launch aid provided to all of 
Airbus’s previous airplane programs is an illegal subsidy.        
The implication of the preliminary ruling by the WTO in late 2009 was that 
Airbus no longer has easy access to subsidies from European governments. The 
panel at the WTO cited that Airbus’s subsidy to its A380s is illegal. The preliminary 
ruling clearly reins in Airbus’s freedom to use government subsidies to develop new 
airplane models at any cost and any time. However, what Airbus has received from 
the EU governments already has got the company into a position where it can be 
commercially viable. Whether Airbus could have done without its governmental aid 
is now a mere speculation. Having realized that the A380 is not the right airplane for 
the more fuel- and cost-conscious airlines, Airbus has now quickly started 
developing its “new generation” A350 to catch up with the “new generation” high 
technology Boeing B787. Suppose Airbus didn’t have easy access to R&D funding, 
would it have been a more prudent and competitive rival to Boeing? If Airbus had 
limited funding without generous backing of the EU governments, could it have 
avoided the fiasco of the super jumbo A380 program?  
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Airbus and Boeing are building what their economy needs: the right 
commercial airplanes that best meet the needs of travelers and make a great 
contribution to their governments’ balance of payments. Both Airbus and Boeing 
proved that they continue building state-of-the-art technology airplanes at a time 
when their status in the world is under challenge. Airbus and Boeing both made a 
huge investment in their “new generation” high technology industry contributing to 
their country’s balance of payment. Having lost much of its automobile industry in 
recent years, the US needs the continued success of Boeing, a global player and 
major contributor to the large commercial airplane industry as well as to the US 
defense industry.  
Boeing is the embodiment of American invention and the result of a 
deeply American concept developed in the principle of neo-liberalism; Airbus is the 
result of the European challenge to the US large commercial airplane industry. 
Airbus replicates the inherited tradition of state-owned consortium company 
reflecting the superiority of the French aerospace technology.  How did these two 
different political actors from the US and EU play out in the government subsidy 
disputes at the WTO? Several conclusions were drawn from this study at the 
conclusion of the EU-US litigation in 2011; these are detailed in the following 
paragraphs:  
First, the EU has stated its goal of creating mutually “assured 
embarrassment” through its case against the US.
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 Obviously, the EU wanted the 
WTO to believe that the US had comparable programs to the EU’s programs that 
provide Airbus with billions of Euros in grants for late-stage R&D, and local 
economic incentives in the form of A380 production facilities and other company-
specific infrastructure. However, the US strongly argued that no such program 
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existed in the US to provide Boeing with $15 billion in market-distorting launch aid. 
The US also claimed that there was no analogue in the US to risk-free, no- or low-
interest loans that shifted the risk of commercial airplane development from Airbus 
to the European governments. 
Second, the US looked for key legal and factual flaws in the reasoning 
behind the EU’s assertions regarding the adverse effects and programs that Airbus 
has challenged. At this stage of the EU and US disputes at the WTO, Boeing’s 
argument has already won the preliminary ruling of the case.  
Third, the Airbus A350 currently being developed in direct competition 
with Boeing 787 airplane (also currently being built) prompted Boeing to file a 
complaint against European subsidies to Airbus at the WTO in late 2004. Thus, 
Boeing tried to prevent any more launch aid from EU governments to Airbus. 
However, Boeing was in a politically precarious position. Boeing was selling more 
airplanes in Europe than Airbus was selling in the US market. And British Airways 
has been, and still is, one of the biggest customers for Boeing airplanes.   
Fourth, there is the growing realization that the most successful Boeing 
“new generation” 787 airplane program has given Boeing some control over the 
future prospect of the American large commercial airplane industry. The 
government subsidies can be looked at in terms of their efficiency in the economy 
as a whole to bring about its redistribution efficiency rather than productive 
efficiency. When Airbus decided to build the A380 to displace the 747, a huge 
amount of EU government subsidies worth billions of dollars went into the R&D to 
develop the state-of-the-art technology for the “new generation” super jumbo A380. 
However, the production of the A380 subsequently caused almost two-year delays, 
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only to find that Airbus had an impaired ability to market the A380 to compete with 
the Boeing B787 in the marketplace.  
Airbus launched the new generation, high technology triple-deck, super 
jumbo jet A380 in 2000, relying exclusively on EU government financing. However, 
Boeing’s concept of the high technology medium-range B787 clearly excelled over 
the Airbus A380. The studies indicate that airline customers prefer the Boeing B787, 
because it provides preferred passenger cabin comforts and flies directly non-stop 
from origin to destination over the long-range route.
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Airbus’s triple-deck A380 problem may be characterized as the “subsidy 
syndrome” that left much to be desired. In spite of unlimited funding by government 
subsidies that have been expended in the development of the A380, Airbus has 
been unable to prevent two-year delays of the A380 production. The Boeing B787 
also encountered a series of technical problems like the Airbus A380 and suffered 
from almost two-year delivery delays. Both Airbus and Boeing encountered not only 
the technical problems of the “new generation” airplane but also the production-
related problems endemic to large commercial airplane production, arising from a 
large number of subcontractors and their task of coordinating with second- and 
third-tiered suppliers’ network. However, the major difference between the A380 
and the B787 is that the Boeing 787 program made record-breaking sales, winning 
four times as many orders as the A380. The B787 has already monopolized this 
market sector. However, Airbus’s pursuit of catching up with the most successful 
B787 continues. Airbus’s next “new generation” A350 program is currently being 
developed in direct competition with the B787 in the near future. So far the most 
successful “new generation” new technology B787 is scheduled for the flight test 
before the end of 2012.  
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 In conducting this research, we took an empirical approach to develop a 
complete empirical study first and then worked on the theoretical implications to 
complete a theory-based thesis. The theoretical foundation of the thesis consisted 
of the theory of state-business relationship developed by Susan Strange and the 
theory of varieties of capitalism regarded by Hall & Soskice (authors of Varieties of 
Capitalism) and Colin Crouch from the University of Warwick Business School.
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 We have examined the Airbus vs. Boeing case at the WTO court that 
started in 2004 and ended in late 2011. This case study has dealt with one of the 
biggest political-economic disputes case studies in the recent history. The following 
conclusions we have drawn from this case study will be open for further 
discussions. 
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
At the outset of this study, we have identified the two theories that might best fit to 
explain the empirical study we have so far developed this thesis without any 
theoretical implications. The first theory is the state-firm relationship theory 
developed by Susan Strange (1992) followed by the varieties of capitalism theory 
regarded by Peter Hall and David Soskice. We attempt to explain this case study by 
these two theories developed by well-known scholars. We were a bit dismayed to 
hear the criticism that varieties of capitalism was not even a theory but then we 
came across the article, titled “Regional and Sectoral Varieties of Capitalism” written 
by distinguished Professor Colin Crouch (2009) from Warwick Business School
243
 
clearly exemplifying the case study with the theoretical implication of the varieties of 
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capitalism. The Airbus-Boeing case study was developed within the wide theoretical 
perspectives of the two theories: the state-business relationships and varieties of 
capitalism to explain EU-US airplane subsidy disputes as follows:  
 
 The theory of State-firm relationships 
 
There are two players to be considered in state-firm relationships. They are the 
state and business (or firm).
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 The state-firm relationships have been developed by 
Susan Strange (1992). Her theory states that governments need to face up to the 
world politics as well as the structural changes associated with the politics. 
Accordingly, we first focused on the increasing importance of the changing 
environment where Airbus and Boeing operate business. Strange argues that these 
structural changes have permeated beyond financing and production that impact 
global politics and economy. Given the global politics and the changing business 
environment where Airbus and Boeing operate, Stange’s theory seems to best fit 
the ongoing Airbus-Boeing competition and the business environment where Airbus 
and Boeing operate. Her theory is about multi-phases of bargaining theory that can 
be applicable to the relationship between the EU governments and the US 
governments, the government – firm relations that affect the EU government – 
Airbus relationship and the US government – Boeing  relational bargaining, and 
Boeing to Airbus relationships which equates to a firm-firm relationships. Strange 
argues that because the international competition (like Airbus and Boeing) forces 
the states to bargain with foreign firms where the US governments and the EU 
governments negotiate on behalf of Boeing and Airbus. That’s what exactly the EU 
government and the US government did to resolve the governmental subsidy 
dispute cases at the WTO court. Susan Strange’s theory seems to be the best fit to 
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explain the empirical study that has been developed. The application of her 
relational multi-facet theory supports to explain the Airbus vs. Boeing disputes. 
There are some differences across the three major EU member states of Airbus. 
However, a “varieties of capitalism” approach can be the basis for a productive 
interchange among scholars. The Airbus-Boeing study was developed within wider 
theoretical perspectives of the state-business relationships which provided a 
theoretical base for explaining the EU-US airplane subsidy disputes. 
The Theory of Varieties of Capitalism
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The variety of capitalism theory is regarded by Prof. Colin Crouch from the business 
school at Warwick University.
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 The theory of the varieties of capitalism derived 
from the study of comparative capitalism in the preceding thirty years. The theory of 
the varieties of capitalism is an actor-centered concept in a firm-centered political- 
economic environment where strategic interactions are crucial to the behavior of 
economic actors. According to Hall and Soskice (2001), the relevant actors may 
include individuals, firms, producer groups, or government. The crucial actors seek 
to advance his interests in a rational way in strategic interaction with others in a 
capitalist economy.
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 From the perspective of the theory of varieties of capitalism (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001), the large commercial airplane industry would be seen as mature 
industrial sectors characterized by continuous research and innovation, therefore, 
the US, Germany, and France are considered well-equipped to succeed. In fact, the 
large commercial airplane industry is in a duopoly competition between the US and 
EU. The empirical applications in varieties of capitalism theory highlights how policy 
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makers benefit when they connect two levels of analyses at a macro and micro level 
across the many different sectors by defining contemporary capitalism.
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CONCLUDING STATEMENTS  
 
Duopoly competition between Airbus and Boeing results from both companies’ 
almost exclusive domination of the large commercial airplane market since the early 
1990s6 resulted from mergers and consolidation within the global aerospace 
industry over decades. Both the EU and US had a long history of government 
subsidy disputes over an alleged violation of the WTO rules by Airbus since mid-
1970. Boeing and the US government seriously questioned the EU governments’ 
financial support to Airbus after 2003 when Airbus delivered more new airplanes 
than Boeing.  
 The latest round of subsidy disputes between Airbus and Boeing were 
litigated by the US at the WTO. This is because the US finally decided to seek legal 
settlements at the WTO rather than negotiated settlements between Airbus and 
Boeing. However, Boeing’s decision to take a legal action against Airbus was a big 
surprise to Airbus. This is because Airbus might have thought that Boeing will never 
take legal action against Airbus for fear that Boeing would lose many European 
airline customers if Boeing brought a law suit against Airbus. Perhaps that was the 
main reason why Boeing had not taken legal action against Airbus for so many 
years. Instead Boeing kept complaining about Airbus’s subsidization while Boeing 
was losing market share to Airbus. However, Boeing finally filed a law suit against 
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Airbus’s continuous use of subsidies at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in 2005. 
Airbus immediately followed suit by filing complaints at the WTO.  
 Not many American private enterprises have corporate resources to take 
on a European consortium company like Airbus to justice at the WTO. Following 
Boeing’s legal action at the WTO, Airbus immediately followed suit by filing 
complaints against Boeing at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in Geneva 
in 2005. The legal proceedings at the WTO lasted for six years and Boeing finally 
won the case at the WTO in 2011. It was generally expected that Boeing had the 
case because the EU governments’ subsidy provided to Airbus was the known 
facts. The final rulings were made by the DSB as follows:  
 
The EU and member state subsidies breached their WTO obligations. Each grant of 
launch aid and other subsidies provided by EU countries to Airbus over the last four 
decades caused adverse effects to the interest of the United States. The report 
found loss of market share in such non-minor markets as the EU, Australia, China, 
and Korea. Therefore, even without prohibited subsidies findings, the EU and its 
member states must still bring themselves into compliance with the DSB 
recommendations and rulings once adopted.  Specifically, the EU and its member 
States will have to take appropriate steps to withdraw the subsidies or remove the 
adverse effects within six months.  
 However, it should be noted that WTO ruled in August 2010 and in June 
2011 that  Airbus had received improper government subsidies through loans with 
below market rate from several European countries. In a separate ruling in February 
2011, however, WTO found that Boeing had received local and federal aid in 
violation of the WTO rules. Airbus vs. Boeing disputes never ceased.    
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS  
 
 Subsidy disputes between the EU and the US, as it seems, are no longer 
the critical issue to the US as Boeing’s business is booming and their main business 
is to reduce billions of dollars of production backlogs. Competition is intense. The 
subsidy disputes between Airbus and Boeing basically ended about a year ago in 
June 2011.  
 However, it should be noted that the WTO made multiple separate  
rulings as follows: The WTO ruled in August 2010 and in June 2011 that Airbus had 
received improper government subsidies through loans with below market rates 
from several European countries. In a separate ruling in February 2011, WTO found 
that Boeing received local and federal aid in violation of the WTO rules.   
 This should end the US claim against the EU government’s subsidy to 
Airbus. It is not known if Boeing seeks compensation from Airbus. After all, Europe 
is a huge, lucrative market to Boeing, it is critically important for Boeing to keep a 
great reputation to European airline customer. Airbus has known this and perhaps 
that may be the main reason why Airbus didn’t even bother with Boeing’s claim 
against Airbus’s continuous subsidies. The court decision ended the subsidy 
disputes between Airbus and Boeing for now.  Airbus may or may not completely 
cease the government subsidies from now. Airbus needs to develop “new 
generation airplanes” after the A350. The airlines need the old model airplanes to 
be replaced by the “new generation” airplanes to bring down the operating costs of 
the airplane fleet. Airbus will need the new cash infusion to develop “new 
generation” airplanes, because that was the way Airbus has been doing the 
 
 
186 
business for decades. Therefore, it is most likely that Airbus and Boeing may see 
each other at the court some day in the future.  
 Why did the EU-US disputes happen when they did, particularly in terms 
of high level EU-US relations?  Was this particular political-economic dispute worthy 
of causing seriously negative impact on the long-term relationship between the EU 
and US, notwithstanding that relationship was less important to the US than it was 
in the past as the US shifted attention to China and the Pacific basin countries?   
 From the US viewpoint, at its core, the governing issue was Airbus’s 
sustained use of government subsidies which eventually became a presidential 
issue for both the Bill Clinton and George Bush administrations. However, no legal 
action was taken against Airbus’s use of subsidies by the US government until 
2004. The main reason was that Boeing had been quite hesitant to take a legal 
action against Airbus because Boeing was quite concerned about jeopardizing the 
customer relations with European airlines by taking a legal action against Airbus.  
 Our view is that the EU-US relationship is much stronger than ever before 
as the US critically needs the European allies as China’s political-economic status is 
steadily increasing on a global basis. And also our view is that China’s global 
presence and its omnipresent political-economic activities are positive as China 
increasingly involves with the rest of the world.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
 
At the outset of this research, three research questions have been developed. 
These questions turned out to be the right guideline to help us to determine a focal 
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point of the thesis and setting a right course of research direction. At least these 
questions gave us an insight into what to look for and what needed to be answered 
in the back of our head from the beginning to the end of the research.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS #1 
Why have the large commercial airplane subsidy disputes been one of the 
longest running political-economic issues between the EU and the US?  
 
There are three primary reasons why the EU and the US have been carrying on 
these subsidy disputes for decades. These three reasons are directly related to the 
political-economic interests of Airbus and Boeing, and are supported by a small 
number of strategically supportive agents, namely the European governments and 
the US government. The three main reasons for continuing the subsidy disputes are 
as follows: 
First, the US continued its efforts toward keeping the subsidy disputes 
from starting a trade war with the government of Boeing’s important European 
airline customers. Boeing preferred not to press charges against Airbus on the 
subsidy issues because Europe is a huge customer base for Boeing airplanes. 
Instead, Boeing continued to complain about Airbus’s sustained use of government 
subsidies, i.e. the soft loans that finance new Airbus airplane programs. The best 
defense for Boeing seemed to be to keep arguing about Airbus’s sustained use of 
the EU governments’ subsidies and to press the EU in moderation on the Airbus 
subsidy issues. Neither Americans nor the Europeans wanted the trade war that 
could bring about a great deal of negative impact on the EU-US trade relations. 
Furthermore, Boeing makes a significant contribution to the US balance of trade, 
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and would be particularly concerned about the unfavorable impact that Boeing’s law 
suit against Airbus might have on airplane sales to the Airbus consortium member 
countries – France, Germany, UK, and Spain.  
The Clinton administration was quite anxious to press charges over the 
government subsidies against Airbus in early 1990s, but Boeing was not about to 
bring a lawsuit against Airbus and the European governments that have been 
subsidizing Airbus. Boeing did not file complaints at the WTO during the Clinton 
administration because Boeing still had a major market share. Boeing decided to 
not overly pressure the EU governments because the large commercial airplane 
business in the European marketplace was critically important to Boeing since 
Boeing was successfully selling the “new generation” technology B787 airplanes to 
the European marketplace. Likewise, Airbus had complete freedom to market and 
sell the Airbus A380 to the lucrative US marketplace, but so far none of the US 
airlines has bought the A380.  
Therefore, it made sense that Boeing was careful to not press charges 
against the EU on the government subsidies that Airbus had received: added 
pressures from the US government subsidy issues could possibly have triggered a 
trade war situation, pitting Boeing against Airbus in an undesirable political situation. 
Obviously, Boeing was concerned about this negative effect which would be 
counterproductive to Boeing’s sales in the European marketplace. Both Bill Clinton 
and George Bush took up the EU-US subsidy disputes as one of the presidential 
issues; both US presidents called for a level playing field and tried to communicate 
this message to EU governments in an attempt to mitigate the negative effect of the 
European government subsidies that directly impact upon Boeing’s commercial 
airplane business. However, the US government was not able to pressure 
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European governments hard enough to get the near-term result. European national 
airlines and European flag carriers are major customers of Boeing commercial 
airplanes. Therefore, the government subsidies disputes became drawn out political 
issues between the EU and the US. 
Second, the 1992 GATT agreement turned out to be at the core of the 
political-economic conflicts between the European and the United States 
governments, which were concerned about the political and economic effects of 
protecting the interests of Airbus and Boeing as two principal political corporate 
actors. Boeing’s failure to follow the 1992 GATT agreement would have definitely 
jeopardized its political position. Therefore, Boeing kept the pact for twelve years 
while Airbus took full advantage of this agreement by institutionalizing and 
legitimizing its on-going subsidies from the European governments. Airbus steadily 
increased its market share gain, while the 1992 GATT legitimized Airbus’s 
sustained use of launch aid to its fullest extent, one-third of the total R&D 
expenditures.  
Third, political sensitivity is one of the main causes of the long drawn-out 
subsidies disputes between Airbus and Boeing. Both Airbus and Boeing 
approached the subsidy disputes with a great deal of political sensitivity to the host 
governments of customer airlines: for example, Airbus kept a political balance by 
not making a big case out of the Japanese government’s indirect subsidies to 
Boeing’s airplane programs in a risk-sharing partnership with the three Japanese 
‘heavies’, although Airbus was quite aware of the Japanese government’s subsidies 
to Japanese companies involved the Boeing programs of the B787, and other 
airplane programs including the B777s, the B767s, and the B7J7. It has been 
reported that the Japanese government took a substantial loss when the Boeing-
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Japan risk-sharing B7J7 airplane program was eventually terminated mainly due to 
the technological difficulties of building this particular airplane model.   
However, the primary reason why Airbus did not press the issue of the 
Japanese government’s “indirect” subsidies to the Boeing airplane program is 
because, for decades, Airbus had been trying to get a foothold in the Japanese 
marketplace where Boeing still maintains a dominant market share. For that reason 
alone, Airbus understated the Japanese government’s subsidies and tried to not 
press the issue of the Japanese subsidies involved in the Boeing-Japan risk sharing 
joint ventures. For now, Japan remains Boeing’s long-time major customer of 
commercial airplanes and a joint-venture partner of Boeing airplane programs. 
Airbus seems to be keeping a low profile in the political playing field, simply 
because pressing the issue of the Japanese government’s subsidies could possibly 
have a long-term negative effect on Airbus’s relationship with the Japanese 
government, which would be counterproductive to Airbus’s potential airplane sales 
in Japan. 
Airbus’s handling of the Japanese subsidies issue has been as skilful as 
Boeing’s attempt to not press too hard over Airbus’s subsidies issues. The deft 
handling of the government subsidies issue is hugely important to twenty-first- 
century politics. A tacit agreement seemed to exist between Airbus and Boeing to 
not sell or transfer advanced aeronautical technology specifically to Japan, for fear 
that someday Japan would become a formidable competitor in commercial airplane 
market. However, this agreement, if it ever existed, does not seem to exist any 
longer as some critics including Pritchard (2002) claim that Boeing has been 
undertaking a technology transfer and outsourcing to Japan. Newhouse (2006) also 
 
 
191 
claims that Boeing is increasingly becoming a system integrator rather than an 
airframe manufacturer.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS #2:  
Why was the 1992 GATT agreement kept rather peacefully for many years and 
why did it suddenly collapse in 2004? 
 
Due to the influence of governments, international politics plays an important role in 
the acquisition decisions of airplanes by airlines. For example, British Airways (BA) 
had been one of Boeing’s biggest loyal customers outside the US for decades, as 
were. Lufthansa, the German carrier, Air France-KLM, the French-Dutch carrier, all 
of which have been big customers of Boeing 747 and other Boeing airplanes. BA 
operated an all-Boeing airplane fleet and was the launch customer for the Boeing 
757.
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 In 1998 BA announced an order for 220 Airbus airplanes worth three billion 
British pounds – the largest single deal made to Airbus by any airline outside the US 
at the time. The magnitude of airplane orders such as this was not unprecedented, 
but BA’s equipment decision for Airbus airplanes appeared to be a complete 
reversal by an airline that had been the most loyal customer of Boeing for the past 
decades. Some critics commented on BA’s acquisition of Airbus airplanes as a 
giveaway or a loss leader as the market suggested. BA got a deeply discounted 
airplane deal from Airbus. However, even if this were an unfair loss leader, or below 
cost transactions as the market price suggested, there was not much Boeing could 
have done because BA still remained one of Boeing’s customers for the Boeing 777 
and other airplanes. Therefore, it was not in the best interest of Boeing to take this 
to the WTO for an anti-dumping law suit case against Airbus, even if the Airbus deal 
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with BA was deeply discounted below cost. BA split its long-expected wide-body 
order between Airbus A380 and Boeing 787, – ordering 12 Airbus A380s and 24 
Boeing B787s. 
Air France-KLM currently operates a total of 23 747s (including 6 747 
freighters) to accommodate the need for high-density passenger seats as well as 
providing cargo-lifting capability to meet increasing air cargo demands. In addition, 
a fleet of 49 Boeing 777-200/300ERs with extended range capability meet the 
requirement of the long-range, high-density passenger market. A fleet of 183 Airbus 
airplanes accommodate short- to medium-range market segments, with various 
sizes of airplanes ranging from the A318 with 123 seats to the A340-300 with a 272 
seat capacity.   
 Boeing has delivered no B787 airplanes yet, but if Boeing ultimately 
delivers, the B787 will be an assured success over Airbus A380. Boeing B787 has 
more than 900 orders, including a total of 683 firm orders from 47 customers - more 
than four times as much as Airbus A380, which totals about 200 orders, including 
185 firm orders.
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 Boeing now has a total of over $200 billion in commercial 
airplane orders, about half of them for the B787.  
The long drawn-out subsidy issue is due to different business practices 
between Europe and the US which are associated with cultural differences in 
general as well as differences in corporate culture. In Europe, government subsidies 
are often accepted while the US business calls for free trade.
251
 American corporate 
culture generally calls for aversion of openly outright government subsidies or cash 
infusions from the government, as practiced in Europe.
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The EU argued that Boeing profited from billions of dollars of lucrative US 
defense and NASA aerospace contracts. European companies therefore got the 
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same free market access like other US companies and, in fact, EADS won some of 
the US defense contracts. Boeing has monopolized the long-range, high-density air 
traffic segment with its 747 fleet since 1970 when Airbus successfully debuted its 
A300, a mid-range, wide-body airplane. Over the course of three decades, Airbus 
has quickly caught up with Boeing in the development of a similar product line of 
commercial airplanes comparable to the Boeing fleet, with the exception of the 747 
class jumbo jet. In recent years, Airbus has finally decided to take up on Boeing’s 
last bastion, the 747 market segment.  
Airbus’s idea was to supersede the Boeing 747 airplane with a “new 
generation,” super jumbo jetliner, the A380. In this highly competitive duopoly 
between Airbus and Boeing, the rationale behind the Airbus A380 was based on an 
old concept of “hub and spokes”, displacing the old technology 747 to capture the 
high-density traffic segment with a super triple-deck jumbo jet, the A380. Boeing 
counteracted Airbus’s move by directly challenging the 555-800 passenger-carrying 
capability of the A380 with the development of a “new generation” Boeing 787 
jetliner with 223-296 seat capacity to provide the direct point-to-point service to best 
meet passenger demands. 
In the battle for the future of air travel, sales of these two competing 
airplanes speak for themselves: so far the Boeing 787 has raked in record-breaking 
sales orders and is completely booked over the next several years. The first Airbus 
A380 airplane delivery took place in September of 2007 after almost two-year 
delivery delays. Airbus completely shunned the publicity of the A380, especially its 
colossal size, and its enormous passenger-carrying capability.  
Boeing’s marketing approach for the B787, focusing on the 20 percent 
fuel efficiency of the airplanes, and the lower operating cost of the airplane which is 
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directly associated with its profitability to the customer airlines. The marketing of the 
B787 is focused on the passenger appeal and maximum cabin comforts for the 
passengers. For example, the B787 passenger cabin comforts were greatly 
improved by increasing the cabin comfort level.
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The first round of the long-awaited Airbus A380 vs. Boeing B787 battle 
was overwhelmingly won by Boeing in terms of sales results. However, in Boeing, 
which has had its own problems with the on-time delivery of its “new generation” 
high technology B787, there was no outright rejoicing over the Airbus A380’s 
delayed delivery, but there was a sense of conviction that Boeing could win the 
lucrative mid-range B787 commercial airplane marketplace. However, Boeing also 
ran into problems with delayed delivery of the B787 just like Airbus’s delayed 
delivery of the A380. Boeing announced a multiple of production delays of B787 due 
to technical problems, production problems, and labor problems associated with 
Boeing’s multiple tiers of suppliers falling behind schedule. After two-year delays, 
the B787 is now scheduled for flight test in late 2012.  
The modern world of air travelers has changed considerably. For 
example, the study shows that  passengers prefer a B787 direct flight (from origin to 
destination without connecting flight) instead of an A380 super jumbo jet flying from 
major airports to major airports followed by a connecting flight to the final 
destination on a smaller jet (“hub and spokes”).
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 This was confirmed by the record 
breaking B787 sales, in direct comparison to a marginal sales result of the A380. 
Survival of the fittest and the wisest in a free competition could well be at the root of 
the overwhelming success of the Boeing B787 over Airbus A380. Clearly, Boeing’s 
marketing effectiveness, system integrator capability, and technological superiority 
of the airplane are all beginning to ripple across this highly competitive duopoly 
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competition between the two airframe manufacturers. This competition process is at 
the core of the next phase of competition between the Boeing B787 and the Airbus 
A350, both of which are currently being developed. The final result of the 
competition between the Boeing B787 program and the Airbus A350 program will 
be seen in years to come, because these airplane programs normally develop into 
generations of derivative airplanes. For example, the Boeing 747 programs 
outlasted many other airplane programs over the last three decades starting from 
the original model 747-100 which developed into more improved and enhanced 
models followed in the 747-200, -300, -400 series, to the current 747-8 series.      
Airbus and Boeing are deploying diverging strategies for commercial 
airplanes. Airbus’s strategy focuses on the ‘hub and spokes’ concept to displace 
Boeing’s 747s with the high-capacity seating from 555 to 800 passengers, long-
range super jumbo A380 focused on flights between major hub airports to capture 
high-density passenger segments, from which smaller airplanes carry passengers 
to the final destinations. On the other hand, Boeing’s strategy is the “new 
technology” B787, long-range two-engine wide-body airplane that will fly directly to 
destinations further apart. Airbus argues that the level of passenger cabin comforts 
will be matched by the A380, and that seat-mile costs of the A380 are 15 to 20 
percent lower than Boeing 747.
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In previous decades, repeating the mantra of a “level playing field”
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 (fair 
and free competition) seems to have been Boeing’s approach to best protect its 
own business interests. The US government seems to have understood this 
delicate balance of pressing European governments not too hard but putting 
enough pressures on to get some result for Boeing. In this way, Boeing continued 
business as usual and made contributions toward the US balance of trade.  
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Today, Boeing plays a significant role as a major US defense contractor 
of particular importance to US national defense and security. Large commercial 
airplanes like the Boeing 747, for example, can be of critical importance in case of a 
US national emergency. The 747 fleet of the US flag carriers is a part of the US 
national emergency preparedness: the 747 fleet of US flag carriers can be deployed 
for large-scale mass evacuation from earthquakes, tsunami, volcano eruptions, and 
evacuation of US citizens trapped in the hostilities and war outside of the US.  
The EU’s continued subsidies, which have already helped Airbus surpass 
Boeing by capturing a major market share in 2003, could be regarded as 
counterproductive and potentially as having a negative effect on US interests. 
Therefore, Boeing is important for the interests of the US government in terms of  
US defense and security. This is directly contrasted to Boeing’s position back in the 
late 1960s when Boeing had no significant role in the US Defense Department as a 
major contractor, nor in relation to national security. Boeing’s predicament of near 
bankruptcy in the late1960s was clearly evinced in the US government’s hands-off 
policy towards Boeing. Today, Boeing has a critical function to perform in the US 
government’s defense and, national security, and makes significant contributions to 
the US balance of trade. Therefore, the EU-US subsidy disputes need to be 
resolved in the best interests of both the EU and the US to ensure that Airbus and 
Boeing compete in a “level playing field” in the free marketplace.  
The EU’s approach to protecting Airbus favors safety nets and industrial 
policies that help Airbus to overtake or drive its competitors out of the marketplace, 
while the US approach to supporting its large commercial airplane industry is more 
complex, partly due to the unique climate of American corporate culture and its 
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aversion to government subsidies which are often associated with state controlled 
welfare state.  
However, in the highly competitive environment of the duopoly between 
Airbus and Boeing, both sides required billions of dollars in R&D expenditures for 
their new airplane programs – Boeing’s “new generation” airplane, the B787 and 
also Airbus’s new A350 program currently being developed. So how did Airbus and 
Boeing finance these “new generation” airplane programs? While Airbus’s 
intransigence on subsidy disputes is palpable, at least one third of Airbus’s R&D 
expenditures for the super jumbo A380 were financed through EU government 
subsidies, which Airbus legitimized by the now-defunct 1992 GATT bilateral pact.  
In fact, since the advent of the 747 in 1970 that made a revolutionary 
change the way people around the globe travel, Boeing has been the front-runner 
as a model for operating in a global economy. In the 1980s, Boeing spearheaded 
outsourcing aircraft parts and soon started manufacturing major portions of airframe 
outside of the US against the stiff opposition of unionized American workers. 
Boeing’s rationale behind building airplanes outside of the US was straight forward 
– it’s for survival to become competitive in a global economy by bringing down the 
cost of building airplanes.  
Boeing has been an airframe manufacturer of the most innovative “new 
generation” airplane, the B787, and the current production airplanes including 737, 
747, 767, and 777.  However, in the 1990s Boeing was heading towards 
increasingly becoming “simply a system integrator” rather than an airframe 
manufacturer by giving a great deal of control over designing and building the major 
portion of airframe manufacturing to Boeing’s risk-sharing partner suppliers. 
Surprisingly, Boeing has devolved tasks to its major suppliers including designing 
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and building of wings because the technology of wings has been long regarded as a 
well-guarded secret and a core technology at Boeing.  
Many of the US’s arguments about the government subsidies are 
presented in lengthy detailed legal documentation. The US counter-argued Airbus’s 
assertions in compliance with the 1992 bilateral agreement. The US documents 
were prepared by Boeing’s in-house lawyers,
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 with the legal expertise of reputable 
American law firms retained by Boeing, and a team of US government attorneys. 
The US documents are persuasive, effective, and water-tight from a legal 
standpoint. Therefore, the US arguments were most likely to withstand and prevail 
at the WTO court.  
What are the EU’s overall strategy and approach to countering the US 
arguments? In comparison with the US legal argument, the EU’s arguments 
included every conceivable argument that they could find. Their main argument was 
that the spin-off from the heavy US investment in military airplane technology 
benefited the commercial airplane programs of Boeing. Basically, the Europeans 
have produced every conceivable argument that they might possibly be able to 
make. For example, the European Commission argued that Boeing received $23.7 
billion in subsidies (shown in the Exhibit 9: An overview of US subsidies to Boeing’s 
large civil aircraft. Source: European Commission). That leaves Airbus’s over-all 
arguments as unbelievable and less convincing.  
Airbus should have taken a more sophisticated legal approach to the 
case, because there is what is called a “gray area” in Boeing arguments. Boeing’s 
loss of market share in 2003 made Airbus a leader of the industry. Boeing blames 
this loss entirely on the subsidies that Airbus received from the EU governments. 
However, it is also due to Boeing’s sales and marketing strategies which did not sell 
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as many airplanes as Airbus did. Therefore, Airbus could have increased the odds 
by highlighting Airbus’s superior management, sophisticating advanced 
marketing/sales endeavors against Boeing’s mismanagement that caused Boeing’s 
steady market share loss. In fact, Boeing’s top management might not have been in 
top shape during the years 2003 to 2005. Boeing ex-Chairman and CEO (Chief 
Executive Officer) Phil Condit resigned in 2004. In a typical American corporation, a 
CEO has an enormous power associated with its major responsibility for the 
corporate profit and loss toward maximization of the stockholder’s wealth.   
There are fundamental differences in the modus operandi and “rules of 
engagement” in the free competition between Airbus and Boeing in the way they 
operate in business. If the economy slows down and airplane orders dwindle, 
Boeing almost always resorts to laying-off of its surplus production workers to 
minimize the risk of corporate loss. For example, when airplane demand fell off in 
1992, Boeing started laying off 28,000 people, or 20% of its workers, over the next 
two years it slashed production by 47 percent including its 737 and 757 in Renton 
and its wide-body 767 and the jumbo 747 in the Everett plant. 
Airbus did not always resort to an American way of solving a business 
slump. If Boeing’s “new generation” 787 airplane program does not succeed, 
Boeing’s risk-sharing partners, the Japanese ‘three heavies”, shares the loss with 
Boeing. The Japanese “three heavies” presumably took most of the loss as in the 
case of the failed 7J7. Without the Japanese risk-sharing partners, Boeing faces 
great exposure, taking a risk of losing perhaps billions of dollars and going out of 
business. If Airbus’s super jumbo A380 program does not succeed, Airbus does not 
have to pay back the money that the EU governments loaned out to Airbus for the 
airplane program that failed.  
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In the world of the capital-intensive, high-risk large commercial airplane 
business, Airbus and Boeing both deploy the most effective and efficient ways of 
developing billions of dollars’ worth of new airplane programs like the Boeing 787 
and Airbus A380. Boeing has been practicing an innovative fail-safe risk-sharing 
venture with the Japanese three “heavies” backed by the investment of the 
Japanese government. Boeing’s joint risk-sharing venture with Japan works like a 
double-edged sword in the world of making and marketing large commercial 
airplanes. On the manufacturing front, because of the American aversion of 
government subsidies, Boeing relies heavily on the Japanese government’s 
subsidies in lieu of the US government’s subsidies.
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The Europeans openly favor the government subsidies that provide the 
safety-nets to Airbus and the industrial policies that help protect their most capital-
intensive commercial airplane industry. Duopolists Airbus and Boeing do not want to 
drive each other out, because if Boeing wasn’t there, as a major competitor, Airbus 
would not continue receiving subsidies. However, Airbus has developed its cost 
efficiency, perhaps better than Boeing, and does not need subsidies any longer.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS #3:  
What has the intensity of duopoly competition brought about?  
 
Airbus’s vertiginous descent in recent years started with the A380 fiasco, in which 
there were – almost two-year production delays and cost overrun in the production 
of the super jumbo A380, due to a series of mismanagement problems in an 
attempt to displace the dominant Boeing B747. However, the intense duopoly 
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competition led to a price war between Airbus and Boeing: as result, Airbus 
captured one hundred percent of the no-frills airline market. However, Boeing 
responded with the most fuel efficient “new generation” B787: – a smaller (223 - 296 
seats), medium-range (non-stop flight distance) airplane with reduced emissions 
and an emphasis on fuel economy. Both Airbus and Boeing became more efficient 
in production and came up with the most fuel efficient airplanes, Boeing B787 and 
Airbus 350.  
Since its inception in 1970, Airbus received launch aid from the EU 
governments for every single new airplane in the form of subsidies. American 
competitiveness was challenged by Airbus as it quickly started catching up with 
dominant American companies by developing a range of product lines comparable 
to Boeing’s. The Bush administration was concerned about American airframe 
manufacturers of large commercial airplanes facing the European competitors 
heavily subsidized by the EU governments. So the general consensus by Boeing 
and the US government was to set a limit on Airbus’s sustained use of the EU 
government subsidies. The US and the EU governments started negotiations to limit  
European subsidies, which led to a subsidies agreement between the EU and the 
US governments in 1992. The agreement set a limit on European governments’ 
subsidies to no more than one-third of the R&D costs of a new airplane. Boeing 
wanted to seek less than one-third of the R&D costs but ended up supporting the 
subsidies agreement in 1992. The subsidies agreement allowed R&D expenditures 
only exclusive of production subsidies. However, as the 1992 agreement legitimized 
the EU governments’ continued subsidies to Airbus, McDonnell-Douglas was 
squeezed between the two strong competitors, Airbus and Boeing. Although 
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McDonnell-Douglas was still in business, duopolistic competition was beginning to 
take shape between Boeing and Airbus.  
McDonnell-Douglas started seeking a partnership to save its commercial 
airplane business. As Airbus continued developing its product line with the aid of 
government subsidies, Airbus’s market share continued expanding at the expense 
of Boeing. The 1992 subsidies agreement was meant to set a limit on Airbus’s use 
of subsidies. Instead, the subsidies agreement provided Airbus with a great 
advantage: a legitimate use of EU governments’ subsidies. The same subsidies 
agreement made the US government agree to the right of the European 
governments to subsidize their commercial airplane industry. Therefore, since 1992 
Airbus had used the 1992 bilateral pact as a justification for the EU governments’ 
subsidies. However, right from the beginning the US government started 
complaining that European governments have to stop subsidizing Airbus.  
By the time Boeing merged with McDonnell-Douglas in 1997, Airbus had 
become a major threat to American competition. During the four-year period 
between 1995 and 1999, Boeing held the major market share and Airbus shared 
about one-third of the market share in terms of number of airplanes delivered. A few 
years after the 1997 merger with McDonnell-Douglas, Boeing discontinued  
production of McDonnell-Douglas commercial airplanes altogether. Airbus’s market 
share had been increasing steadily, and by 2003 Airbus overtook Boeing.  
US politicians saw the damage caused by Airbus’s sustained use of the 
EU governments’ subsidies when Airbus overtook Boeing leadership position in 
2003. It is possible that Airbus’s sustained use of government subsidies could 
eventually drive Boeing out of the market. The issues of Airbus subsidization 
became more pressing to Boeing in the second half of 2004 when Boeing faced the 
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critical problem of Airbus’s new subsidies for the A350, as Airbus’s market share 
continued to outpacing Boeing’s.  
Twelve years after the 1992 subsidies agreement, in early 2004, Boeing 
finally came to a realization that it had lost out on its decades-long leadership 
position to Airbus in the large commercial airplane industry. Airbus institutionalized 
its sustained use of government subsidies under the auspices of the GATT bilateral 
pact. However, Boeing realized that Airbus no longer needed European government 
subsidies. The 1992 GATT agreement was no longer relevant and needed a new 
agreement was needed. Therefore, the US government terminated the 1992 
subsidies agreement in 2004 and filed a complaint against Airbus in the WTO court.   
After merging with McDonnell-Douglas in 1997, Boeing was no longer an 
export-dependent commercial airplane company. Boeing has become a major 
contractor of the US Department of Defense, carrying increasingly more weight in 
Washington and the US Congress. In addition, Boeing is armed with high caliber 
legal defense and professional legal expertise with its in-house lawyers including a 
former US judge.
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  Boeing was ready to take on Airbus at the WTO court. 
Not only had the 1992 agreement outlived its usefulness, but subsidy-
driven Airbus also forced Boeing to trail Airbus in 2003. The termination of the 1992 
GATT agreement had implications for American competitiveness in the large 
commercial airplane industry as well as political and economic implications in so far 
as this relates to US trade policy. In fact, the 1992 GATT bilateral agreement 
between the EU and US governments made the US agree to the European 
governments’ subsidization of Airbus.  
Consequently, US Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellick started 
putting pressure on the EU through his continued dialogues about ending new 
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subsidies with EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy in late spring and early 
summer in 2004. USTR and EU trade officials had a meeting in July 2004 in order 
to secure a commitment to end new subsidies. The subsidy disputes soon 
escalated to become a US presidential issue. And in August 2004, President Bush 
instructed USTR Zoellick to pursue all possible avenues to end Airbus’s subsidies 
including the option of filing a WTO case. Subsequently, USTR Zoellick met with EU 
trade officials and EU Trade Commissioner Lamy in late September 2004 to discuss 
how to end the subsidies through the negotiation of a new bilateral agreement.  
However, the EU remained opposed to the goal of ending all new subsidies for 
large civil aircraft, not to mention on how to achieve this goal.  
 The United States was committed to resolving the subsidies to Airbus 
through negotiation. However, considering the EU’s unwillingness to end subsidies 
through negotiations, filing a WTO case became quite necessary to ensure, one 
way or another, a leveling of the playing fields. It became very clear to the US that 
the 1992 agreement had outlived its usefulness and no longer reflected current 
political-economic and market realities.  
The 1992 EU-US bilateral agreement was a truce between the EU and 
the US because the Americans had for years complained about the $26 billion in 
subsidies that were supposedly provided to Airbus. However, the real amount of 
subsidies that the EU government had provided to Airbus was not known. The 
agreement was meant to remove Airbus’s advantage of an unlimited sustained use 
of government subsidies and therefore to reduce launch aid. However, instead of 
reducing launch aid, the US agreed to the right of the EU governments to continue 
subsidizing Airbus as before. The 1992 agreement allowed the EU governments to 
institutionalize the launch aid mechanism that provided Airbus with unique 
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advantages over Boeing in developing new airplane programs, including Airbus’s 
new production airplane, the super jumbo jet A380 and the latest A350 airplane 
scheduled for delivery in 2012.  
The implication of the 1992 bilateral agreement was that the US 
government confirmed the right of other governments to subsidize their industries. 
Therefore, the 1992 agreement posed a serious question for US trade policy. The 
US critically needed a consistent and coherent trade policy for dealing with other 
governments, including a sustainable policy for dealing with EU governments. Both 
US and EU governments needed a new trade agreement that reflected the realities 
of current marketplace, in order to best meet the mutual interests of the US and the 
EU governments.  
The WTO served as an agreed multilateral forum for resolution of the 
trade disputes. However, Boeing had been pressed by Airbus’s steadily increasing 
market share outpacing Boeing’s diminishing share. After unsuccessful 
government-to-government attempts to resolve the issue, the US terminated the 
1992 GATT bilateral agreement and registered formal complaints against Airbus at 
the WTO over the EU’s sustained “launch aid” to Airbus.  
What really triggered the US termination of the 1992 bilateral agreement 
is the fact that Airbus finally overtook Boeing in 2003 in terms of market share. The 
US asked the EU to negotiate a new agreement in the framework of rules 
established by the WTO, which does not support Airbus launch aid. Boeing’s 
termination of the accord is viewed by some critics as a strategy ploy to press 
Airbus to delay the launch aid to redesign its new long-range A350, which will be 
directly competing against Boeing’s B787
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. The subsequent discussions between 
the EU and US governments did not result in agreement. Boeing viewed the Airbus 
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subsidies as causing market distortion in the commercial airplane duopoly 
marketplace. The US government sought to make the EU subsidies to Airbus cease 
so that the airplane marketplace won’t be distorted by such subsidies. Boeing fully 
supported the action taken by the US government.  
 So where are the disputes heading? The subsidy disputes will be 
mitigated by the fact that Airbus and Boeing both want to continue getting 
government subsidies and have little desire to reverse the situation. Both 
companies cannot operate completely free of subsidies. Both the EU and US 
governments want their large commercial airplane makers to succeed and to 
continue contributing to the nation’s balance of payments. Furthermore, both Airbus 
and Boeing potentially play a vital role in national security and emergency action. 
 The preliminary ruling of the WTO sided with Boeing in late 2009. By the 
end of 2010, there was much clearer picture of the trajectory of the EU-US airplane 
subsidy disputes at the WTO. And also the US’s attempt to prevent EU 
governments’ continuous subsidy to Airbus was not as pressing as it was since 
2008 when Boeing experienced record breaking success with the “new generation” 
787 airplane sales in contrast with the disastrous sales and the resulting financial 
fiasco of Airbus’s super jumbo jet A380.  
This situation, however, still leaves the unsolved question: What is the 
right thing for Airbus and Boeing to do? Airbus-Boeing competition is beneficial to 
the extent that the economy and the competition operate on fair trade principles. 
Airbus and Boeing both strive for superiority in the commercial airplane 
marketplace. Boeing stayed competitive and survived against Airbus’s duopolistic 
competition backed by “soft loans” from EU governments from 1998 to 2009. Robert 
Keohane advanced the arguments that a subsidy neutral condition was not always 
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the most crucial factor ensuring the sustainability of duopolistic competition, but 
rather the political power of the state (i.e. the power of the US in case of Boeing) is 
a bigger factor. The international system ensures all states heed to the rule of a 
“level playing field” regardless of the willingness of participating states. However, 
according to the theory advanced by Keohane, if the US’s market leadership 
declines, the international system becomes exposed to unfair competition.    
What are the critical factors for sustaining duopolistic competition 
between Airbus and Boeing? The US’s powerful hegemonic leadership from the 
1960s to the early 1970s had the capability to ensure compliance with free trade 
and free competition rules to stabilize the international system. Airbus and Boeing, 
as the two equally powerful commercial airframe manufacturers, continued to 
stabilize the industry by precluding the entry of any potential newcomer from 1998 
to 2009 in a fiercely competitive duopolistic competition.  
The commercial airplane industry has been stable for over three decades 
because of these huge barriers to entry and Boeing’s complete domination in the 
market since 1970. However, Boeing domination of the industry has been replaced 
by Airbus’s emerging leadership in recent years. The high barriers to market entry 
are characterized by high R&D investment requirements for “new generation” 
technology airplanes, and the highly competitive Airbus-Boeing duopolistic share of 
the marketplace. Since Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas in late 1997, the 
industry has been effectively in duopoly competition between Airbus and Boeing in 
the production of large commercial airplanes.  
Is the Airbus-Boeing strategic duopoly sustainable? In answering this 
question, first, this research has identified the contributing factors and conditions for 
the sustainability of Airbus-Boeing duopolistic competition. Second, the research 
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has explained the assumptions of sustainability by examining the connections 
between the quantifiable tangible corporate resources, and intangibles such as 
system integration capabilities, economy of scales, and political powers.  
The duopolistic stability of Airbus-Boeing competition from 1998 to 2011 
can be explained by Robert Keohane’s neo-realist version of hegemonic stability 
theory.
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 Keohane’s theory suggests that states are the most important actors in 
the international system.  However, the theory suggests that when the hegemonic 
leadership declines, the system becomes exposed to economic instability and 
violence. Quite clearly, the US had been taking a hegemonic leadership for 
decades: since the end of World War II, followed by the Cold War between the US 
and the former communist bloc led by the USSR and Communist China. The world 
has since changed for the better, with the political-economic system moving 
towards free economy and free trade, joined by Russia and its former USSR’s 
satellite countries. China actively participates in the free enterprise system of the 
world while it remains the only country (besides Cuba) under the unique socialistic 
principle of state ownership.      
 In June 2011, the US argued before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
at the WTO.
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 Launch aid and other subsidies to Airbus added up to some $18 
billion which benefitted Airbus but caused adverse effects on Boeing’s market 
share. These illegal subsidies greatly helped Airbus to develop a full product line of 
large commercial airplanes, which enabled Airbus to eventually capture a major 
market share. Therefore, the Dispute Settlement Body will rule that the EU and the 
member state subsidies breached the WTO obligations.  
 Airbus did not entirely rely on commercial financing based on an on-going 
interest rate available in the financial market. Instead, Airbus continued benefitting 
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from European government subsidies. Airbus’s repayment of the “launch aid” was 
either tied to, or entirely dependent on, successful sales of the new Airbus airplane 
models.
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 If a particular airplane model did not sell well then Airbus did not have to 
repay the financing cost to the EU governments. The US argued that the Airbus 
A380 “super jumbo” airplane program alone received approximately $3.7 billion in 
“launch aid” from France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
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 The WTO Appellate Body concluded that “either directly or indirectly, 
launch aid was a necessary precondition for Airbus’s launch of the A380” in 2000 
and that it would not have been possible for Airbus to launch the A380 in 2000 by 
financing entirely at a commercial market rate. The Appellate body declined the 
EU’s argument that, even without any “launch aid”, Airbus could have launched an 
A320 series of airplanes in 1987 and an A330 series of airplanes in 1991. The 
Panel and Appellate Body have concluded that without “launch aid” these Airbus 
airplanes would not exist today.  
 The Panel and the Appellate Body’s findings confirmed the long-term 
adverse effects of the EU’s subsidies to Airbus on the US large commercial airplane 
industry.
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 The EU’s subsidies to Airbus caused the market share loss to Boeing in 
some of the world’s largest commercial airplane markets including Europe and 
China. In addition, Boeing lost sales of hundreds of airplanes in sales campaigns 
involving ten major airline customers. The lost sales of hundreds of airplanes is 
particularly significant in view of the fact that the annual output of the US large 
commercial airplane industry constitutes about three to four hundred airplanes.  
 Furthermore, the United States claimed that the EU still continues to 
subsidize Airbus. The Panel and Appellate Body supported the US claims regarding 
a number of other payments that the EU and some member states made to Airbus 
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in subsidized terms and found that these payments harmed the US large 
commercial airplane industry. The Appellate Body confirmed that France and 
Germany subsidized Airbus by providing equity financing worth $1.6 billion at a time 
when no commercial investor would have made such investments.
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 The Appellate 
Body also confirmed that EU member states provided WTO-inconsistent subsidies 
to Airbus through infrastructure payments which are worth more than $1.2 billion.
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 The EU is now into its fifth decade of providing Airbus with massive 
amounts of market-distorting launch aid to its airplane models. Consequently, the 
launch aid continues helping Airbus to sustain a major share of the global market for 
large commercial airplanes. However, the continuation of the decades-long launch 
aid to Airbus is finally coming to a stop.   
 The Panel and the Appellate Body at the WTO confirmed that the EU 
governments’ subsidies violated WTO rules and thereby affirmed what the United 
States told the Appellate Body six years ago –: that  launch aid conferred immense 
subsidies to Airbus that caused serious harm to the US interests. Airbus is presently 
getting launch aid for its latest airplane model, the A350. The US strongly argued 
that the on-going funding to Airbus is no longer acceptable and that the EU 
governments need to comply with their obligations to withdraw the subsidies or 
remove their adverse effects within the six-month period.
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 After the lengthy legal proceedings, the Panel and Appellate Body at the 
WTO finally concluded that, without launch aid, Airbus and its fleet of airplanes 
would not have existed today.
 
Without Airbus, it is most likely that Boeing would 
have been in a dominant monopoly position in the global marketplace.
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 Therefore, 
the Panel and Appellate Body at the WTO will rule that the EU and its member 
states will have to take appropriate steps to withdraw the subsidies or remove the 
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adverse effects within six months, according to the statement by the United States 
at the June 2011 Dispute Settlement Body meeting. The US also stated that the EU 
and its member states must still comply with the Dispute Settlement Body’s 
recommendations and rulings, once adopted, “even without prohibited subsidies 
findings”.  
 In light of the WTO ruling, a self-restraint fifty percent market share rules 
may be needed for the Airbus-Boeing duopoly competition. As for Airbus, 
adherence to the fifty percent market share will enable to reduce the further 
exposure of Airbus’s reputation of the EU Government subsidy. Therefore, it is 
expected that the EU Governments would comply with the WTO ruling. The case 
has been one of the most closely watched government subsidy disputes between 
the EU and the US because of the precedents that this case could set for other. The 
legal setback for the EU could possibly set a precedent for the US to challenge EU’s 
Governments’ subsidies to some other export industries as well.    
 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This section reevaluates the core research questions and answers in the light of 
detailed analyses of the EU-US disputes in the previous chapters 2 to 7 in order to 
identify core factors and the driving forces that might have led to different paths 
towards different future outcomes. 
 We developed the key research questions at the outset of the research 
which certainly did us good as the guiding light in the fog in terms of where we were 
heading and what we are supposed to get. However, the shortcoming of the 
research questions is that we always had a nagging feeling that we might have 
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missed out the big tree in the forest. But, of course, the strong point of the research 
questions are the total focus on the research endeavors toward accomplishing the 
research objectives that one set out to accomplish within the timeframe. As we have 
researched what we set out to accomplish, we have identified myriad of other 
research opportunities that we almost wished to expand the thesis to spheres of 
other academic disciplines including marketing/sales competition between Airbus 
and Boeing.      
 
EXPLANATIONS ON THE HYPOTHESES 
 
The four hypotheses which were developed at the outset of the thesis can be 
explained as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1. Without the continued ‘launch aid’ from the EU governments, Airbus 
would not have been able to speed up the development of a full product line 
comparable to Boeing’s:  
 It is the widely known fact that over the four decades since its inception, 
Airbus has been and still is subsidized by the European governments.  Therefore, 
the governmental subsidy issue remains to be the root cause of the on-going EU-
US airplane subsidy disputes. Foregone conclusion is that without the “launch aid” 
Airbus would never have been able to compete head-to-head with Boeing nor have 
been able to develop a full product line of airplanes. The EU governments continue 
financing Airbus airplane programs for the A380 super jumbo airplane and the on-
going A350 mid-range “new generation” airplane program at a below market rate.   
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Hypothesis 2 Without the sustained use of the EU Government subsidies, Airbus 
would not have been able to surpass Boeing and capture the major market share 
for several years since 2003: 
 Without continued government subsidies from the EU governments, it is 
least likely that Airbus has been able to develop a full product line of airplanes in a 
quick succession and overtake Boeing and achieve the dominant market share 
without any hurdle.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Without the continued subsidies from the EU governments, Airbus 
would not have been able to achieve its overall production cost efficiency and 
production of high quality airplanes: 
 Airbus has been able to attain a high level of cost efficiency and produce 
high quality airplanes with the governmental aid. Airbus wouldn’t have been able to 
succeed without it.   
  
Hypothesis 4. Boeing terminated the 1992 GATT agreement in order to pressure 
Airbus to cut off or delay the continued ‘launch aid’ for Airbus’s new airplane 
program:  
Although the 1992 GATT bilateral became dated, the key reason for the termination 
of the agreement is Airbus’s continued use of the “launch aid” for its new airplane 
development at any time Airbus wants it. Therefore, Boeing attempted to intercept 
Airbus’s free access to the governmental subsidy at any time Airbus wants it.   
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 
Exhibit 1   Airbus vs. Boeing Market Share (%) by the Number of Airplane 
Delivered 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Airbus  33% 32%    33% 29% 33% 39% 39% 45% 52% 53% 57% 
Boeing  54% 55% 58% 71%* 67% 61% 61% 55% 48% 47% 43% 
 
Source: Adapted from Airline Business Magazine (Time, January 24, 2005, p37) and Wall 
Street Journal Europe.   
*Note: Boeing figures from 1998 reflect the 1997 merger with McDonnell 
Douglas, but Douglas airplane production was discontinued soon afterward.  
 
 
Exhibit 2   Boeing Airplane Orders – New Net Orders for 2005 vs. 2006 
 
Years                  Single 
   Aisle 
Airplanes              
       
           Twin Aisle Airplanes         
Single and      
Twin Aisle  
Airplanes 
     737  747  767  777  787  Total Grand Total  
  2005     569   43   15  154  235   447      1,016 
  2006     729   72   10   76  157   315      1,044 
 
Source: The Boeing Company 
Note: Figures are adjusted for cancellations and conversions as of December 31, 2006.         
 
 
Exhibit 3   2001-2005 Boeing Financial Highlights    
 
(US dollars in millions except per share data) 
       2005         2004        2003       2002       2001 
Revenues    54,845      52,457     50,256    58,831   57,970  
Net Earnings      2,572        1,872           718         492     2,827  
Earnings per share*        3.19          2.24         0.85        2.84       3.40 
Operating margins        5.1%        3.8%        0.8%        6.4%       6.2% 
Contractual backlog**  160,473    109,600   104,812   104,173   106,591 
 
Source: The Boeing Company’s 2005 annual report.  
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*Before cumulative effect of accounting change and net gain (loss) from discounted 
operations. 
**Commercial Airplanes backlog at December 31, 2005, has been reduced by $7.8 
billion to reflect the planned change in accounting for concessions effective January 
1, 2006.  
 
 
Exhibit 4   2003-2006 Boeing Annual Orders Summary   
 
2006 Annual Orders Summary 
 
      737   747   767   777    787   TOTAL 
   Gross      733    72     8    77    160    1,050 
   Net      729    72    10    76    157    1,044 
 
Note: Gross Orders does not include cancellations or conversions. 
          Net Orders in year of cancellations adjusted for current year  
          cancellations/conversions. 
          Source: The Boeing Company 
 
 
2005 Annual Orders Summary 
 
      737    747   767    777 787           TOTAL 
   Gross      574     48   19   153  235           1,029 
   Net      569     43   15   154  235     1,002 
 
Note: Gross Orders does not include cancellations or conversions. 
          Net Orders in year of cancellations adjusted for current year  
          cancellations/conversions. 
          Source: The Boeing Company 
 
 
2004 Annual Orders Summary 
 
      737    747  767   777   787   TOTAL 
   Gross      152    10     9    42    56      277 
   Net      147    10     9    42    56      277 
 
Note: Gross Orders does not include cancellations or conversions. 
          Net Orders in year of cancellations adjusted for current year  
          cancellations/conversions. 
          Source: The Boeing Company 
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2003 Annual Orders Summary 
 
      737     747   757       767   777   TOTAL 
   Gross      197       4           7     11    13      240 
   Net      206       4    -1     10            12      239  
 
Note: Gross Orders does not include cancellations or conversions. 
          Net Orders in year of cancellations adjusted for current year  
          cancellations/conversions. 
          Source: The Boeing Company 
 
Exhibit 5   Boeing 787-8 versus Airbus 350-800   
 
 Boeing 787-8  (1
st
 flight: 2010)  Airbus 350-800 (due 2014) 
Engines GEnx (GE); Trent 1000 (Rolls-Royce) Trent XWB (Rolls-Royce) 
Passenger Seats 210 to 250 seats 270 seats 
Range Up to 8,200 nautical miles 8,300 nautical miles 
Fuel Efficiency  20% less than 767-300ER 25% less than 777-300ER 
List Price $157 million to $167 million $199.3 million 
Orders 900, worth about $82.4 billion 109, worth about $21.7 billion 
Cruising Speed  Mach 0.85 Mach 0.85 
Materials 50% composites; 20% aluminium; 
15% titanium, 10% steel; 5% other 
52%composites;20% aluminium; 
14% titanium; 7% steel; 7% other 
 
Source: Coco Masters/Everett, in Global Business, Time Magazine, Sept. 17, 2007. 
 
 
Exhibit 6   Boeing 787 - Global Airframe Manufacturing Effort  
 
                   AIRFRAME              SOURCING  
Wheel well/box  Japan 
Forward fuselage Japan 
Wings Japan 
Engine/landing gear Britain 
Horizontal stabilizer/center fuselage Italy 
Trailing edge Australia 
Wing tips South Korea 
Forward fuselage Kansas, USA 
Engine/housing Ohio and California, USA 
Leading edge Oklahoma, USA 
Aft fuselage South Carolina, USA 
Tail fin Washington, USA 
 
Source: The table was constructed based on data from Boeing. 
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Exhibit 7   Length of Time Required for Settlement Procedure by Stage  
 
STAGE BY DISPUTE SETTLEMNT PROCEDURES TARGET TIME 
Consultations, mediation, etc. 60 days 
Panel set-up and panelists appointed 45 days 
Final panel report to parties 6 months 
Final panel report to WTO members 3 weeks 
Dispute settlement body adopts report (if no appeal) 60 days  
Without appeal Total = 1 year 
Appeals report 60-90 days 
Dispute settlement body adopts appeals report 30 days 
With appeal Total = 1 yr. 3 mo. 
Source: The table was constructed based on the primary data source from WTO. 
 
 
Exhibit 8   Main Stages of the Panels’ Work  
 
MAIN STAGES DESCRIPTION OF PANELS’ WORK  
Before the first hearing Each side in the dispute presents its case 
in writing to the panel. 
First hearing The case for the complaining country and 
defense. The complaining country or 
countries, the responding country, and 
those that have announced that they have 
an interest in the dispute, make their case 
at the panel’s first hearing. 
Rebuttals The countries involved submit written 
rebuttals and present oral arguments at the 
panel’s second meeting. 
Experts If one side raises scientific or other 
technical matters, the panel may consult 
experts or appoint an expert review group 
to prepare an advisory report.  
First draft The panel submits the descriptive (factual 
and argument) sections of its report to the 
two sides, giving them two weeks to 
comment. This report excludes findings and 
conclusions. 
Interim report The panel then submits an interim report, 
including its findings and conclusions, to 
the two sides, giving them one week to ask 
for a review.    
Review The period of review must not exceed two 
weeks. During that time, the panel may 
hold additional meetings with both sides.   
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Final report A final report is submitted to the two sides 
and three weeks later, it is circulated to all 
WTO members. If the panel decides that 
the disputed trade measure does break a 
WTO agreement or an obligation, it 
recommends that the measure be made to 
conform with WTO rules. The panel may 
suggest how this could be done.   
Report -  DSB’s ruling The report becomes the Dispute Settlement 
Body’s ruling or recommendation within 60 
days unless a consensus rejects it. Both 
sides can appeal the report.   
 
Source: The table was constructed based on the primary data source from WTO. 
 
 
 
Exhibit 9   Overview of US Subsidies to Boeing’s Large Civil Aircraft (LCA) 
Division  
 
  
           Entity                                    
 
  Name of 
Subsidy 
 
                 Description of 
Subsidy 
 
Total Amount                    
(USD millions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State of Washington 
and Municipalities 
          Therein 
    
 HB 2294 Tax    
 Incentives   
State of Washington provides 
LCA- 
related: (1) business and 
occupation 
(“B&O”) tax rate reductions; (2) 
B&O tax 
credits; (3) sales/use tax 
exemptions; (4) 
leasehold excise tax 
exemptions; and (5)  
property tax exemptions.   
 
 
3,456.7 
 Everett B&O Tax 
 Rate Reductions 
City of Everett reduces the 
B&O tax rate 
paid by Boeing on LCA 
manufactured in Everett. 
 
67.5 
 
 
 
Project Olympus 
Master Site 
Agreement  
Subsidies 
State of Washington and 
municipalities 
therein: (1) provide 
coordinators to 
facilitate 787 production; (2) 
provide job 
training incentives for 787 
 
 
 
 
395.8 
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employees; (3) 
provide Boeing’s 747 LCF with 
the same incentives accorded 
to the  787; (4) 
assume certain litigation cost; 
and (5) 
provide infrastructure-related 
subsidies to  
facilitate Boeing’s LCA 
production in  
Everett, Washington.  
 
 
 
State of Kansas and 
Municipalities 
Therein 
 
Wichita IRB Tax 
Breaks 
City of Wichita provides 
property and 
sales tax breaks to LCA 
component 
production facilities in Wichita 
through the  
issuance of industrial revenue 
bonds. 
 
783.7 
 
 
KDFA Bonds 
State of Kansas pays the 
interest on bonds 
that will be used to facilitate 
production of a portion of the 
787 fuselage.  
 
122.0 
 
 
 
 
 
State of Illinois and 
Municipalities 
Therein 
 
 
 
 
Boeing Relocation 
Package 
Pursuant to the relocation 
package for  
Boeing: (1) State of Illinois 
reimburses cost related to the 
relocation of Boeing’s 
headquarters; (2) State of 
Illinois provides 
Boeing’s headquarters with 
income tax 
credits; and (3) City of Chicago 
and Cook 
County provide property tax 
abatements  
for Boeing’s headquarters.    
 
 
 
24.3 
 
 
Retirement of the 
Former Lease 
 
City of Chicago pays to retire 
the lease of  
the former occupant of 
Boeing’s 
headquarters in Chicago. 
  
 
 
0.5 
 
Source: European Commission 
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Exhibit 9   Overview of US subsidies to Boeing’s Large Civil Aircraft (LCA) division 
(continued) 
 
      
         Entity 
         
    
  Name of Subsidy 
              
                   Description of Subsidy Total  
(USD 
Mil.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     US Government  
U
S
 A
e
ro
n
a
u
ti
c
s
 R
&
D
 
  
       
NASA ACT 
Program 
NASA funds R&D related to 
composites 
technologies that will be utilized on 
the 787. 
417.7 
NASA HSR 
Program 
NASA funds R&D related to high 
speed civil aircraft technology that 
also has applications for Subsonic 
LCA. 
 
       
1,314.4 
NASA AST 
program 
NASA funds R & D related to 
improving 
environmental impact, safety, and 
efficiency of LCA. 
 
692.5 
NASA HPCC 
Program 
NASA funds R&D related to 
computing and communications 
technology for the design and 
development of LCA. 
 
352.8 
NASA Aviation 
Safety Program 
NASA funds R&D related to 
improving the safety of LCA. 
 
804.1 
NASA QAT 
Program 
NASA funds R&D related to noise 
reduction technology for LCA. 
 103.7 
NASA Vehicle 
Systems 
Program  
NASA funds R&D related to 
improving 
environmental impact and efficiency 
of  
LCA. 
902.9 
NASA R&T 
Base Program 
NASA funds R&D related to basic 
and 
applied advanced LCA technologies. 
      
5,818.3 
DOD RDT&E 
Program 
DOD funds R&D related to dual-use 
technologies – i.e., technologies 
applicable to both military and 
commercial aircraft. 
2,379.0 
DOC Advanced 
Technology 
Program 
DOC funds R&D related to high risk, 
high 
pay-off, emerging and enabling 
4.6 
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technologies applicable to LCA. 
NASA/DOD 
Intellectual Property 
Right  
Waivers/Transfers  
NASA and DOD transfer to Boeing 
valuable patent rights, rights to trade 
secrets, and exclusive rights to 
certain data for LCA-related and 
other technologies. 
726.4 
 
NASA/DOD 
IR&D/B&P Program 
NASA and DOD reimburse Boeing 
for its 
own independent LCA R&D that is 
not 
related to any specific contract, as 
well as  
for its bid and proposal costs.  
3,108.3 
NASA/DOD  
Facilities, Equipment 
and Employees 
NASA and DOD provide their 
facilities, 
equipment, and employees for LCA-
related R&D. 
N/A 
 
Source: European Commission 
 
 
Exhibit 9   Overview of US subsidies to Boeing’s Large Civil Aircraft (LCA) division  
(continued) 
 
      
         Entity 
         
    
  Name of Subsidy 
              
         Description of Subsidy 
Total 
Amount 
  (USD 
Mil.)  
US Government 
(continued) 
DOL 787 Worker 
Training Grants 
DOL provides grants to help train 
787 workers. 
1.5 
FSC/ETI 
The US Government lowers taxes 
paid by 
Boeing on each LCA produced 
and sold for 
use outside the United States. 
2,199.0 
     TOTAL    
23,675.5 
 
Source: European Commission 
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Exhibit 10   Single-Aisle Passenger Airplanes  
 
          More than 175 seats                 90 to 175 seats           Regional jets 
Boeing 707, 757 
Boeing 737-900ER 
Airbus A321 
Boeing/MDC DC-8 
Tupolev TU-204, TU-214 
Boeing 717-200, 727 
Boeing 737-100 through -500 
Boeing 737-600, -700, -800 
Airbus A318, A319, A320 
Boeing/MDC DC-9, MD-80, -90 
Fokker 100 
BAe 146-300, Avro RJ100 
Embraer 190, 195 
Bombardier CRJ-1000 
Yakovlev Yak-42 
Tupolev TU-154 
Ilyushin II-62 
AVIC ARJ-900 
Dornier 328 Jet 
Fokker 70 
BAe 146-100, -200 
Avro RJ70, RJ85 
Bombardier CRJ 
Embraer 170, 175 
ERJ-135, -140, -145 
Sukhoi Superjet 100 
Antonov An-148 
Tupolev TU-134 
Yakolev Yak-40 
AVIC ARJ-700 
 
Source: Boeing Current Market Outlook 2007 
 
Exhibit 11   Twin-Aisle Passenger Airplanes  
 
                     Large                    Medium                      Small 
 
3  class: More than 400 seats 
 
        
2  class: 310 to 400 seats 
3  class: 250 to 370 seats 
       
 2  class: 230 to 310 seats 
 3  class: 180 to 250 seats 
Boeing 747 
Airbus A380 
Boeing 777 
Airbus A330-300, A340 
Airbus A350-900, -1000 
Boeing/MDC MD-11 
Ilyushin II-86  
 Boeing 767, 787 
Airbus A300, A310, A330-
200 
Airbus A350-800 
Boeing/MDC DC-10 
Lockheed L-1011 
Ilyushin II-96 
 
Source: Boeing Current Market Outlook 2007 
 
 
 
Exhibit 12   The Commission’s Directorates-General, Services and Other 
    Relevant Bodies 
DGI          External Relations: Commercial Policy and Relations with  
            North America, the Far East, Australia and New Zealand   
DGIA       External relations: Europe and the New Independent States, 
                Common Foreign and Security Policy and External Missions 
DGIB       External Relations: Southern Mediterranean, Middle and Near East,  
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Latin America, South and South-east Asia and North-South 
Cooperation 
DGII         Economic and Financial Affairs 
DGIII        Industry 
DGIV        Competition   
DGV         Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs 
DGVI        Agriculture 
DGVII       Transport 
DGVIII      Development 
DGIX        Personnel and Administration   
DGX         Information, Communication, Culture, Audio-visual 
DGXI        Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection  
DGXII       Science, Research and Development 
DGXIII      Telecommunications, Information, Market and Exploitation of 
                 Research 
DGXIV      Fisheries 
DGXV       Internal Market and Financial Services 
DGXVI      Regional Policies and Cohesion 
DGXVII     Energy 
DGXIX      Budgets 
DGXX       Financial Control 
DGXXI      Customs and Indirect Taxation 
DGXXII     Education, Training and Youth 
DGXXIII    Enterprise Policy, Distributive Trades, Tourism and Cooperatives 
DGXXIV   Consumer Policy and Consumer Health Protection 
 
Secretariat-General of the Commission 
Inspector General 
Legal Service 
Spokesman’s Service 
Joint Interpreting and conference Service 
Statistical Officer 
Translation Service 
Joint Research Centre 
European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)  
Euratom Supply Agency 
Office for Official Publication of the European Communities 
  
 
Source: Cini and McGowan (1998) p46      Note: DGXVIII was disbanded in 1996. 
  
Exhibit 13   Objectives Associated With Competition Policies 
 
Consumer Welfare CC This is a technical function of competition 
policy which assumes a direct and formal 
relationship between the promotion of 
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competition and improved economic 
performance. T 
Protection of the Consumer This Involves the defence of the individual 
against big business, usually for moral or 
political reasons.  
Redistribution of Wealth  This is an attempt to inhibit a small number 
of firms from accumulating a large amount 
of wealth, an inherently political objective 
which implies that monopolies and cartels 
are undemocratic. 
Protection of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises 
This does not just imply the protection of 
infant industries, but also assumes that a 
large number of small firms in a market are 
in itself a good thing.  
Regional, social and 
Industrial Considerations 
These reflect the frequent use of 
competition policy as an instrument working 
for non-competition policy ends, such as 
the development of regions in decline, the 
reduction of unemployment or the 
attainment of a global presence in a 
particular sector.  
Market Integration This is a particularly European phenomen-
on in which competition policy is used to 
break down privately constructed barriers 
to trade between the EU member states, 
thus contributing to  the creation of a Single 
European Market (SEM). 
 
Source: The table constructed based on Cini and McGowan (1998) page 4 
 
 
 
Exhibit 14   Article 85[81] of the EEC Treaty on European Union 
 
 
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as 
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market, and in particular those which:  
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading  
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
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(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject  of such contracts. 
 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically 
void. 
  
3.The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
 
- any agreement or category of agreement between undertakings; 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings; 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; 
 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or   
promoting technical or economic progress while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertaking concerted restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question.  
  
 
Source: Cini and McGowan (1998) p61 
 
Exhibit 15   Article 86[82] of the EEC Treaty  
 
 
Any abuse by one or more understandings of a dominant position within the  
Common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.  
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of      consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transaction with other trading  parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other  parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject  of such contracts. 
 
 
Source: Cini and McGowan (1998) p82 
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 Source: www.euractiv.com “EU claims US aid to Boeing cost Airbus $27 billion.” Article #167126. 
5 Major consortium (international business agreement) states of Airbus: France, Germany and the UK. 
6
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That said, Boeing recognizes and continues to set out to achieve significantly improved 
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typically characterized by other leading American companies of today. They are quite different from typical US 
companies a few decades ago, champions of near-term success measured by the year-end income statement 
and balance sheet often at the expense of long-term corporate success. Just like lean principles, long-term 
corporate objectives rather than short-term ones had its roots in the Japanese management practice of 
achieving long-term goals instead of seeking the short-term success. Consequently, the US companies 
including Boeing recognized the value in the long-term success and found ways to emulate the successful 
Japanese management practice of long-term goals in the late 1980s and the 1990s. 
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